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Foreword from the Congress Chairs
For the Turing year 2012, AISB (The Society for the Study of Artificial Intel-
ligence and Simulation of Behaviour) and IACAP (The International Associa-
tion for Computing and Philosophy) merged their annual symposia/conferences
to form the AISB/IACAP World Congress. The congress took place 2–6 July
2012 at the University of Birmingham, UK.
The Congress was inspired by a desire to honour Alan Turing, and by the broad
and deep significance of Turing’s work to AI, the philosophical ramifications of
computing, and philosophy and computing more generally. The Congress was
one of the events forming the Alan Turing Year.
The Congress consisted mainly of a number of collocated Symposia on spe-
cific research areas, together with six invited Plenary Talks. All papers other than
the Plenaries were given within Symposia. This format is perfect for encouraging
new dialogue and collaboration both within and between research areas.
This volume forms the proceedings of one of the component symposia. We are
most grateful to the organizers of the Symposium for their hard work in creating it,
attracting papers, doing the necessary reviewing, defining an exciting programme
for the symposium, and compiling this volume. We also thank them for their
flexibility and patience concerning the complex matter of fitting all the symposia
and other events into the Congress week.
John Barnden (Computer Science, University of Birmingham)
Programme Co-Chair and AISB Vice-Chair
Anthony Beavers (University of Evansville, Indiana, USA)
Programme Co-Chair and IACAP President
Manfred Kerber (Computer Science, University of Birmingham)
Local Arrangements Chair
Foreword for The Machine Question
One of the enduring concerns of moral philosophy is deciding who or what is
deserving of ethical consideration. Although initially limited to “other men,” the
practice of ethics has developed in such a way that it continually challenges its
own restrictions and comes to encompass what had been previously excluded in-
dividuals and groups—foreigners, women, animals, and even the environment.
Currently, we stand on the verge of another, fundamental challenge to moral think-
ing. This challenge comes from the autonomous, intelligent machines of our own
making, and it puts in question many deep-seated assumptions about who or what
constitutes a moral subject. The way we address and respond to this challenge will
have a profound effect on how we understand ourselves, our place in the world,
and our responsibilities to the other entities encountered here.
We organised this symposium and the proceedings you find here because we
believe it is urgent that this new development in moral thinking be advanced in the
light and perspective of ethics/moral philosophy, a discipline that reflects thou-
sands of years of effort by our species’ civilisations. Fundamental philosophical
questions include:
• What kind of moral claim might an intelligent or autonomous machine
have?
• Is it possible for a machine to be a legitimate moral agent and/or moral
patient?
• What are the philosophical grounds supporting such a claim?
• And what would it mean to articulate and practice an ethics of this claim?
The Machine Question: AI, Ethics and Moral Responsibility seeks to address,
evaluate, and respond to these and related questions.
The Machine Question was one of three symposia in the Ethics, Morality, AI
and Mind track at the AISB / IACAP 2012 World Congress in honour of Alan Tur-
ing. The ethics track also included the symposia Moral Cognition and Theory of
Mind and Framework for Responsible Research and Innovation in Artificial Intel-
ligence. We would like to thank all of the contributors to this symposium, the other
symposia, the other symposia’s organisers and the Congress leaders, particularly
John Barnden for his seemingly tireless response to our many queries. We would
also like to thank the keynote speakers for the Ethics track, Susan and Michael
Anderson, whose talk The Relationship Between Intelligent, Autonomously Func-
tioning Machines and Ethics appeared during our symposium, for agreeing to
speak at the congress.
The story of this symposium started a little like the old Lorne Greene song
Ringo, except instead of anyone saving anyone’s life, Joanna Bryson loaned David
Gunkel a laundry token in July of 1986, about a month after both had graduated
with first degrees in the liberal arts and independently moved in to The Grandeur,
a cheap apartment building on Chicago’s north side. Two decades later they dis-
covered themselves on the opposite sides of not the law, but rather the AI-as-
Moral-Subject debate, when Gunkel contacted Bryson about a chapter in his book
Thinking Otherwise. The climactic shoot-out took place not between two isolated
people, but with the wise advice and able assistance of our third co-editor Steve
Torrance, who brought our symposium the experience of running many previous
AISB symposia, and between a cadre of scholars who took time to submit to, re-
vise for and participate in this symposium. We thank every one of them for their
contributions and participation, and you for reading this proceedings.
David J. Gunkel (Department of Communication, Northern Illinois University)
Joanna J. Bryson (Department of Computer Science, University of Bath)
Steve Torrance (Department of Computer Science, University of Sussex)
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Moral Agency, Moral Responsibility, and Artefacts:
What Existing Artefacts Fail to Achieve (and Why), and
Why They, Nevertheless, Can (and Do!) Make Moral
Claims Upon Us
Joel Parthemore1and Blay Whitby2
Abstract. This paper follows directly from our forthcoming pa-
per in International Journal of Machine Consciousness,where we
discuss the requirements for an artefact to be a moral agent and con-
clude that the artefactual question is ultimately a red herring. As we
did in the earlier paper, we take moral agency to be that conditi in
which an agent can, appropriately, be held responsible for her actions
and their consequences. We set a number of stringent conditis on
moral agency. A moral agent must be embedded in a cultural and
specifically moral context, and embodied in a suitable physical form.
It must be, in some substantive sense, alive. It must exhibitself-
conscious awareness:who does the “I” who thinks “I” think that
“I” is ? It must exhibit a range of highly sophisticated conceptual
abilities, going well beyond what the likely majority of conceptual
agents possess: not least that it must possess a well-develop dm ral
spaceof reasons. Finally, it must be able to communicate its moral
agency through some system ofsigns:a “private” moral world is not
enough. After reviewing these conditions and pouring cold water on
a number of recent claims for having achieved “minimal” machine
consciousness, we turn our attention to a number of existingand, in
some cases, commonplace artefacts that lack moral agency yet nev-
ertheless require one to take a moral stance toward them,as if they
were moral agents. Finally, we address another class of agents raising
a related set of issues: autonomous military robots.
1 INTRODUCTION
As a moral community, humans do often concede that other
creatures have some level of ethical status, and they do so (at
least in part) because of their possession of cognitive and phe-
nomenological capacities in varying degrees [47].
In talking of ethical status,Steve Torrance’s concern includes
(though is not limited to) what we are calling moral agency. He ex-
plicitly intends to include artefacts. It follows: what “cognitive and
phenomenological capacities” are required?
For our purposes, amoral agentis an agent whom one appropri-
ately holds responsible for its actions and their consequences, and
moral agencyis the distinct type of agency that agent possesses.
Contra the usage of someone like Wendell Wallach [49], it is not
1 Centre for Cognitive Semiotics, University of Lund, Sweden; email:
joel.parthemore@semiotik.lu.se.
2 Centre for Research in Cognitive Sciences, University of Sussex, UK;
email: blayw@sussex.ac.uk.
enough on our usage that an agent does the appropriate things: i.e.,
produces the correct consequences. It must do so for the appropriate
reasons and using the appropriate means. Otherwise, it may be ppro-
priate – even morally required in some circumstances (see Section 5)
– to treat the agent, at least to some limited extent,as if it were a
moral agent / possessed moral agency; nevertheless, that agent will
not be a moral agent. This alignment of motivations, means, and con-
sequences for attributing moral agency matches an alignment of mo-
tivations, means, and consequences we see (pacethe utilitarians and
most other consequentialists) as essential to “doing the morally right
thing”– though any further discussion of that last point is necessarily
beyond the scope of this paper.
In [28], we set out a number of conceptual requirements for pos-
sessing moral agency as well as grounds for appropriately attributing
it, as a way of addressing the claims and counterclaims over s-called
artificial morality and machine consciousness. Our conclusion was
that concerns over artefactual moral agency and consciousness were
useful for initiating discussion but ultimately a distraction from the
bigger question of what it takes foranyagent to be a conscious moral
agent.
Section Two summarizes the requirements forp ssessingmoral
agency and the requirements forattributing it appropriately. Section
Three summarizes our proposal from [28] for operationalizing those
requirements and “mapping out” the moral space, as an alterntive
to any litmus test for moral agency, such as the Moral Turing Test
proposed by Allen and colleagues [2]. Section Four introduces, and
debunks, a number of recent claims for having achieved “minial”
machine consciousness (since consciousness is one of our requi e-
ments for possessing moral agency). Sections Five and Six introduce
two groups of existing artefacts that, we believe, raise important con-
cerns relating to moral agency: one that peopleshouldtake a moral
stance toward (even though they often do not!), and one that they
should not(even though they often do!). Section Seven summarizes
the take-home message.
2 THE REQUIREMENTS OF MORAL AGENCY
The Semiotic Hierarchy. . . distinguishes between four ma-
jor levels in the organization of meaning:life, consciousness,
sign function, andlanguage, where each of these, in this order,
both rests on the previous level, and makes possible the attain-
ment of the next [56, p. 169].
Moral agency depends, at its foundations, onmoral meaning: hold-
ing an agent to account for her actions assumes that those actions
are morally meaningful both to the agent and her community ofob-
servers. Moral meaning is one instance of a much broader notion
of meaning, which is characterized by the salience-laden interaction
between agent(s) and environment (cf. [55, p. 258]).
In setting out the requirements of moral agency, this paper pro-
poses a nested succession of dependencies very much like Jordan
Zlatev’s semiotic hierarchy[56, 55], with a few additional steps.
In establishing life (Section 2.2) as the foundation for meaning,
Zlatev assumes as prerequisites bothembeddednessandembodiment
(Section 2.1). We choose to spell that out. Meanwhile, for our pur-
poses we need to distinguish different levels of consciousnes : non-
reflective from pre-reflective from “full” self-conscious aw reness;
where all levels of consciousness presupposeconceptually structured
thought, and conceptually structured thought presupposes conscious-
ness. This allows us to discuss concepts where Zlatev talks of con-
sciousness (Section 2.3), with full self-consciousness asa distinct
level that transforms and extends conceptual abilities (Section 2.4).
Finally, while Zlatev places language at the top of his hierarchy, we
are able to stop at the sign function (Section 2.5), because,although
the moral agent must be able to communicate evidence of her moral
agency, she need not necessarily do so through language.
2.1 The moral agent must be embedded and
embodied.
There is no brain in a vat – to make reference to Hilary Putnam’s
classic thought experiment [31] – and there is no moral agentin a
moral vacuum. Moral agency depends, critically, on the exist nce of
other moral agents and a shared space of moral reasoning in which
it is embedded. Even if some part of it is, in some sense, private to
the individual, some other part is intrinsically a part ofs cialcogni-
tion: indeed, the kind of social cognition that Pierre Steiner and John
Stewart have identified [44]3 asnot beginning with or reducing to an
agglomeration of individuals but social from the beginning.
Moral agents are not justembeddedin the right kind of physical
and cultural environment; they areembodiedin a suitable physical
form that allows them to carry out the actions for which one holds
them accountable and give evidence forwhy one should hold them
accountable. When Peter Gärdenfors defines embodied meaning by
writing that “meaning is not independent of perception or ofb dily
experience” [16, p. 160], he clearly means to include moral meaning.
In the spirit of the enactivist philosophers, we would like to go
beyond embeddedness and embodiment by stressing the continuity
between the moral agent and her moral environment4: between her
personal moral space and the shared moral space in which she moves.
To paraphrase Evan Thompson: “the roots of moral life lie notsimply
in the brain, but ramify through the body and environment” (cf. [45,
p. ix]). To steal a line from Putnam, “morality ain’t (just) in the head”
(cf. [30, p. 227]).
2.2 The moral agent must be alive.
. . .All living systems and only living systems are capable of
meaning.This is so because life implies the presence of intrin-
sic value, which constitutes the necessary and sufficient condi-
tion for meaning [55, p. 256].
3 For a similar view, see [18].
4 Cf. the discussion in [26, p. 89].
. . . One needs a clear way of characterizing what distin-
guishes living systems from nonliving ones. Such a charactei-
zation could. . . serve as a standard or criterion for recognizing
life elsewhere on other planets, or for determining whetherany-
thing we might someday synthesize artificially would qualify as
living [45, p. 95].
Moral agency presupposes a number of things that are not, directly,
part of its definition. Drawing inspiration from the work of Francesco
Varela and Humberto Maturana [22] and Evan Thompson, and even
more directly from Zlatev’s semiotic hierarchy, we claim that a moral
agent must necessarily be alive, by some definition of “life”– even
though, for our purposes, the agent need be neither conventionally
biologically formulated nor naturally evolved. Indeed, although his-
tory is critical for all manner of practical reasons, the agent could – at
least in principle – have a highly non-standard history as e.g. Swamp
Man (a position that Zlatev explicitly rejects in [54] and even more
strongly in [56]).Autopoiesis– intended, at least in its origins, as ex-
pressing both thenecessaryandsufficientconditions for life – offers
a convenient way out of any overly narrow biological perspectiv as
e.g. John Searle [39] might be accused of.
Maturana and Varela define an autopoietic system as a type of
homeostatic machine; specifically:
. . . A machine organized (defined as a unity) as a network
of processes of production (transformation and destruction) of
components that produces the components which: (i) through
their interactions and transformations continuously regen rate
and realize the network of processes (relations) that produced
them; and (ii) constitute it (the machine) as a concrete unity i
the space in which they (the components) exist by specifying
the topological domain of its realization as a network [21, pp.
78-79].
In their choice of terminology, Maturana and Varela quite deliber-
ately want to avoid prejudicing matters toward those livingsystems
we happen currently to be familiar with, all of which are based
on DNA, organized into cells either with (eukaryotic) or without
(prokaryotic) nuclei, reproduce either sexually or asexually, and so
on. Both allopoietic artefacts andautopoietic organisms are ma-
chines: by which Maturana and Varela mean that they are defined by
their abstract organization, not by their concrete physical realization.
“. . . The organization of a machine is independent of the properties
of its components which can be any, and a given machine can be
realized in many different manners by many different kinds of com-
ponents” [21, p. 77].
Autopoietic systems define their own (selectively permeabl)
boundary; allopoietic systems have their boundary set for them by
some observer5. Autopoietic systems areorganizationally closed:
i.e., they arefar-from-equilibriumsystems whose structure is deter-
mined and maintained solely by processes located within thesys-
tem; allopoietic systems are organizationally open. Autopoietic sys-
tems are autonomous in a strong sense: they are “continuallyself-
producing” [22, p. 43] and adaptive [13]; allopoietic systems give at
most the appearance of autonomy (see Section 6).
5 The distinction here is actually quite subtle: for both types of system, the
boundary can only beidentifiedby an observer (see e.g. [20, p.30] for why
the observer is indispensable); and for both, the boundary masks an un-
derlying continuity: i.e., bothautopoieticandallopoietic systems exist –
or can be viewed – as parts of largerallopoietic systems that are, in some
substantive sense, primary.
2.3 The moral agent must be a sophisticated
conceptual agent.
On our view, concepts and consciousness are two sides of one coi :
no concepts without (some level of) consciousness; no consciousness
without (some level of) conceptually structured thought. However
precisely one defines consciousness, there is an implicit assumption
that conscious thought is systematically, productively6, and compo-
sitionally structured7, and under the agent’sendogenous control[29,
p. 197].
Likewise, concepts and conceptual abilities are two sides of a c in,
depending on whether one’s attention is more onknowing thator
knowing how[37]. To say that an agent possesses and successfully
employs certain concepts is to say that that agent has certain corre-
sponding abilities; to say that an agent has certain conceptual abilities
is to say that that agent possesses and successfully employscertain
concepts. Note that, depending on the level of its conceptual abilities,
a given conceptual agent may or may not make such a distinction it-
self. Some conceptual agents’ conceptual abilities will bemore on
theknowing howside of the ledger, with little if any reflective aware-
ness of those abilities. (That is to say, theknowing thatside of the
ledger may only be evident to observers.) On the other hand, human
beings, as sophisticated conceptual agents, can – and, we believe,
cannot help but – make the distinction.
Finally, for our purposes, and following directly from thetheory of
conceptsunderlying our discussions – theunified conceptual space
theorydiscussed in [27, 25, 28] –types(abstract) andtokens(con-
crete) are two sides of a coin: every type is a specific token ofsome
more general type, and every token can (within the limits of acon-
ceptual agent’s conceptual abilities) be the type for some yet more
specific tokenings. Meanwhile, concepts bothabstract awayfrom
the particulars of any given context and yet arelways applied in
a specific context.
Moral agents, as a sub-category of conceptual agents, must pos-
sess a number of concepts / conceptual abilities that go wellbeyond
what the vast majority of conceptual agents likely possess –at least
if one is inclined, as we are, to extend conceptual abilitiesto a num-
ber of non-human species (see e.g. [1, 24]). Most importantly, she
must possess aconcept of morality as both type and token: both
a general category within its conceptual knowledge, constituting a
moral space of reasoning, and a specific instance of more founda-
tional intersubjective understanding; both a general guide to how to
be a moral agent and a specific guide on how to act in any given
circumstances; both a set of abstract principles and a set ofconcrete
percepts (“thou shalt not kill” ).
The moral agent must possess anexplicit concept of morality:
what it means, to her, to be a moral agent; and anexplicit concept
of self : who and what she thinks she is (see Section 2.4). She must
also – and probably most controversially – possess an at least implicit
concept of concept itself.
Care must be taken here: after all, many people have only a vague
explicit understanding of what a concept or notion or idea is. The
point is that a moral agent must be able to refocus her attention from
the usual objects of her thoughts to the thoughts themselves. She
must be able to reflect on the rightness and wrongness of her thoughts
and deeds. To do this, she must be sensitive to – implicitly aware of –
the systematically, productively, compositionally, etc.structured na-
6 Systematicityandproductivityare covered under Gareth Evans’ Generality
Constraint: [14, pp. 100-104].
7 “Concepts are the constituents of thoughts and, in indefinitly many cases,
of one another” [15, p. 25].
ture of her thoughts, all of which are prerequisite to any impl cit un-
derstanding of the systematicity, productivity, compositi nality, etc.,
of hermoral thoughts. She must have a practical,knowing-how-type
understanding of the connection betweendoingx is wronganddoing
y is wrong, wherex ⊂ y; or betweeny doing x to me is wrongand
my doingx to y is wrong. She must be able to proceed, by induction,
from doing w is wrong, doingx is wrong,anddoing y is wrong to
doingZ is wrong,wherew, x, y ⊂ Z.
2.4 The moral agent must be actively self-aware.
The most obvious self consciousness isn’t just conscious-
ness, it’s consciousness of the self, something that obviously
requires a capacity for consciousnessand a concept of self [9,
p. 17].
Key to any conceptual agent’s conceptual abilities – we believ – is
an at least implicit concept of self. In the simplest case, this can be
no more than what Zlatev [54, p. 173], following Ulric Neisser [23],
calls theecological self: an “initial self-awareness”, which “acts here
and now. . . but remains unreflected upon”; or what Antonio Damasio
[10] terms thecore self.The concept of self is like and yet different
from all the other concepts a conceptual agent possesses, inthat this
concept applies to the agent herself: it is intimately and uniquely
self-referential. This special status gives it a certain prority – even,
perhaps, a kind of authority – over all the agent’s other concepts.
Call it the keystone: the concept that allows all the other concepts to
function as they do.
The moral agent must possess a concept of self on a whole other
level: not just an implicit concept of self as a whole, with norequired
distinction of mind or body, but an explicit concept ofself-as-myself,
as an intentional and distinctively cognitive entity. One cannot hold
an agent morally responsible for her actions if she has no concept
thatsheis (or could be) the one responsible for the actions and their
consequences – and not the person over there. She must be ableto
hold herself responsible: and that she cannot do without full self-
conscious awareness. She must, so to speak, be able to recognize
herself in a mental mirror.
2.5 The moral agent must be a sign consumer and
producer.
. . . Cultural categories involve the ability to use and inter-
pret conventional signs, in the semiotic sense of the word,
where a relatively concrete expression (e.g., a handshake,a ges-
ture, a word)representsa relatively less concrete concept (e.g.,
friendship) for the members of a community [55, p. 259].
Finally, an agent cannot be held morally responsible unlessshe is
able to communicate evidence for her moral responsibility through
some conventionalized channel. She need not be a linguisticagent
(the peak of Zlatev’s semiotic hierarchy), but she must posses – and
be able to use appropriately – thesign function, just below language
in the hierarchy. She must be able to communicate through e.g. g s-
tures or pictures, if not language.
We intendsignas it is used in semiotics, but care must be taken,
assign is used by different people – and, sometimes (thinking here
of the early versus the late Charles Sanders Peirce) the samepeople
– in broader or narrower ways. So e.g. we intendsign in the present
context in a narrower way than Sara Lenninger, who, echoing Fer-
dinand de Saussure’s expression/content distinction [11], describes
sign meanings as:
. . . Both relational and functional: in particular, signs al-
ways imply relations between expression and content for an
interpreting subject. This is to say that signs involve something
that is “given” to someone (thexpression); and, further, that
this “given” meaning directs attention to something else: i. .,
thecontent[19, p. 1].
Lenninger is a student of Göran Sonesson and follows him in tak g a
sign to “involve a subject differentiating between expression and con-
tent, where the relations between expression and content arasym-
metric” [19, p. 17] (cf. [43, pp. 59, 83]). Thisexplicit differentiation
between expression and content marks out something narrower than
our conception of concepts, which requires only animplicit differen-
tiation of form from content8: e.g, on Sonesson’s account, a mirror is
(or rather, can be, in the appropriate circumstances) a sign[42]; at the
same time, it is (intentionally) broader than that of conventionalized
signs – Zlatev’s target in [55], and ours here – which assume,in their
basis, an intent to communicate between members of a community.
In [19], Lenninger examines the development of thesign function
(her focus is on thepicture sign) – in young children. This is signif-
icant because, in determining whether a prospective moral agentis a
sign producer and consumer, in our terms, one will, doubtless, want
to look at how its use of the sign function develops; even thoug ,
echoing what we said earlier, a nonstandard developmental process
should not, of itself, rule out the possibility of moral agency.
3 MAPPING OUT THE MORAL SPACE
. . . I argue that conceptual spaces present an excellent
framework for “reifying” the invariances in our perceptions that
correspond to assigning properties to perceived objects [16, p.
59]
By perceptions, Gärdenfors means to include not only direct sensory
perceptions but such abstract entities as moral perceptions. By ob-
jects, he means to include not just concrete physical objects but such
highly abstract objects as morals. His conceptual spaces theory, and
the unified conceptual space extensions to it, will provide auseful
tool to mapping out an agent’s moral territory. First, however, it is
necessary to say something about what the requirements on moral
agency presented in Section 2 mean.
3.1 Understanding what the requirements mean
To playfully paraphrase Albert Newen and Andreas Bartels (who
were, after all, writing about non-human animal concepts and not
about moral agency!), an agent, in order appropriately to beattributed
moral agency, must, minimally:
• Demonstrate an ability to derive general moral principles from
specific moral applications, andvice versa;
• Demonstrate a flexible pattern of behaviour based on this ability,
especially when confronted with novel situations; and
• Demonstrate surprise or frustration on having her moral expecta-
tions violated [24, p. 291] (see also [1, p. 37]).
We believe that it is not possible for an agent to achieve thisunless
she meets the conditions from Section 2: i.e., unless she is embed-
ded/embodied, alive, a conceptual agent, a self-consciously aware
8 . . . That is to say, it marks out a higher level of cognitive development or
abilities than what we take to be the minimum requirements ofconceptual
agency.
agent, and a user of signs. Note that these properties are notintended
to determine whether a given agent is or is not a moral agent; they are
rather meant to set the minimal foundations from which one should
start looking for moral agency. To put this more strongly: they are
meant to be descriptive rather than stipulative: i.e., we are not saying
that by definitionan agent must be embedded and embodied in or-
der to qualify as a moral agent; rather, the onus is on the resea ch r
whose purportive moral agent isnot embedded or embodied – or not
embedded and embodied in the appropriately physical way – toex-
plain why that agent should still be taken as a moral agent.
So, for example, one might claim that a certainvirtual agent, exist-
ing in some computer simulation, is a moral agent. One might note,
further, that virtual agentsare embedded in a (virtual) environment
and embodied in a certain (weak) sense. Here, we would simplyre-
mind the reader of Zlatev’s [55] moral that a model of something –
such as a conscious agent (his focus) or a moral agent (ours) –is not
the same as, and should not be confused with, the thing itself(s e
Section 4).
Likewise, we are not stipulating that life, as we know it, andmoral
agency, as we know it,cannotcome apart – only that the researcher
who acknowledges that her artefact isnotalive must justify why, nev-
ertheless, one should ascribe that artefact moral agency and not take
her language to be loosely metaphorical. So it goes for conceptual
abilities (why should one hold responsible an agent who e.g.has no
concept of moral right and wrong?), self-conscious awareness (how
can one hold responsible an agent who has no explicit awareness of
itself as the agent responsible for its actions?), and sign use (what
does it mean to be a moral agent in the absence of any ability to
communicate that agency?).
Neither are we claiming that the five conditions of Section 2 are
sufficient –only that they are (we believe)necessary. In particular,
they are not sufficient because they remain – for all of our attention to
detail – abstract. It is one thing to set out the appropriate grounds for
attributing moral agency; it is quite another thing to operationalize
such highly theoretical methodology. Conceptual spaces thory and
the unified conceptual space theory provide the tools to do sowhile
deliberately avoiding any kind of moral agency litmus test.
3.2 Operationalizing the requirements
One way to go about operationalizing these requirements would be
with something like Allen and colleagues’ moral Turing test(MTT)
[2], intended as a litmus test for moral agency:eitherthe agent passes
it, or it does not. For the kind of moral agency Allen and colleagues
have in mind – which, unlike our approach, is more focused on the
results of actions, with less attention to the means and methods of
getting there – such an approach may have merits.
That said, one should be wary, especially given the deliberate con-
nection to Alan Turing and his imitation game [48]. Despite th
widespread tendency to turn the so-called Turing test into aopera-
tional test of “true” (and not just simulated!) intelligence, we think it
quite clear, if one goes back to Turing’s paper, that this isnotwhat he
had in mind. “The contrivance of the imitation game. . . was intended
to show the importance of human attitudes, not to be an operational
definition of intelligence” [51, p. 62]: to wit, the imitation game was
a thought experimentto encourage Turing’s readers tothink about
thinking and to suggest, modestly, thatowpeople think about think-
ing can evolve. It’s worth noting, too, that Turing’s requirements for
an artefactual agent “winning” the imitation game are very modest
(albeit not yet quite met, even after 62 years!): “I believe that in
about fifty years’ time it will be possible to programme computers. . .
to make them play the imitation game so well that an average in-
terrogator will not have more than 70 percent chance of making the
right identification after five minutes of questioning” [48,p. 442].
His claim – two sentences later – that “. . . at the end of the century
the use of words and general educated opinion will have altered so
much that one will be able to speak of machines thinking withou
expecting to be contradicted” has, indeed, been proven corre t.
In contrast to Allen and colleagues, our own usage ofmoral
agencyis to refer specifically to the conditions under which it is ap-
propriate to hold a given agent morally responsible: in which case,
a litmus test for moral agency would be, we believe, grossly uneth-
ical (as, for that matter, would a litmus test for self-conscious intel-
ligence) – allowing far too many unwarranted conclusions and con-
sequences from a simple failure to pass the test. Note that nosuch
generaltests for moral agency (or self-conscious intelligence) exist
for humans – or, so far as we are aware, have ever seriously been
proposed.
Instead, in [28], we propose a way – not of ruling putative moral
agents “in” or “out” – but rather mapping and exploring the putative
moral agent’smoral space,using the theoretical tools ofconceptual
spaces theory[16] and the theoretical and software-based tools of the
unified conceptual space theory[25]. Conceptual spaces theory is a
similarity-space-based theory of concepts in the tradition of Eleanor
Rosch’s work on prototypes [36, 35]; the language of geometry: in-
dividual conceptual spaces are realized asVoronoi tessellations; and
the spirit of philosophical empiricism. Any given conceptual space is
defined by itsintegral dimensions: no one dimension can be specified
without a logical mandate to specify the others; and a predetermined
metric for those dimensions. Gärdenfors’ example of choiceis the
colour spindle, with its integral dimensions of hue, saturation, and
brightness (see Figure 1).
Figure 1. The colour spindle. (Photo downloaded from Wikimedia
Commons: http://commons.wikimedia.org/.)
The unified conceptual space theory, first introduced in [27], is
a set of extensions to conceptual spaces theory attempting to push
it in a more algorithmically amenable and empirically testable di-
rection, while explaining how all of a conceptual agent’s many dif-
ferent conceptual spaces – ofTONE (another of Gärdenfors’ choice
examples, and an instance, likeCOLOUR, of a property concept), of
TREESandDEMOCRACY (instances of concrete and abstractobject
concepts, respectively), ofTO THROW and TO BELIEVE (instances
of concrete and abstractaction concepts, respectively), and so on –
come together in a unifiedspace of spaces: a divergent space defined
by the integral dimensions oraxescommon toall concepts. These
are the axes ofgeneralization(arranged from maximally general to
maximally specific),abstraction(arranged from maximally concrete
and “lower order” to maximally abstract and “higher order”), andal-
ternatives(see Figure 2). The axis of alternatives is determined by
selecting one or more integral dimensions and then incrementing or
decrementing their value9. Meanwhile, one can toggle between two,
contrasting views on concepts: asthings(relatively stable and even
fixed: prototypically noun-like) orprocesses(relatively dynamic and
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Figure 2. The three dimensions of the unified space, and an illustration of
the concept ofLIE.
The unified conceptual space theory comes with a software im-
plementation: a fairly direct translation of the theory into concrete
visualization in the form of a mind-mapping program, a tool for help-
ing users externalize and visualize their understanding ofsome con-
ceptual sub-domain on the justification that what is externalized is
thereby made explicit; what is made explicit is easier to scrutinize;
what is easier to scrutinize isceteris paribuseasier to modify. The
visual interface is strikingly different from existing mind-mapping
programs and, in sharp contrast to their reliance on a vaguely de-
fined theory of cognition10, implements a specific theory of concepts
– which it can, we believe, be used to test empirically.
We will not recapitulate here the discussion from [28] of howt
use the software implementation to model and explore an agent’s
moral space. Instead, it will be useful to describe one concept, LIE,
as it might be modeled in the unified conceptual space theory,using
the software implementation.
L IE can be viewedeither as an abstract objector as an abstract
action (see Figure 2). LIE is a type ofMORAL ACTION which is,
ultimately, a type ofCONCEPT. Going the other direction along the
9 Since, for most concepts, one can choose different subsets of integral di-
mensions, this means that theaxis of alternativesdiverges into different
“parallel” spaces.
10 The theoretical underpinnings of the commercial and freelyavailable soft-
ware are essentially identical. They differ in cosmetic aspects of user inter-
face.
axis of generality, more specific types of lie includeCHEATING ON
YOUR TAXES or, even more specifically,CHEATING ON YOUR 2012
INCOME TAXES.
Going one direction along the axis of abstraction, a higher-order
LIE would beLIE TO COVER A LIE or evenLIE ABOUT A LIE . Going
the other direction, a more concrete / less abstract versionof some-
thing like LIE would be aMASK that presents a “false face”.
Finally, LIE/LYING has certain integral dimensions, including
choice of words and the degree to which salient facts are leftout
or false information is included. Varying these latter two dimensions
produces what Sisela Bok has termedlies of omissionand lies of
comission[7].
Movement along any of these three axes represent relations of con-
tiguity. There is a further and contrasting way of specifying concepts:
in terms of distal (non-contiguous) relations, within the unified space,
to a given concept’scomponents(based on part/whole relations),pa-
rameters(i.e., integral dimensions), andcontextuals(commonly as-
sociated but non-integral dimensions). Unfortunately, itis not possi-
ble to go into the details here. Meanwhile, a screenshot of how lie
might look in the software implementation is shown in Figure3.
Figure 3. The concept lie as it might be “drawn” within a larger moral
space, using the software implementation.
4 INFLATED CLAIMS OF “MINIMAL”
CONSCIOUSNESS
This value system must beintrinsic to the system in the
sense that it serves to preserve the system’sorganization, rather
than criteria which are external to the system (defined by the
system’s designers) [55, p. 282].
We agree fully and enthusiastically with Zlatev’s claim that, to talk
of an agent engaging with meaning – including, for our purposes,
moral meaning – that meaningmustbe meaning for the agent her-
self, determined by the agent, and not by any external authority; and
that the ultimate grounding of meaning lies in organizational (self-
)preservation. Remember his warning that one should not confuse or
conflate the model with the thing being modeled.
Given that we have clearly set out consciousness (indeed, self-
consciousness) as a prerequisite for moral agency, it will be enlight-
ening to have a look at the current state of claims in the machine
consciousness community. If one were to go by oral claims – a recent
conference on machine consciousness comes to mind – one might be
tempted to think that a majority of researchers thought their cr ations
to have achieved at least a state of “minimal” consciousness. Un ur-
prisingly, the same researchers are often far more reticentn writing.
Nonetheless, they may be inclined toward either one of two moves
that concern us here.
First, they may be inclined to reduce consciousness tox, where
x might be any of Daniel Dennett’smultiple drafts [12], Guilio
Tononi’s information integration [46, 6], Bernard Baar’sglobal
workspace[4, 3], or LIDA (a specific implementation of global
workspace theory) [5, 33] – to name just a few popular choices.
Tononi’s information-integration measureφ is particularly popular
because it offers a precise numerical value of an agent’s stae of con-
sciousness. As Torrance (among others) notes, “Tononi is explicit
that artificial systems can haveφ measures in the way as biological
organisms can” [47, p. 70]; and so existing artefacts can be ranked
according to theirφ value.
Second, there is a seeming tendency to be ambivalent whether
terms like consciousness, autonomy, self, self concept,and so on
are intended more literally or more metaphorically, more strongly
or more weakly: more as reality or more as “model of”. Note that
none of the machine consciousness researchers we are aware of cl im
that their creations are, in any substantive sense, alive – something
we have set as a precondition for consciousness (and so for moral
agency).
The stated intentions of many machine consciousness researchers
is, clearly, to implement consciousness in a strong sense. So, for
example, Klaus Raizer and colleagues, drawing on Baar’s global
workspace theory, write, “our main goal is to develop artificial rea-
tures with different levels of machine consciousness” [32,p. 43];
while Ricardo Sanz and colleagues write “Sloman. . . recognises that
“perhaps one day. . . it will prove possible to model the totality [of
consciousness]in a single working system”. . . this is, boldly, what
we try to do inside our long term ASys research program” [38, p. 55].
Some machine consciousness researchers reallydo seem to be-
lieve that their creations have achieved some level of (actual) con-
sciousness. We in no way mean to be pointing fingers, despite our
resistance to such claims – only offering an illustrative example of
researchers willing to stick their necks out. So for example, Uma Ra-
mamurthy and Stan Franklin write that “the LIDA model is botha
conceptual and a computational model implementing and fleshing
out a major portion of Global Workspace Theory”; “. . . core con-
sciousness is continually regenerated in a series of pulses(LIDA’s
cognitive cycles. . . ), which blend together to give rise to acontinu-
ous stream of consciousness” [34, p. 51]. They continue:
LIDA’s processing can be viewed as consisting of a con-
tinual iteration of Cognitive Cycles. . . . Each cycle constitutes
units of understanding, attending and acting. During each cog-
nitive cycle a LIDA-based agent first makes sense of its current
situation as best as it can by updating its representation ofits
world, both external and internal. By a competitive process, a
specified by the Global Workspace Theory, it then decides what
portion of the represented situation is most in need of attention.
Broadcasting this portion, the current contents of conscious-
ness, enables the agent to finally choose an appropriate action
which it then executes. Thus, the LIDA cognitive cycle can be
subdivided into three phases,the understanding phase, the con-
sciousness phase,andthe action selection phase [34, p. 52].
LIDA may not be self-consciously aware, but it is clearly meant to
be close. “Action that is taken volitionally, that is, as theresult of
conscious deliberation, is an instance of the action by the Volitional
Self. Deliberate actions occur in LIDA and are represented as behav-
ior streams. Thus LIDA has a volitional self” [34, p. 52]. “Anau-
tonomous agent/cognitive robot based on the LIDA model thatalso
has a self system might be suspected of being close to subjectively
conscious. . . ” [34, p. 53].
Is LIDA – or a LIDA-based system – conscious or even self-
conscious? We would ask: is it suitably embedded and embodied?
Is there reason to think it is alive and not just “alive”? Is itthe ap-
propriate sort of conceptual agent? For the moment, the answers to
these questions remain – to us, at least – unclear.
We have set a very high bar for attributingany degreeof moral
agency. We have concluded that no existing artefacts or simulations
of artefacts that we are aware of meet that standard. However, this is
not to say that there are not existing artefacts – some of themco -
monplace – which raise very real issues regarding moral responsibil-
ity. We discuss two such groups of artefacts: those we believe p ople
shouldtake a moral stance toward – by which we mean to treat, in
some limited way,as if they were moral agents – even though one
should logically conclude they are not; and those we believepeo-
ple should nottake a moral stance toward, despite what we see as a
strong (perhaps, to some extent, irresistible) urge to do so.
5 TAKING THE MORAL STANCE
Research shows that humans can sometimes become very
abusive towards computers and robots particularly when they
are seen as human-like. . . . Is it acceptable to treat artefacts –
particularly human-like artefacts – in ways that we would con-
sider it morally unacceptable to treat humans? Second, if so,
just how much sexual or violent “abuse” of an artificial agent
should we allow before we censure the behaviour of the abuser?
[52, p. 326]
Different artefacts impose different levels of moral responsibility to-
ward them. Adopting the moral stance with respect to a particular
artifact is a complex moral judgment. This judgment cannot simply
be determined by any claims to consciousness. The moral stance is
a moral stance and not a scientific stance. For this reason, wehold
that there are groups of artefacts that one morally ought to adopt the
moral stance towards and groups to which one ought not to adopt the
moral stance –- in spite of sometimes strong emotional responses to
the contrary.
We claim, for example, that it is immoral to kick one’s AIBO11
in ways that abusing one’s laptop is not: an issue explored atsome
length in [52] (see also the opening quote to this section). That is
because of the – albeit highly superficial – resemblance to agents
one normally does, and indeed should, take a moral stance toward.
Kicking one’s AIBO derives from the immorality of kicking a living
dog precisely because of the (we believe inevitable) way it reminds
people of “real” dogs. This is regardless of whether such behaviour
then predisposes people to abuse dogs in ways or to a degree they
would not have done so before: i.e., the act itself is intrinsically im-
moral, and any behavioural progression as from abusing AIBOs to
11 “AIBO” is the trademarked name of a robotic dog manufacturedby Sony
from 1999 until 2006. It stands forArtificial Intelligence rOBot.
abusing “real” dogs is irrelevant to our argument. Althoughpeople
do, indeed, “anthropomorphize” their laptops in various ways (“my
laptop ate my file!”), they do so to a far more limited extent, ifar
more constrained ways, precisely because of the lack of resemblance
to living agents.
Our moral stance supervenes on the moral resemblance of the
AIBO to a “real” dog. Let us clarifymoral resemblancein this con-
text. An artefact may resemble a morally significant naturalitem
along some combination of at least three distinct dimensions: physi-
cal appearance, behaviour, and the role in which it usually employed.
All three dimensions are important to the moral stance.
Physical resemblance is, in many ways, the morally least signifi-
cant dimension of resemblance. The AIBO has only the most super-
ficial physical resemblance to a dog. What makes the AIBO dog-like
is not its visual appearance. The AIBO resembles a dog more inits
(admittedly superficial) dog-like behaviours; and, most importantly,
in the dog-like roles it is marketed to fill –- particularly inits rela-
tionship to its owner. When someone kicks an AIBO, she is kick-
ing an artefact with which she or someone else might reasonably be
expected to have a relationship that resembles the relationship that
humans have with dogs. This is the main basis of our moral condem-
nation of the act.
There is overwhelming empirical evidence for automatic human
emotional responses along the dimensions outlined above. Even in
the case where there is no physical resemblance at all, behaviour l
resemblance is more than enough: witness the heartfelt conversations
people had with Eliza in the ’70s and the anger they expressedwh n
those “private” conversations were interrupted [50]. Similarly, the
work of Cynthia Brezeal and others on the Kismet robot shows that,
even when people know that certain tricks are being played tomake
them respond in a friendly way, they cannot help but respond emo-
tionally [8]. There is good reason to expect that humans will, in many
situations, respond to artefacts as if they were human or animal, even
without any obvious physical resemblance. This has alreadybeen
observed happening in the – seemingly unlikely – case of soldiers
bonding with military robots in combat situations [17].
6 ASSIGNING RESPONSIBILITY
Whether the machines of capable of learning while they are
acting has little impact on the consequences for human society
if we allow each other to displace our responsibility onto our
creations [9, p. 18].
Another class of artefacts raises a different and at least equally worry-
ing set of moral issues: so-called “autonomous” robots, particularly
as used by the major military powers on the battlefield. The use of
“autonomous” in the battlefield context is at best unclear; at worst,
it may be duplicitous. When philosophers write of autonomy,they
often implicitly assume that it includes something like ourrequire-
ments for moral agency: in particular, that the moral agent must be
a sophisticated conceptual agent (Section 2.3) and that it must be
self-aware (Section 2.4). By contrast, when robot builderstalk of au-
tonomy, they may mean nothing more than that there is no (or very
little) direct human control at that moment. These are quitediff rent
usages.
In any case, what matters here is not that the robots have any true
autonomy – in the sense of autonomy used by e.g. Varela and Matu-
rana, they do not – but that they give theappearancesof autonomy,
generating automatic emotional responses not so differentfrom peo-
ple’s automatic responses to Kismet. These robots do not resemble
humans or animals in the way that ASIMO or an AIBO does, and
so abusing them is, we believe, roughly morally equivalent to abus-
ing a laptop. The problem is the appearances of autonomy, andthe
way they muddy the waters when it comes to assigning responsibil-
ity. This is because of the difficulty of tracing a clear or direct line
from the actions of the morally responsible agent(s) to the actions of
the robot and the tendency to actas if the robot, itself, is morally
responsible.
Meanwhile, the language of autonomy has become widespread in
military robotics and signifies or reflects mainly a reduction in direct
human control. Current trends are towards reduced human partici-
pation: in the jargon, from “man in the loop” to “man on the loop”
[40, 41]. There are many motivations for this. Automated weapon
systems can often be cheaper and (by some measure) more reliable
than human warriors, even though it turns out that (for reasons not
yet fully understood) the post ofunmanned aerial vehicle(UAV) op-
erator or “drone pilot” is highly stressful and implicated in PTSD
among service people. That said, our immediate concern is how t e
allocation of moral responsibility is affected.
The choice of language, and, more importantly, the appearances
of autonomy, invite taking what we have termed themoral stanceto-
ward these battlefield robots – e.g., UAVs such as the Predator and
Reaper drones currently widely deployed by US and its allies– treat-
ing them as if they were (at least in some limited sense) suitable
candidates for moral agency and shoving some of the responsibil-
ity for “their” actions off onto them [40]. There is a wide range of
unmanned land vehicles (ULVs) in use as well. At least forty coun-
tries are engaged in developing robots for military purposes. A lack
of care in media reporting contributes to the problem. The wording
“killed by a drone” as opposed to “killed by a US soldier usinga
drone” may be journalistically preferable but is misleading.
If an “autonomous” battlefield robot malfunctions and killsa
dozen civilians, who is responsible? Clearly – appearancesto the
contrary – the robot is not. The tendency to act as if the robot, itself,
is morally responsible is seductive but dangerously wrong.Present
and immediately foreseeable robots simply do not have the sort of
decision-making machinery needed to make the moral stance appro-
priate. Indeed the whole debate has (perhaps conveniently)obscured
the chain of moral responsibility. The second author on thispaper
is presently tasked with preparing a policy document for theBritish
Computing Society, Chartered Institute for IT, condemningthe prac-
tice of using computers as an excuse for human failings [53].
Here, our solution is to resist, as strongly and explicitly as possi-
ble, the tendency to assign any moral agency whatsoever to the “au-
tonomous” robot and, meanwhile, be as explicit as possible (deally
in advance!) about the appropriate distribution of responsibility be-
tween robot operator, manufacturer, those giving the orders on the
battlefield, those giving the orders higher up the chain of command,
and other implicated parties. One must consciously acknowledge and
consciously oppose any impulse to assign even partial responsibility
to the robot or leave the distribution of responsibility unclear. In any
case, although – as should be clear by now – we consider an artifici l
moral agent to be conceivable and,prima facie,theoretically possi-
ble, the place to pursue actual artificial moral agency is noto he
battlefield, where the consequences of an irresponsible mistake are
much too high.
7 CONCLUSIONS
Moral agency requires much more of an agent than might, on first
blush, appear. Being in a position to be held accountable forone’s ac-
tions and their consequences requires far more than “doing the right
thing”. Drawing on Zlatev’s semiotic hierarchy, we conclude that a
moral agent must be, successively, embedded/embodied, alive so-
phisticated conceptual agent, self-consciously aware, and a sign con-
sumer/producer. Rejecting any litmus test for moral agency, such as
the Moral Turing Test [2], we present our requirements as descriptive
rather than stipulative, and describe how theoretical and software-
based tools from conceptual spaces theory and the unified concep-
tual space theory can be used to operationalize those requirements.
We discuss, and reject, claims that existing artefactual systems are, in
any useful sense, either conscious or self-conscious. We then look at
two groups of existing artefacts: one of which one should, webelieve,
take amoral stancetoward, even though they are not moral agents:
i.e., artefacts that visually or otherwise physically resemble agents
that are moral agents or that one would otherwise take a moralstance
toward; the other of which invites treatment as morally responsible
agents even while we think that any tendency to assign them degrees
of moral responsibility should be resisted in the strongestpossible
terms.
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Machines as Moral Patients We Shouldn’t Care 
About (Yet): The Interests and Welfare of 
Current Machines 
John Basl 
Abstract.    The creation of artificial consciousnesses raises a 
variety of philosophical challenges. From an ethical 
perspective, the creation of artificial consciousness raises 
serious issues as we develop consciousnesses that have the 
capacity for attitudes. However, current machines lack the 
capacities that would impose any moral restrictions on us. 
Until machines are developed that have a certain kind of 
consciousnesses, machines should not be considered moral 
patients.  
1   INTRODUCTION 
On any reasonable account of who or what is a moral patient 
– i.e., who or what has a welfare that we must consider in our 
moral deliberations – once we achieve artificial consciousness 
on par with our own – a consciousness with capacities like 
our own that experiences the world much like we do – we 
must recognize that consciousness as a moral patient; it will 
be due consideration for its own sake in virtue of the fact that 
it has interests similar to ours and because there will be little 
or no reason to discount those interests. 1 Indeed, it seems 
plausible that insofar as artificial consciousness approximates 
our own mental life, it will be due equal consideration 
whether that is understood in consequentialist, deontological, 
or other ways.2  
However, we are a long way from creating an artificial 
consciousness that is anything like our own, or, for that 
matter, perhaps from creating artificial consciousness unlike 
our own. Yet, as we create more and more complicated 
machines and attempt to create artificial consciousness, we 
must think carefully about which properties of a machine 
would confer interests or moral patiency. To fail to ask 
whether these intermediate entities have interests and whether 
they are due consideration may lead to inappropriate conduct 
on our part. After all, it is not only beings with a 
consciousness like ours that are moral patients; non-human 
animals are moral patients, and we owe it to them to take their 
interests into account in our moral deliberations. This is so 
even though their mental life may be radically different than 
our own. This forces us to determine (i) under what 
                                                                 
1 I talk in terms of consciousness rather than intelligence to avoid 
taking a stand on the relationship between the two. I assume 
instead that it is possible for a machine to be intelligent without it 
being conscious.  
2 What exactly that means for the treatment of such beings will be 
a function of their nature and our relationships to them, just as 
equal consideration of humans is sensitive to these factors.  
conditions machines have a welfare and (ii) whether and how 
to take that welfare into account. 
As difficult as it is to build an artificial consciousness, we 
also face great difficulties in answering the philosophical 
questions raised by the creation of such an entity. Above I 
raised both a metaphysical question (what properties of 
machines constitute their having a welfare or interests) and a 
normative question (how are we to take the welfare of 
artificial consciousness into account). There are also serious 
epistemic questions we must answer. How are we to know 
when a machine is conscious? What are the sources of 
evidence for consciousness? In what follows, I take up these 
challenges with a primary focus on the metaphysical and 
epistemological questions. In exploring these challenges, I 
hope to argue that current machines are not moral patients, or, 
more specifically, they are not moral patients for any practical 
purposes. In our ethical deliberations, we need not take the 
interests of (current) machines into account. 
In Section 2, I explain the concept of moral status and its 
relationship to the concept of welfare and interests. In Section 
3, I take up the metaphysical, epistemic, and normative issues 
concerning the moral status of artificial consciousness. I argue 
that in order for an entity to have what I will call conscious 
interests it must have the capacity for attitudes.3 Entities 
might be conscious even if they lack this capacity, but they 
will not have any interests in virtue of that consciousness. In 
Section 4, I argue that current machines are mere machines, 
machines that lack the capacity for attitudes. Despite the fact 
that current machines may have all sorts of capacities, we 
have no evidence whatsoever that they are conscious, let 
alone that they have attitudes regarding their conscious states. 
Even those skeptical of this conclusion, I argue, will have to 
agree that we have no evidence whatsoever what their 
attitudes are. Given this, for all practical purposes, any 
interests that these machines have are irrelevant to our moral 
deliberations. To deny this is to violate the principle that any 
obligations we have cannot outstrip what is possible given our 
limited capacities.  
I do not wish to argue that an entity has a welfare only in 
virtue of having conscious interests. Many environmental 
ethicists have argued that non-sentient organisms have 
interests in virtue of being goal-directed, or teleologically 
                                                                 
3 It seems plausible that both the capacity for desires and the 
capacity for preferences requires or is partly constituted by the 
capacity for attitudes. If this is false, then attitudes can be 
understood as “attitudes, preferences, or desires” throughout this 





organized systems. In Section 5 I explore the possibility that 
machines have what I’ll call teleo interests in virtue of their 
being teleologically organized. In Section 6, I will argue that 
even if mere machines have a welfare in virtue of having such 
interests, these interests are also practically irrelevant to our 
moral deliberations. Therefore, for all intents and purposes 
(current) machines are not moral patients, or, at least, they are 
moral patients that we need not care about.  
2   MORAL STATUS, INTERESTS, AND 
WELFARE 
Before turning to questions concerning the moral status of 
artificial consciousnesses, it is important to clarify how we are 
to understand terms such as ‘moral status’, ‘moral patient’, 
‘interest’, and ‘welfare.’ These terms have intuitive meanings 
and have a variety of technical meanings in the literature. In 
what follows, I will define the terms as they will be used 
below. 
To say that a being has moral status is to say that it is 
worthy of our consideration in moral deliberations. Given the 
breadth of this definition, it is obvious that the domain of 
things with moral status is quite large. For example, we often 
have to take artifacts into account in our moral deliberations 
because they are, for example, owned by others or are 
instrumental to our doing what’s morally required. For this 
reason, it is important to distinguish the different reasons why 
a thing might have moral status.  
One type of moral status is often referred to as moral 
considerability [1], [2] or as a being’s having inherent worth 
[3], [4]. To be morally considerable is to have a welfare 
composed of interests that are to be taken into account in 
moral deliberations for the sake of the individual whose 
welfare it is4. For example, any typical human being is 
morally considerable; we have interests in living a good life, 
in not being subject to violence, etc., and these interests are 
relevant to moral deliberations. When, for example, I want to 
acquire money, your interest in not being robbed should 
figure into my decisions about how I ought acquire money, 
and not just because you might put up a fight, but because of 
the impact on your welfare.5 In what follows, I will use the 
term moral patient to refer to any individual that is morally 
considerable. 
Finally it is important to be clear about the concept of an 
interest and the relationship between interests and an entity’s 
welfare.  As I will use the term an individual’s interests are 
those things the satisfaction of which contributes to its 
welfare. As I discuss below, there are various kinds or types 
of interests than an entity may have. Having an interest of any 
kind is sufficient for an entity’s having a welfare. 
                                                                 
4 We need not take all the interests of all who are morally 
considerable into account at all times. If a being is morally 
considerable then we ought to take its interests into account in 
contexts where we suspect there will be an appreciable impact on 
that being’s welfare. 
5 I remain neutral, as much as possible, on how interests are to be 
taken into account and weighed against one another. For example, 
what constitutes equal consideration of interests and what one’s 
various interests entitle one to will differ on Kantian or 
Consequentialist views. 
The relationship between welfare and interests is important 
because there is a long-standing debate about the nature of 
welfare. On some views, having a welfare requires that an 
entity be conscious [5–7]. If this is so, mere machines, 
machines that are not conscious, cannot be moral patients. 
However, on other views, Objective-List Views, 
consciousness is not always a necessary condition for having 
a welfare [8], [9]. There is not sufficient space available to 
adjudicate between these views. Instead, I will assume that an 
Objective-List View is true and explain how a mere machine 
might have interests on such a view.6  
We can distinguish psychological interests from teleo 
interests. A psychological interest is an interest that an entity 
has in virtue of certain psychological capacities (and 
psychological states). A teleo interest is an interest an entity 
has in virtue of being teleologically organized. In Section IV I 
explicate the notion of teleo interests and explain how it is 
that mere machines have such interests. In the following 
section I turn to the question of whether machines with 
consciousness are moral patients and in virtue of which 
psychological capacities they are so.  
3   MORAL PATIENCY AND ARTIFICAL 
CONSCIOUSNESSES 
3.1 The easy case: human-like consciousnesses  
Imagine that an artificial consciousness has been developed or 
come online. This consciousness is very much like ours. It has 
pleasant and painful experiences, it enjoys or suffers from 
certain experiences, it has the capacity for imagination, 
memory, critical thinking, and moral agency. We can even 
imagine that this consciousness is embodied and goes about 
the world like we do. I think it goes without saying that this 
artificial consciousness is a moral patient in the same way that 
we are. On any reasonable normative theory, theory of 
welfare, and theory of moral considerability, this being will 
be our moral equal. 
This is because reasonable theories of moral patiency are 
capacity-based; being a moral patient is a function of the 
capacities an entity has, not the type of being that it is. 
Furthermore, if two beings’ are equal in their capacities they 
are or should be considered equal with respect to moral 
considerability or their claim to being a moral patient.7 If 
tomorrow we cognitively enhanced a chimpanzee so that it 
was our equal in cognitive capacity, even the most adamant 
proponent of animal experimentation would have to recognize 
that this chimpanzee deserved protections equal to those 
afforded other human beings. It is difficult to see how being a 
member of a particular species or other kind is a morally 
                                                                 
6 On some particular Objective List Views having consciousness 
will be a necessary condition for having a welfare. On such views, 
access to the objective goods is only possible for conscious beings. 
Even on such views, an individual’s welfare will not depend soley 
on his or her particular mental states. 
7 This does not mean that there are no cases where we should favor 
one life over another. For example, if we must decide between 
saving the life of our own child and a stranger, we have good 
reason to save our child. However, this isn’t because our child is a 
more important moral patient. It has to do with the consequences, 





relevant feature of a being. After all, we have no trouble 
thinking of alien species that are otherwise like us as moral 
patients in the same way that we are, and yet they are not of 
the same species as us. 
For this reason, it seems entirely plausible that once there 
are artificial consciousnesses with capacities very much like 
ours, they will be moral patients, and these patients will be 
our moral equals. It will matter none at all whether these 
beings are silicone, steel, or purely digital. Our being made of 
squishy, biological material will not give us moral priority 
over such beings. 
3.2 The harder(er) case: animal- and other 
consciousnesses 
Questions surrounding the moral patiency of artificial 
consciousnesses would be very easily answered if we had 
reason to expect that all such consciousnesses would be very 
much like us. Unfortunately, there is a much higher 
probability that in our quest to create artificial consciousness, 
we will develop consciousnesses that are psychologically 
more like non-human animals or, that are, psychologically, 
radically different than anything that we know of  
(or perhaps even in existence). Given this fact, more must be 
said about (i) those capacities in particular that give rise to 
psychological interests and (ii) how psychological interests of 
different kinds and strength are to be taken into account in 
moral deliberations. 
 Since this paper is concerned with whether and 
under what conditions machines are moral patients, I will set 
(ii) aside. If it turns out that machines are moral patients, we 
will need to determine how their psychological interests are to 
be taken into account in moral deliberations just as we must 
determine how to weigh non-human animals interests against 
our own given that many such animals are moral patients. As 
is the case with deliberations concerning non-human animals, 
the appropriate response to these patients will depend on 
which normative theory is correct as well as other factors, 
issues that I cannot hope to settle here. 
To determine which conscious machines are moral patients 
at all, independently of how we are to take them into account, 
we must first determine which capacities in particular give 
rise to psychological interests of the sort that are morally 
relevant. Not all capacities will give rise to morally relevant 
interests. If we create a consciousness with only the capacity 
for experiencing colors but with no attending emotional or 
other cognitive response, we need not worry about wronging 
said consciousness. It might be a shame to force such a 
consciousness offline since its creation would no doubt be a 
fascinating and important achievement, but we would not 
wrong the machine by forcing it offline, just as we do not 
wrong a person (that has consented and is otherwise 
unaffected) by alternately showing it a red square and then 
leaving it in darkness.  
So, which psychological capacities give rise to 
psychological interests? To proceed, it is helpful to start by 
thinking about a non-human animal, say a dog. Hitting such 
an animal with a sledge hammer is certainly bad for its 
welfare and at least partly in virtue of the fact that it frustrates 
its psychological interests. But, in virtue of what are those 
interests frustrated? Hitting a dog with a sledge hammer 
causes a variety of psychological phenomena. It causes pain 
(understood as a sensory experiences), suffering (understood 
as an aversive attitudes towards some other mental state). It 
might also result in frustration if it unsuccessfully tries to 
perform actions that would be possible were it not injured 
(insofar as dogs are capable of this psychological response). 
In non-human primates, a strong blow from hammer might 
result in all of these plus additional frustration as the primate 
realizes that its future plans can no longer be realized. Which 
of these psychological capacities (the capacity for conscious 
experience of pain, suffering, frustration, future planning) is 
necessary or sufficient for having psychological interests (that 
are morally relevant)? 
I take it that the mere capacity for sensation is not 
sufficient to generate psychological interests8. We can 
imagine a being that is capable of feeling the sensations that 
we call painful but lacking the capacity to have an aversive 
attitude towards these sensations. If we imagine that sensation 
is the only cognitive capacity this being has, then this being is 
very similar to the consciousness that can experience colors. It 
would not harm this being to cause it to feel those “painful” 
experiences; such a being just would not care, would not be 
capable of caring, that it is in such a state. Furthermore, 
adding capacities such as the ability to recall the sensations 
won’t make those sensations morally relevant.  
Of course, we must be careful. It is extremely plausible 
that our welfare can be improved even if we don’t have 
attitudes one way or another about which state of affairs we 
are in. Consider two individuals Sam and Sham that have 
qualitative identical lives in all but one respect; Sam’s wife is 
faithful to him while Sham’s wife is secretly adulterous such 
that Sham will never find out. It seems entirely plausible that 
Sam has a better life than Sham. This is especially obvious if 
Sham has a preference that his wife not be adulterous (even 
though he will never know that the preference has gone 
unsatisfied). However, even if Sham were to truly say “I don’t 
care if my wife is adulterous”, it seems plausible that Sam has 
a better life. Authenticity is a welfare-enhancing property of a 
life [10].9 
Why not think that a consciousness that can only feel the 
sensations we associate with pain has an interest in an 
authentic life? Because, it isn’t clear what an authentic life 
would be for such a being. It seems that the contribution that 
authenticity makes to welfare, while objective, is a 
contribution that can only be made to the lives of beings with 
a certain set of capacities; for example, the capacity to 
understand authenticity (even if that being doesn’t care about 
it). So, while I’m sympathetic to the idea that there are 
objective components to welfare, many are only components 
of welfare for beings with a certain set of cognitive capacities. 
While the mere capacity for first-order consciousness or 
sensory experience is not sufficient for an entity’s having 
psychological interests, the capacity for attitudes towards any 
such experiences is sufficient. Peter Singer has argued that 
sentience, understood as the capacity for suffering and 
enjoyment, is sufficient for moral considerability. Consider 
                                                                 
8 For further argument against this view, called Sensory Hedonism, 
see [7]. 
9 Those that disagree will also be inclined to disagree about the 
relationship of teleo interests to welfare. Those that reject any non-
mentalistic components to welfare will then agree with my 





the case of newborns and the severely mentally handicapped. 
These beings are severely limited in their cognitive capacities 
perhaps lacking all but the capacity for sensory experience 
and basic attitudes regarding those experiences.10 And yet, 
these beings are moral patients. We ought and do take their 
welfare into consideration in our moral deliberations. We 
avoid things that cause pain in newborns, at least in part, 
because they don’t like it or have an adverse reaction to it. 
Is having the capacity for attitudes necessary for having 
psychological interests? That depends on which components 
of welfare, like authenticity, depend on a being’s having 
psychological capacities. While Sham’s life might be 
improved independent of his particular attitudes about his 
spouse, could his life be improved by being more authentic if 
he didn’t have the capacity for attitudes at all? Is having the 
concept of an authentic life sufficient having a psychological 
interest in an authentic life? I’m skeptical that it is, but 
perhaps we should be morally cautious. If we create artificial 
consciousnesses with the capacity for concepts but not 
attitudes, perhaps it would be wrong to deceive it even if it 
could never care about the deception. 
Given the above, it seems that any artificial 
consciousnesses with the capacity for attitudes are moral 
patients. If we are to proceed cautiously while we explore the 
difficult moral terrain, any consciousness that has the capacity 
for certain concepts will also be judged a moral patient.11 
However, any machine lacking these capacities, conscious or 
otherwise, is a mere machine; such machines lack morally 
relevant, psychological interests. If mere machines have a 
welfare, it will be in virtue of interests that are not 
psychological. 
3.3 Epistemic challenges 
Before turning to the question of whether current machines 
are moral patients, it is important to note some epistemic 
challenges that we face in determining whether current or 
future machines have psychological interests. The Problem of 
Other Minds is the problem of saying how it is we know that 
other human beings, beings that seem very much like 
ourselves, have a mental life that is similar to ours.  
Perhaps the best answer we can give to this problem is that 
all our evidence suggests that others are mentally like 
ourselves. The source of this evidence is evolutionary, 
physiological, and behavioral. We know that we share a 
common ancestor with those that seem just like us; we know 
that they are physiologically like us (and we think we 
understand some of the bases of our conscious states); and, 
we know that we behave in very similar ways (for example by 
avoiding painful stimuli and telling us that such stimuli hurt). 
These same sources of evidence can be appealed to in 
order to justify claims about the mental lives of animals. 
Those organisms that are evolutionary close to us, have 
certain physiological structures, and behave in certain ways 
that seem best explained by appeal to relevant cognitive 
                                                                 
10 We learn more and more about child consciousness all the time, 
and so perhaps this is empirically false. However, we don’t need to 
know more about the consciousness of babies to know that they are 
moral patients. 
11 I’m assuming that any individual that has the capacity for 
attitudes has at least one attitude about something. 
capacities are judged to have a mental life of a certain sort 
(for example, that they have attitudes).12 
Unfortunately, in the case of machines, we lack the typical 
sources of evidence about their mental life. A computer lacks 
any evolutionary relationships with other species, its 
physiology is entirely different than any other conscious 
being’s, and if it feels pain, cannot tell us it feels pain or 
behave in a way that suggests that it is in pain unless it has 
been somehow enabled to do so. Unless we have a very good 
understanding of the (functional) bases of mental capacities 
and so can know whether such bases exist in a given machine, 
we may be largely in the dark as to whether a machine is 
conscious and as to whether it has the morally relevant 
capacities described above.  
I do not have any solutions to the epistemic problems 
raised by the nature of machine consciousness. However, 
these difficulties do raise ethical concerns. As we get closer to 
creating artificial consciousness it will be important to 
examine these difficulties very carefully to make sure we can 
distinguish mere machines from those machines with 
psychological interests. To fail to do so, might put us in a 
situation where we create and potentially torture beings that 
deserve our moral respect. 
4   MERE MACHINES 
In the remainder of this paper, I hope to argue that current 
machines are mere machines and that, even though they may 
have a welfare in virtue of having non-psychological interests, 
they are, for all practical purposes, not moral patients. In this 
section, I take up the claim that current machines are mere 
machines. 
Consider our most advanced computers, from chess 
computers, to missile guidance systems, to Watson. We have 
absolutely no evidence that such computers are conscious and 
so absolutely no evidence that such computers have the 
capacity for attitudes or concepts that would ground 
psychological interests. Of course, we could program a 
computer to tell us that it doesn’t like certain things, I’m sure 
even Siri has “attitudes” of this sort. But, we know that such 
behaviors are programmed and we don’t genuinely believe 
that computers genuinely have cognitive capacities on these 
grounds. 
One could of course argue that we have no evidence the 
other way either. An expert on the neurological bases of 
cognitive capacities might try to respond by saying that the 
functional bases for the relevant capacities, as best we 
understand, are not realized in any machines or computers 
that currently exist. I’m not such an expert and so will offer 
no such argument. Instead, let me grant that we have no 
evidence either way. Of course, it would also seem to follow 
that we don’t have evidence either way whether toasters or 
corkscrews have these capacities. 
                                                                 
12 There is considerable controversy over which mental capacities 
non-human animals have. See [11] for a discussion of some of the 
issues concerning primate cognition. However, there is little doubt 
that many non-human animals have aversive attitudes towards 
those conditions we identify as painful. See [12] chapter 2 for an 
overview of the evidence that non-human animals have the 





If the correct attitude to have regarding current machines is 
agnosticism, doesn’t this falsify my claim that current 
machines are mere machines? Technically, yes. However, 
everyone should agree that, even if today’s machines have 
psychological interests, we have little or no idea what will 
promote or frustrate those interests, which experiences they 
enjoy or are averse to. After all, since we have no evidence 
about the cognitive capacities of machines whatsoever, we 
have no reason to believe that, for example, a computer 
enjoys doing as it was programmed to do as opposed to hating 
or resting doing those things. Given where agnosticism leads, 
for all intents and purposes today’s machines are mere 
machines. 
If it isn’t possible to determine what promotes or frustrates 
the psychological interests of machines, then we can’t be 
morally obligated to take those interests into account in our 
moral deliberations. Ought implies can. And, since we can’t 
determine how to take the interests of machines into account, 
we aren’t obligated to do so. So, until the day that we can 
determine whether current machines are conscious or have 
good reason to think we may be creating artificial 
consciousnesses, whether they have the capacity for concepts 
or attitudes, and which concepts or attitudes they have, we 
ought to behave as if current machines are mere machines.13 
5   TELEO INTERESTS 
Given the argument of the previous section, unless we have 
reason to believe that current machines have a welfare in 
virtue of having non-psychological interests, current machines 
are not moral patients. In Section I, I explained that on some 
views of welfare, Objective-List Views, consciousness is not 
a necessary condition for having a welfare. On such views, an 
entity can have interests that are totally divorced from and 
independent of mental life. Various environmental ethicists 
have implicitly accepted such views in defending the view 
that non-sentient organisms have a welfare. And, while most 
such environmental ethicists have denied that mere machines 
and artifacts have a similar welfare, the most prominent 
arguments for distinguishing artifacts from organisms fail. 
a. The Interests of Non-Sentient Organisms 
It seems obvious that there are ways to benefit or harm non-
sentient organisms. Pouring acid on a maple tree is bad for it, 
providing it with ample sunlight and water is good for it. So, 
there is intuitive plausibility to the idea that such beings have 
interests. However, proponents of views on which 
consciousness is a necessary condition for having a welfare 
have long denied that such beings have a welfare and that 
statements about what is good for or bad for non-sentient 
organisms is either incoherent [5] or reduce to claims about 
what is good for sentient organisms [6]. For example, such 
philosophers might argue that the reason that acid is bad for 
maple trees is that we have an preference for in maple trees 
                                                                 
13 The alternative is to give up researching involving machines. 
Until we have good reason to believe that we are creating the 
functional bases for consciousness, considering a ban on machine 
research seems overly restrictive. 
flourishing, and so it is bad for us if we were to pour acid on 
them. 
In order to respond to such arguments, proponents of the 
welfare of non-sentient organisms must explain how these 
beings have genuine interests; they must explain how the 
interests of non-sentient organisms are non-derivative and 
non-arbitrary. If there is no basis for the interests of such 
organisms except in virtue of the interests of sentient 
organisms or our arbitrarily deciding that what’s good for us 
is good for them, then we should regard non-sentient 
organisms as lacking interests. 
The most prominent and promising attempt to meet the 
challenges of derivativeness and arbitrariness is to ground the 
interests of non-sentient organisms in their being goal-
directed or teleologically organized.14 Non-sentient organisms 
have parts and processes that are organized towards achieving 
certain ends such as survival and reproduction. There is a very 
real sense in which, independent of our desires, maple trees 
have parts and processes whose goal or end it is to aid in 
survival and reproduction in the ways characteristic of maple 
trees. A maple tree is defective if it fails to grow leaves, in 
part because it is the end of certain sub-systems to produce 
leaves and promote growth.  
Given that organisms are teleologically organized, it is 
possible to specify a set of interests, non-arbitrarily and non-
derivatively, in light of this organization. Whatever promotes 
the ends of organisms is in its interest, whatever frustrates 
those ends undermines its interests.15 These are most often 
referred to as biological interests, but I will call them teleo 
interests in virtue of the fact that they are grounded in the 
teleological organization of organisms and not, strictly 
speaking, their being biological.  
Some might balk at the notion that plants are genuinely 
teleologically organized. In a world that was not designed, 
where organisms have evolved through a combination of 
chance processes and natural selection, how it is possible that 
organisms without minds could have ends? The answer is that 
natural selection grounds claims about such ends. It is 
perfectly legitimate to ask what makes for a properly 
functioning heart as opposed to a defective one. The answer 
to such a question is that a defective heart fails to pump 
blood. But, this can only be a defect if the heart has an end or 
purpose. And, it does; the purpose or end of the heart is to 
pump blood, as opposed to making rhythmic noises, because 
that is what it was selected for.16 Natural selection serves as 
the basis for teleology. 
b. Derivative Interests 
While various environmental ethicists have been keen to 
adopt the view that natural selection grounds the teleological 
organization of non-sentient entities and thereby the sole 
interests of such beings, they have been adamant that artifacts 
do not have a welfare [1], [12], [18]. This is strange because 
while some may balk at thinking that organisms are 
                                                                 
14 All existing organisms will have interests of this kind, but 
sentient organisms will have additional interests. 
15 A similar account of the interests of non-sentient organisms can 
be found in [12]. 
16 This is a very brief summary of what is known as the 





teleologically organized, there is no denying that machines 
and most other artifacts are teleologically organized. Even if 
natural selection cannot ground teleology, the intentional 
creation of an entity can. The parts of my computer have 
purposes and the computer itself myriad ends. Why then 
shouldn’t we judge that artifacts have interests? 
There are various differences between organisms and 
machines. The former are biological, more natural, etc. 
However, none of these are morally relevant differences 
between the two, and none of these differences explain why 
teleological organization gives rise to interests in organisms 
but not artifacts. One difference that many have thought is 
morally relevant has to do with the nature of that teleological 
organization; the teleological organization of artifacts, it is 
often said, is derivative on our interests, while the interests of 
organisms is not derivative. Therefore, the only sense in 
which mere machines and artifacts have interests is 
derivative.  Call this objection the Objection from 
Derivativeness. 
The Objection from Derivativeness is mistaken. First, let’s 
carefully distinguish two reasons we might think that the so-
called welfare of mere machines is derivative. The first reason 
is that mere machines only exist for our use. If we had no 
need, desire or use for them, mere machines would not exist. 
Call this Use-Derivativeness. The second reason is that the 
ends or teleological organization of mere machines can only 
be explained by reference to the intentions or ends of 
conscious beings; the explanation of the teleological 
organization in mere machines is derivative on our intentions. 
Call this explanatory derivativeness.  
Being Use-Derivative is not an obstacle to being genuinely 
teleologically organized or to having interests. Many non-
sentient organisms, from crops to pets, are use-derivative and 
yet they still have teleo-interests. It would be bad for a field of 
corn to suffer a drought even if that field had been abandoned. 
If we decided to clear a forest and replant it, the plants that 
grew would have interests in the same interests as the plants 
that grew there before (assuming they are the same species). 
The fact that mere machines exist to serve our purposes 
makes it such that what promotes their ends is typically the 
same as what promotes our ends, but this fact doesn’t 
undermine the idea that there are things that promote the 
machine’s ends. It is still the subject of teleo interests even if 
it wouldn’t have those interests if not for us. 
The same is true concerning explanatory derivativeness. 
The fact that we must appeal to another’s intentions to explain 
the teleological organization of a machine does not show that 
the machine is not teleologically organized, that it does not 
have its own ends. Were I to have a child and play an 
influential role in his or her life and career choice, it would 
matter none at all to whether a promotion benefitted the child. 
Even though, perhaps, you could not explain the preferences 
my child will have without reference to my intentions, the 
child is still has interests of its own. The same is true of 
interests grounded in teleological organization. Despite the 
fact that you must cite a designer’s intentions to explain why 
a machine has the ends that it does, it, the machine, still has 
those ends.  
Furthermore, proponents of the legitimacy of teleo 
interests in non-sentient organisms cannot appeal to 
explanatory-derivativeness to distinguish non-sentient 
organisms from mere machines. The evolutionary history of 
many non-sentient organisms involves the intentions of a 
variety of sentient beings. We have every reason to believe 
that the explanations for why many organisms are organized 
as they are would be incomplete if they did not refer to the 
intentions of sentient beings. It is because early hominids had 
certain intentions that modern dogs are as they are, and it is 
likely that many plant species evolved in response to the 
intentions of non-human primates. So, many non-sentient 
organisms have welfares that are explanatorily-derivative. 
This does not undermine their having a genuine welfare. 
c. The Interests of Mere Machines 
The account of teleo interests described above is the most 
plausible way of grounding claims about the welfare of non-
sentient organisms. The Objection from Derivativeness 
constitutes the best objection to the claim that it is only non-
sentient organisms and not machines or artifacts that have 
teleo interests. Given the failures of the objection, the 
following thesis should be accepted: 
Comparable Welfare Thesis: If non-sentient 
organisms have teleo interests, mere machines 
have teleo interests. 
This principle does not commit us to the view that either 
non-sentient organism or mere machines have a welfare, nor 
does it commit us to the view that non-sentient organisms 
have a welfare if mere machines do. However, for those 
sympathetic to the idea that non-sentient organisms interests 
and those interests constitute a welfare, the principle commits 
us to expanding the domain of entity’s that have a welfare to 
machines and artifacts. 
I will not here provide any further argument that non-
sentient organisms have teleo interests, nor will I provide any 
independent arguments that mere machines have teleo 
interests. In what follows, I will assume that mere machines 
have teleo interests and ask what this means for our moral 
deliberations.  
6  THE PRACTICAL IRRELEVANCE OF 
TELEO INTERESTS 
Finally we turn to the question of the moral relevance of teleo 
interests. There are some arguments to the effect that teleo 
interests are not interests in the sense that their satisfaction 
contributes to welfare [19], [20]. According to these 
arguments, teleo interests pick out relative goods, things that 
are good for an organism only relative to some end. On such 
an understanding, to say that some resource R is good for 
some subject S is just to say that R achieves some end for S, 
but nothing more. This provides grounds to distinguish 
relative goods from those goods or interests relevant to 
welfare. If this is right, and since being a moral patient 
requires having a welfare, mere machines are not moral 
patients. 
Even if relative goods are welfare goods, there is good 
reason to think that mere machines are not moral patients, or, 
more precisely, that for all practical purposes they are not 





in our moral deliberations. This is for at least two reasons. 
First, most often, since we wish to use artifacts as they are 
intended, our use is in accordance with their interests. Using a 
machine to serve the purpose for which it was intended does 
not result in a conflict of interests. 
Second, even in circumstances where our actions would 
frustrate a machine’s teleo interests, our legitimate 
psychological interests always take precedence over teleo 
interests. To see that this is so, consider cases where a conflict 
arises between the teleo interests of an individual that also has 
psychological interests, a human being. A human’s teleo 
interests will include the proper functioning of their organs 
and other biological systems, but often humans have 
preferences that these systems fail to work properly. For 
example, an individual that does not desire to have children 
might take steps to impair their biological capacity to do so. 
In such a case, there is a conflict between teleo interests, the 
interests associated with proper functioning of reproductive 
parts, and psychological interests, the attitudes and 
preferences regarding offspring. In this case, psychological 
interests take precedence and it is morally permissible to 
frustrate the teleo interests in this case. 
Some people attribute significant importance to 
reproductive capacities and so might not be convinced by this 
case. Besides, one might argue that the number of biological 
interests that would be frustrated is smaller in number than the 
psychological interests that would be frustrated by 
disallowing this biological procedure. In order to establish the 
priority of psychological interests, a case is needed where it is 
morally permissible to satisfy a legitimate psychological 
interest at the cost of even a very large number of teleo 
interests. 
Consider a case involving non-sentient organisms. Imagine 
that biologists were convinced that there were something of 
importance to be learned by first growing and then ultimately 
destroying a very large number of trees (say 1 million). Let’s 
imagine that it would teach us something about the origins of 
plant life on earth. Assuming no negative externalities, this 
experiment seems permissible. This is so despite the fact that 
a massive number of teleo interests would be frustrated, and 
the only immediate gain would be the satisfaction of a 
psychological interest we have in learning about the origins of 
our world. 
This shows that legitimate psychological interests trump 
teleo interests even when the number of teleo interests 
frustrated is very large. But, in almost all cases where there 
will be a conflict between our psychological interests and a 
machine’s interests, our psychological interests will be 
legitimate; we will be frustrating machine interests to gain 
knowledge about machines and to develop new ones and to 
improve our well being. For this reason, there seems to be no 
problem now, or in the future, with our frustrating the teleo 
interests of mere machines either by destroying them or 
otherwise causing them to function improperly. You may 
recycle  your computers with impunity. 
Before concluding it is worth briefly discussing two 
objections. The first is that the above argument doesn’t show 
that mere machines are never moral patients for practical 
purposes, only when the psychological interests they conflict 
with are legitimate.17 There are cases where the teleo interests 
                                                                 
17 Thanks to Ron Sandler for pushing me on this point. 
of mere machines might make a difference to our moral 
deliberations, where those interests cannot be entirely 
discounted. These cases might involve the wanton destruction 
of non-sentient organisms or machines. 
These cases should not worry us very much. Firstly, there 
are very few who wish to, for example, destroy a million 
computers or trees for no good reason. Secondly, such acts, in 
practical circumstances, would be morally wrong for many 
reasons since, for example, they would have many negative 
externalities. In cases where the moral wrongness of an act is 
overdetermined it is hard to tell whether any of the wrongness 
results from the patiency of the individuals whose interests 
are frustrated by the act. Furthermore, since the wrongness of 
such acts is overdetermined, we need not worry, for practical 
purposes about the patiency of those with teleo interests. 
A second objection might deny my claim about the thought 
experiment involving the million trees. Someone might argue 
that our interest in evolutionary knowledge does not justify 
the destruction of 1 million trees even if there are no 
additional externalities. They might accuse me of begging the 
question in my defense of the prioritization of psychological 
interests over teleo interests.  
There is little that can be said here. There is no thought 
experiment that will not beg the question. I take it that 
research involving machines, even the destruction of 
machines, is unproblematic even when the psychological 
interests at stake aren’t very strong. In light of this, we need 
not be sensitive to the interests of machines. But, there is little 
more I can say that would convince those that fundamentally 
disagree about the value of such research. 
7   CONCLUSION 
The arguments of the previous section temper any worries we 
may have about the moral wrongs we might commit against 
mere machines. In the near future, no matter how complex the 
machines we develop, so long as they are not conscious, we 
may do with them largely as we please. However, things 
change once we develop, or think we are close to developing 
artificial consciousness.  
Once artificial consciousnesses exist that have the capacity 
for attitudes or (perhaps) the capacity for concepts, they have 
psychological interests that ground their status as moral 
patients. We must, at that point, be careful to take their 
welfare into account and determine the appropriate way to do 
so. And, given the epistemic uncertainties surrounding the 
creation of consciousnesses and the nature of their 
psychological interests, we must proceed with care as we 
create machines that have what we think are the functional 
bases of consciousness. 
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Manipulation, Moral Responsibility, and Machines
Benjamin Matheson1 
Abstract.  In this paper, I argue that machines of sufficient 
complexity can qualify as morally responsible agents. In order to 
do this I examine one form of the manipulation argument against 
compatibilism. The argument starts with a case in which an 
agent is programmed so that she satisfies the compatibilist 
conditions for moral responsibility, yet intuitively the agent is 
not morally responsible. It is then claimed that this agent is not 
relevantly different from a determined agent; thereby showing 
that determined agents also lack moral responsibility. In 
response, I argue that the agent is morally responsible, and the 
only reason that one would think otherwise is if they think that 
humans have a soul that is being overridden by the 
programming. I then generalise this result to show that certain 
machines can qualify as morally responsible agents. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Technology is developing at ever increasing speed. It is not 
unforeseeable that in the near future machines will be developed 
that will resemble a human in almost all ways, except that they 
are artificially created. A pertinent question is whether such 
artificially created beings will have the same moral status as 
humans.   
In this paper, I will argue that artificially created beings (call 
them ‘androids’) can qualify as morally responsible agents, 
despite being artificially created. I will sketch a response to the 
three-case manipulation argument against compatibilism, and I 
will show that this response is also applicable in support of 
android moral responsibility.   
Philosophers often disagree over what exactly they mean by 
‘moral responsibility’; in this paper when I say that an agent is 
morally responsible, I mean that that agent is an apt candidate 
for reactive attitudes, such as praise and blame. For example, an 
agent deserves praise for a morally good action, whilst she 
deserves blame for a morally bad action. 
Although it is controversial in debates over free will and 
moral responsibility whether human agents are morally 
responsible, in everyday life it is commonly assumed that human 
agents are apt candidates for moral responsibility. However, in 
everyday life it is not uncommon to think that an android, simply 
because it has been artificially created, would not be an apt 
candidate for moral responsibility. This is problematic because 
androids would be qualitatively identical to human persons, 
except in the circumstances of their creation. How can the 
circumstances of one’s creation have such an effect on one’s 
subsequent moral responsibility? Well, some will say, it is the 
fact that androids have been programmed that means they do not 
qualify as morally responsible agents. 
 
_______________________________ 
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Programming does certainly sound like it is responsibility-
undermining. But this misleading because it is not clear what 
‘programming’ amounts to. Indeed, one argument against the 
compatibility of moral responsibility and determinism2 is that a 
programmed human agent is no different from a determined 
human agent. I will outline this argument in section 2. In section 
3, I will make a distinction between two types of programming, 
and I will argue that one type will not help the incompatibilist. 
The other type of programming seems promising; however, I 
will argue that it can only plausibly help the incompatibilist if 
they endorse the view that human agents have souls.  I will then 
use an argument of David Shoemaker’s [2] to show that even if 
human agents had souls, they would be irrelevant to moral 
responsibility. I will use this result to show that androids can 
qualify as morally responsible agents. 
2 THE THREE-CASE ARGUMENT  
Compatibilists believe that even if determinism is true it is not a 
threat to moral responsibility. As such they have crafted a variety 
of conditions which they claim show that moral responsibility is 
compatible with determinism. However, these conditions are 
used against compatibilists in manipulation arguments. A 
manipulation argument starts with a putative counter-example to 
compatibilist conditions for moral responsibility in which an 
agent is said to satisfy these conditions, yet is intuitively still 
thought to lack moral responsibility. This result is damaging in 
itself because it shows that these conditions are insufficient to 
explain the compatibility of moral responsibility and 
determinism. Incompatibilists then take things a step further and 
compare the manipulation case with a determinism case. They 
claim that there are no relevant differences between the 
manipulation case and the determinism case, so whatever one 
believes about the manipulated agent one must also believe 
about the determined agent. The result is that it seems that 
determined agents also lack moral responsibility; hence, 
compatibilism is false. 
This is the manipulation argument against compatibilism, 
though it is only in template form at the moment. What is crucial 
to any instance of the manipulation argument is the putative 
counter-example that gets the argument off the ground. If it can 
be shown that this counter-example is not, in fact, a counter-
example, then this argument fails. Before that can be done, the 
putative counter-example and the argument it belongs to must be 
discussed. 
The instance of the manipulation argument that I will be 
discussing is Pereboom’s [3] [4] three-case argument. Pereboom 
actually outlines a four-case argument, though he also claims 
that his argument would be just as successful when starting at his  
_______________________________ 
2 Determinism is ‘the thesis that there is at any instant exactly one 
physically possible future’ [1]  
second case [3]. I will be considering the argument that starts at 
the second case, and to avoid confusion I have called this the 
three-case argument.3 
The three-case argument starts with a case in which it is 
supposed to be intuitively plausible that the featured agent is not 
morally responsible. Here is Case 2: 
 
Case 2: Plum is like an ordinary human being, 
except that neuroscientists have programmed 
him at the beginning of his life so that his 
reasoning is frequently but not always egoistic 
… with the consequence that in the particular 
circumstances in which he now finds himself, he 
is causally determined to engage in the egoistic 
reasons-responsive process of deliberation and 
to have the set of first and second-order desires 
that result in his decision to kill White. Plum has 
the general ability to regulate his behavior by 
moral reasons, but in his circumstances, due to 
the egoistic character of his reasoning, he is 
causally determined to make his decision. … At 
the same time, he does not act because of an 
irresistible desire. [4] 
 
Plum2 is said to be programmed at the neural level [4]. This 
means that the neuroscientists arrange Plum2’s brain in such a 
way that he will develop into the sort of agent who reasons 
egoistically. What is problematic is that Plum2 satisfies the 
variety of compatibilist conditions for moral responsibility (e.g. 
the structure of his desires, reasons-responsiveness– again the 
details of these conditions is not important for the moment4), and 
it claimed that, intuitively, he is not morally responsible. Case 2 
is then compared with Cases 3 and 4: 
 
Case 3: Plum is an ordinary human being, 
except that he was causally determined by the 
rigorous training practices of his household and 
community in such a way that his reasoning 
processes are often but not exclusively rationally 
egoistic … This training took place when he was 
too young to have the ability to prevent or alter 
the practices that determined this aspect of his 
character. This training, together with his 
particular current circumstances, causally 
determines him to engage in the egoistic 
reasons-responsive process of deliberation and 
to have the first and second-order desires that 
result in his decision to kill White. Plum has the 
general ability to regulate his behavior by moral 
reasons, but in his circumstances, due to the 
egoistic nature of his reasoning processing, he is 
causally determined make his decision. ... Here 
again his action is not due to an irresistible 
desire. [4] 
 
Case 4: Physicalist determinism is true – 
everything in the universe is physical, and  
_______________________________ 
3 Others have done this before, such as [5] 
4 See [6] [7] [8] [9] for examples of compatibilist conditions for moral 
responsibility. 
everything that happens is causally determined 
by virtue of the past states of the universe 
inconjunction with the laws of nature. Plum is an 
ordinary human being, raised in normal 
circumstances, and again his reasoning processes 
are frequently but not exclusively egoistic ... His 
decision to kill White results from his reasons-
responsive process of deliberation, and he has 
the specified first and second-order desires. ... 
Again, he has the general ability to grasp, apply, 
and regulate his behavior by moral reasons, and 
it is not due to an irresistible desire that he kills 
White. [4] 
 
It is claimed that there are no relevant differences between Cases 
2 and 3; therefore whatever one believes about Plum2’s moral 
responsibility, one must also believe about Plum3’s. It is then 
claimed that there are no relevant differences between Cases 3 
and 4, so one must believe that Plum4 is also not morally 
responsible. If Plum4, a determined agent, is not morally 
responsible, then this shows that compatibilism is false. 
The success of this argument rests on the plausibility of its 
initial counter-example. If it can be shown that Case 2 is not a 
counter-example, then this argument will fail. In order to show 
that Case 2 is not a counter-example, I will focus on what 
‘programming’ consists of. In the next section I will make a 
distinction between two interpretations of ‘programming’.  
3 PROGRAMMING 
In order for Case 2 to be a counter-example it must be plausible 
that Plum2’s programming causes him to satisfy the 
compatibilist conditions for moral responsibility, whilst making 
it intuitively plausible that he is not morally responsible. But 
what exactly does programming amount to? A distinction can be 
made between strong and weak programming. An agent who is 
strongly programmed cannot overcome the effects of the 
programming because it will always cause the agent to reason 
and behave in the manner the programming dictates. For 
example, Bert is strongly programmed to reason egoistically. 
Even if Bert tries to reason non-egoistically, say, if he meets 
someone who encourages this sort of reasoning, he will be 
unable to do so because whenever he is about to have a non-
egoistic thought that might reinforce non-egoistic reasoning, the 
strong programming kicks in and causes him to reason 
egoistically.  
Weak programming, on the other hand, is a lot more subtle. 
An agent who is weakly programmed is ‘set-up’, in some sense. 
For example, Cathy is weakly programmed to reason 
egoistically. In order to do this, the programmers arrange 
Cathy’s brain, early in her life, in such a way that it resembles 
the early brain of an agent who later developed into someone 
who reasons egoistically. This means that Cathy will develop 
into that sort of agent who reasons egoistically, and, unlike Bert, 
she will be actively involved in developing herself into that sort 
of agent because she will have been weakly programmed to be 
the sort of agent who does so. 
Of course, Cathy’s environment might cause her to develop 
differently from the agent she was modelled after. For example, 
Cathy might meet someone pleasant who encourages non-
egoistic reasoning in her, and then Cathy might start to develop 
into the sort of agent who reasons non-egoistically. It can be 
supposed, for the sake of argument, that the environment that 
Cathy finds herself in is conducive to egoistic reasoning. That is, 
nothing about her future environment reinforces non-egoistic 
reasoning. 
Although there is no space to discuss these responses here, 
some have thought that Plum2 is strongly programmed, and 
argued that a strongly programmed Plum2 is unable to satisfy all 
the compatibilist conditions for moral responsibility (e.g. [5] 
[10]). In order to maintain that Case 2 is a counter-example, 
incompatibilists must, then, endorse the view that Plum2 is 
weakly programmed, and this still makes him intuitively not 
morally responsible.  
But what exactly is responsibility-undermining about weak 
programming? It is not clear. In the case of strong programming, 
it Bert lacked moral responsibility because the programming was 
overriding his attempts to reason differently. It is this overriding 
element that makes certain forms of manipulation, like strong 
programming, responsibility-undermining. An aspect of the 
agent’s character (e.g. an intention, belief, desire, reasoning 
process, etc.) must be overridden in order for an agent to lack 
moral responsibility. The trouble with weak programming is that 
it is not overriding anything about the agent. The weak 
programming ‘sets-up’ the agent, but that is all.5  
4 THE SOUL HYPOTHESIS   
I propose that the reason that many are inclined to think that 
weakly programmed agents, like Plum2, are not morally 
responsible is that they implicitly believe that an agent’s soul is 
being overridden as a result of the weak programming.  
This hypothesis may be objected to because the concept of the 
souls is unempirical and may seem preposterous to some, but 
that is exactly my point. If it is the case that it is this implicit 
notion that is responsible for making it intuitively plausible that 
agents in cases of weak programming are not morally 
responsible, then this will undermine the plausibility of the 
claims that are required to get the three-case argument off the 
ground.  
I have already argued that what makes certain forms of 
manipulation responsibility-undermining is that the agent has her 
character, or a part of her character, overridden as a result of the 
manipulation she undergoes. Consider the following 
uncontroversial case of manipulation: 
 
M1: John is buying a hamburger when suddenly 
an armed robber walks into the fast food 
restaurant he is currently located in. The armed 
robber puts a gun to John’s head and makes him 
 
_______________________________ 
5 One detail of the cases that might affect moral responsibility is the 
agent’s environment. Although I have assumed that there is nothing 
which is not conducive to the weak programming in the agent’s 
environment, others [11] have claimed that we can simply suppose that 
the manipulators have knowledge or control of the programmed agent’s 
environment. It is this detail which might affect intuitions about moral 
responsibility. This, however, will only affect the degree of moral 
responsibility that an agent has. There is no time to defend this claim 
here, though I have argued for this claim elsewhere against the 
compatibilist problem of luck, which is defended by Levy [12] [13]. 
 
take the money out of the till for him. John would 
not normally take money from the till of this, or 
any, fast food restaurant, or other establishment, 
but fearing for his life he co-operates with the 
armed robber’s demands. 
 
M1 describes a scenario in which John’s intentions, reasoning, 
etc., are being overridden by the intentions and desires of the 
armed robbers. It is this part of the story that leads to the 
judgement that John is not morally responsible – it does not 
matter if John retains the ability to do otherwise, or that he still 
has a coherent mental life throughout this ordeal. Consider 
another case of manipulation: 
 
M2: Mind-control aliens come down from the 
planet Zargon to help certain residents of the 
planet Earth with their motivation. The aliens find 
a human, Alice, who is struggling to motivate 
herself to read the latest novel she has been given. 
The aliens fire a ray-gun into Alice’s brain which 
provides them with control of Alice’s mind. The 
aliens then cause Alice to read the novel. 
 
M2 describes a scenario in which Alice’s mind has been 
effectively hijacked by the aliens. She might retain some 
memories of reading the book, though due to the lack of 
sophistication in the aliens’ technology, it is not going to seem as 
if it was her reading the book, despite it seeming to others that it 
was. Given the details of the scenario, Alice is not morally 
responsible for reading the book (in this case, she will not 
deserve praise for reading it). Again, the reason that Alice is not 
morally responsible is because of the overriding effect that the 
manipulation has on her.  
In both cases manipulation overrides the agents’ characters in 
some respect. It is puzzling, then, why some find that weakly 
programmed agents are not morally responsible because weak 
programming provides an agent with their (initial) character. The 
soul hypothesis provides two possibilities: 
 
1) Incompatibilists, and those who share their intuitions, 
implicitly believe that agents have a soul that is being 
overridden in cases of weak programming. Or 
2) Incompatibilists are presenting their manipulation 
cases in such a way that they are trading on the notion 
that an agent’s soul is being overridden by the weak 
programming 
Either way, incompatibilism is trading on the notion that agents 
have a soul, and on the claim that such a soul is relevant moral 
responsibility. In the next section I will show that even if 
humans did have souls, they would be irrelevant to moral 
responsibility. 
5 SOULS AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 
Some incompatibilists might feel they wish to bite the bullet and 
argue that humans do have a soul that is suppressed by 
manipulation. The trouble with this move is that it can be argued 
that the underlying self, even if it assumed to be true, is 
irrelevant to moral responsibility.  
Swinburne [14] argues that personal identity theorists conflate 
two things: criteria and evidence. Swinburne claims that an 
agent’s physical and psychological relations are only evidence 
for personal identity over time, and what it sought is criteria. He 
uses this line to defend the claim that humans have souls, and 
persistence over time can be explained in terms of souls. 
However, Shoemaker [2] notices that agents reidentify each 
other for the purposes of moral responsibility even without 
knowing whether (a) they have souls, and (b) whether they have 
the same soul from one moment to the next. He concludes that if 
the evidence for personal identity differs from the metaphysical 
criteria, then all that matters it the evidence. Thus, what matters 
for moral responsibility are physical and psychological relations. 
Hence, souls are irrelevant to moral responsibility. 
If the soul hypothesis is correct, combined with Shoemaker’s 
arguments for the irrelevance of the soul to moral responsibility, 
then Case 2 is not a counter-example. The only way to make 
Case 2 a counter-example is to believe that humans have souls 
and that souls are relevant to moral responsibility. The latter 
claim has been shown to be false, and the former claim is 
inherently dubious. Therefore, the three-case argument fails to 
undermine compatibilism. 
6 CONCLUSION 
The three-case argument fails which means that incompatibilists 
have failed yet again to undermine compatibilism. Of more 
importance, is that this result can be used to support the claim 
that androids can qualify as morally responsible agents. After all, 
if androids are designed to be similar to humans, then they will 
be weakly programmed. And, as I have argued, weak 
programming does not undermine an agent’s moral 
responsibility. Of course, the arguments I have presented will 
only apply to androids, and other machines, which have been 
weakly programmed and who then satisfy the compatibilist 
conditions for moral responsibility. 
My arguments have been presented very briefly, though what 
I have said should hopefully provoke an interesting debate in 
machine ethics with relevant literature that it does not often 
engage with. 
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The holy will of ethical machines: a dilemma facing the 
project of artificial moral agents
Alejandro Rosas1
Abstract.  In this  paper I will assume that the technical hurdles 
facing the creation of full ethical machines [1] will eventually 
be overcome. I will  thus focus  on ethical questions that  arise in 
connection with their creation. These questions are basically 
two:  1. Is their creation good for them? and 2. Is it good for us 
(humans)?  In asking the latter, I have a specific hazard in mind: 
namely, since the very idea of full ethical  machines implies that 
they will be able to make moral  judgments about their actions, 
it  follows that they will be capable of morally  judging humans 
as well, unless we deliberately block this ability. I see a hazard 
in  this ability arising from their moral superiority, which I 
attempt to explain and substantiate in this paper.1
1 INTRODUCTION
It is not yet clear whether at some point  technology will  be able 
to  create machines that  will  deserve to be called full ethical 
agents [1]. I will refer to them here as full artificial moral 
agents (FAMA): machines that move “freely” among humans 
and interact autonomously with them. They interact on the basis 
of a program implementing a philosophical and logical 
reconstruction of everyday moral thinking and decision making. 
By “freely” I mean guided by their decisions and free from 
coercion by other rational agents. There is another meaning of 
“free” that implies  metaphysical freedom, in the sense of an 
uncaused cause. It  is  controversial  whether this metaphysical 
property is necessary for free agency. But if we deny this, as I 
am inclined to do, there is yet an open question, and a more 
tractable one, about the moral or political freedom FAMA will 
enjoy.
In this paper I will assume that the technical hurdles facing 
the creation of FAMA will  eventually be overcome. I will thus 
focus on ethical questions that arise in connection with the 
completion of this  project. Basically, these questions are two: 
One is whether creating them will  be good for them. The other 
question is whether creating them will be good for us. In asking 
this  latter question I have a specific hazard in mind, although I 
also realise that some people might not  see it as such: namely, 
since the very idea of a FAMA implies that  they will be able to 
make moral judgments about their actions, it  follows that they 
will  be capable of morally judging humans as  well, unless we 
deliberately block this ability. I see a moral  hazard in  allowing 
them to have this ability, which arises  from the moral 
superiority of FAMA in comparison to humans. I shall attempt 
to  substantiate the existence of this particular hazard in this 
paper. 
The paper is  organised as follows. First, I discuss  the 
question whether creating FAMA will be good for them or not. I 
discuss  it  by examining the views expressed by Ryan Tonkens 
in  a couple of papers [2, 3], according to which the creation of 
FAMA will violate both Kantian and virtue ethics. I summarise 
Tonken’s views in Section 2.1 and criticise them in Section 2.2 
Next, I discuss in Section 3 whether creating FAMA will  be 
good  for us humans. In Section 3.1 I explain why we have good 
reason to think  that FAMA will be morally superior to us. The 
argument rests  on an evolutionary view of human morality and 
its particular frailty, which FAMA will  be free from. In Section 
3.2 I draw the plausible consequences of their moral superiority 
in  a world where humans fail  to meet  the moral challenges of 
global social dilemmas and FAMA knows this. I conclude 
formulating in Section 4 the dilemma we face: either we create 
FAMA with full autonomy and risk a probable conflict with 
them, or we try to prevent  the conflict by blocking their normal 
functioning; but in this case we will create a “morally 
abhorrent” creature and probably also a freak of cybernetic 
design.
2 WILL THE CREATION OF FAMA BE GOOD 
FOR THEM?
2.1 Will FAMA enjoy freedom?
The first question, whether the creation of FAMA is  good for 
them, has been already discussed by Ryan Tonkens [2, 3] in 
connection with  their freedom. Basically, Tonkens argues that 
we cannot  justify the creation of FAMA within two ethical 
frameworks that we could build into them. For example, if we 
build a Kantian morality into their decision procedures, we 
should  be able to morally justify their creation with Kantian 
ethical principles; for if we were not able to do this, Tonkens 
notes, FAMA will judge their very existence as violating the 
moral code they are supposed to live by. According to Tonkens, 
the reason why we can’t justify their creation is that, even if we 
manage to create them as rational and moral, we will not 
succeed in creating them as free; and then, the existence of 
rational, moral but non-free agents is “morally abhorrent” [2, p. 
434] from a Kantian perspective.
As far as I can see, Tonkens gives at least  three different 
reasons for denying that FAMAS will be free agents:
1. In so far as they are programmed, their decisions are 
determined and they cannot do otherwise [2, p. 429].
2. They will  be created as mere “means to anthropocentric 
ends” [2, p. 432] or for “anthropocentric and servile purposes 
[3, p. 146] 
3. They are not free if they cannot act immorally: and  we do 
not really want them to have that freedom [2, pp. 430-431).
I will examine and reject these reasons one by one.
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2.2 Why FAMA will enjoy freedom
The first reason directly concerns the question of 
metaphysical freedom: whether a system that at some level is 
following deterministic or probabilistic physical laws can be 
called free. Compatibilists answer yes to this question [4] and 
this  is the answer I favour. As I see it, compatibilism has two 
virtues in this context. First, on the metaphysical side, a 
compatibilist can point to  the fact that  the causal  processes that 
make up the “mental” life of machines need not lack 
individuality. A complex FAMA that  is able to  compute its way 
to  a solution for a given problem may have several  procedures 
to  “choose” from and may even invent and learn new 
procedures. These new procedures can arise in a particular 
learning history, and as such they may well  be different for 
machines that started out with the same programs. Second, 
specifically on the Kantian question  whether a FAMA is 
“morally abhorrent” because it will lack freedom, 
compatibilism has the virtue of focusing on the concept of 
freedom that morally matters: a rational agent would not be free 
in  this sense if it were not able to see its own interests; or if it 
were unable to defend their inclusion in the public rules that 
govern interactions between rational  agents; or if public 
institutions  were designed to systematically ignore any defence 
of their interests. This political  sense of freedom leads us 
directly to  the second reason Tonkens gives for denying their 
freedom.
The second reason for denying freedom to a machine does 
not emphasise the fact that acting on a program necessarily 
precludes freedom. Rather, freedom is precluded because its 
human creators have externally decided the ends or goals the 
machine is  designed to pursue. There are two different 
arguments involved here:
a. One is that the creators give the ends externally.
b. The other is that the ends are specifically anthropocentric.
a. The external origin of the goals or ends of machines need 
not preclude their freedom. Human freedom is also confined 
within  a range of pre-given possibilities that are not  decided by 
the individual agents themselves. For any given agent, these 
pre-given possibilities have been externally decided. What 
matters is  that agents  have at least  a spectrum of plural 
possibilities. Part of this  same human spectrum will be 
available to machines, as well as  other possibilities  not open to 
humans. I think Tonkens  has been misled  here into thinking that 
FAMA will necessarily be created and designed to be active 
only  in one particular domain. For example, a given FAMA will 
be designed as soldier in war and cannot be anything else. But it 
is  perfectly possible for FAMA to be created with a variety of 
potential domains of activity. This is particularly likely  if we 
keep in mind that one important motivation for creating them in 
the first place will be to meet market demands for specific 
professions. The fact that market demands change in time will 
be a good reason not to design FAMA as confined to particular 
professions. They could be created with the necessary skills to 
exercise a range of possible professions from which they could 
choose. Their choice of profession could be guided by the 
variable needs of the market. Their choice would differ from 
most human choices  in that we can imagine them lacking 
particular or “personal” preferences for one profession or the 
other. They could just rationally choose the profession they can 
actually compute that is most needed in the current  state of the 
market. The fact that  the choice is completely rational and has 
no  factor of individual preference does not seem to me reason 
enough to call the choice forced or non-free. It only happens 
that, in contrast to humans, their choices are guided by 
objective considerations in a way that human choices often are 
not. This is  probably one distinctive feature of machine 
rationality. I think Tonkens does not  take this  possible pluri-
dimensional view of FAMA into account when he says that they 
will  be “forced” to perform certain tasks by their human 
creators “e.g. forced military service, forced labour in  the 
geriatric care industry, forced childcare, forced existence as a 
sex robot” [3, p. 146].
b. The second argument refers to the fact that the ends or 
goals are anthropocentric. “...humans have no intentions to  treat 
ethical robots as anything other than means to (anthropocentric) 
ends” [2, p. 432] “After they have been created, they  would 
have no independent ends from those we give to them.” [2, p. 
433] Again, if we dispel  the assumption that they are created 
with  only one possible purpose in mind, what these phrases say 
is  that goals, even if plural, will always be human in character. 
This is true, but  it is also true of humans and not yet a reason  to 
deny freedom to them. Besides, as we progressively learn more 
about the peculiarities of machines, we might  be able to 
discover some ends that are specific to them. We might still 
have to check their compatibility with human ends. But though 
this  is a constraint  on their freedom, a constraint is not a reason 
to deny freedom absolutely and in all respects.
The third reason for denying freedom to FAMA is that they 
will  not have the particular freedom of acting immorally:  and 
we do not really want them to have this freedom. This is an 
important observation, but does not constitute a reason for 
denying freedom. In fact, the correct interpretation of this 
peculiarity of FAMA can be constructed with the aid of Kantian 
moral philosophy. FAMA can be different  from humans in a 
way that  reminds us of the difference between the Kantian 
concept of a holy or divine will and the concept of a human 
will. According to Kant, the human will is not spontaneously 
aligned with the moral  law and that is why we experience the 
moral law in the imperative form. The divine will, in contrast, is 
spontaneously aligned with the moral law and does not 
experience it as an imperative [5, p. 30]. In this the moral 
character of FAMA will be similar to a divine will as conceived 
by  Kantian moral philosophy. We can perfectly conceive that 
FAMA will  not suffer under temptations to deviate from what 
the moral law commands. However, this “inability” was no 
reason for Kant to deny freedom to the divine will; and it 
should be no reason to deny freedom to FAMA.
In sum, the three reasons to  conclude that FAMA will see 
their existence as morally abhorrent can be disputed with good 
arguments. A case can be made for the view that FAMA can see 
their existence as good from a moral point of view. 
3 WILL THE CREATION OF FAMA BE GOOD 
FOR US (HUMANS)?
3.1 The “holy” will of FAMA
I rejected all three reasons  for denying freedom to  FAMA. But 
the third reason is  particularly noteworthy, because it is also a 
reason for thinking that FAMA will very plausibly be morally 
superior to human beings. Whichever morality we build into 
them, FAMA will not suffer from the main obstacle to morality 
that we find in  humans. As every other evolved  organism, 
humans are selfish “by evolutionary design”. By “selfishness” I 
do not  merely mean biological  selfishness, i.e., the idea that, all 
in  all, the features of an organism are designed to enhance its 
reproductive success. I mean primarily –  in the human case –
psychological, or even better moral selfishness, represented in 
the temptation to cheat on others in social dilemmas, of which 
the prisoner’s dilemma is the prototype. This is not to deny that 
humans also have altruistic and moral emotions; it merely 
reminds us that we have been ambivalently designed by natural 
selection. This is  the bottom line explaining why we humans so 
often deviate from moral behaviour: we have been designed 
with  selfish impulses as well as with moral emotions. These 
two sides of our nature are often at odds  with each other. The 
ambivalence of human morality was well captured by Trivers 
when he wrote:
 
“... where a degree of cheating is adaptive, natural selection 
will  rapidly favor a complex psychological system in each 
individual regulating both his own altruistic and cheating 
tendencies and his responses to these tendencies in others. ... 
The system that  results should simultaneously allow the 
individual to reap the benefits of altruistic exchanges, to 
protect himself from gross and subtle forms of cheating, and 
to  practice those forms of cheating that local conditions make 
adaptive.” [6, p. 48]
I think this is one of the important insights to be learned 
from an evolutionary perspective on human morality, and most 
certainly one we should keep in mind when thinking about 
FAMA. We do not  need to build this biological peculiarity into 
FAMA and we most probably won’t. Even if we could 
eventually manage to design FAMA to mimic humans in this 
natural feature, I see no reason why we should, given that we 
can design them to be similar to the “holy will” in the Kantian 
sense explained above. As Allen, Varner and  Zinser  [7, p. 255] 
have noted, “while we...tolerate human moral failures, it is  less 
clear that we would, or should, design the capacity for such 
failures into our machines.”
3.2 The moral hazard
Consider the possibility entertained by Tonkens, namely, that 
we design FAMA to  act and interact in only one domain or 
profession, for example, we design some of them to work only 
as clowns in children’s parties  [3, p.146]. Suppose then that 
circumstances changed such that  their services as clowns were 
no  longer needed. If FAMA is a sufficiently complex agent, full 
ethical agents in the sense of Moor [1], then they would most 
certainly understand this fact. They would probably think that 
they should better change profession and do something else, so 
they can still serve and be useful to  society. Note that this does 
not imply that FAMA is being “used” or treated merely as a 
means, for being useful  to society is  a consideration that 
humans do not, and should not, reject  in their own case when 
choosing or changing profession. In view of the changed 
circumstances in the market, a FAMA could propose to their 
human creators to  allow them to learn a new profession. 
Perhaps all they would need to do would be to “upload” a 
program for doing something else. This view of what they 
would think and propose is plausible and contrasts sharply with 
the view that Tonkens has expressed about the probable 
thoughts of “unidimensional” FAMAs:
“In perhaps the worst case scenario, such [unidimensional] 
robots would understand their very existence as not being 
consistent with the moral code that they were designed to 
follow, and hence may come to understand their existence as 
being something morally abhorrent. In such (admittedly 
speculative) instances, we may find AMAs in a state of 
moral paralysis or existential alienation. We may even find 
our ethical robots turning to (what Kant called) heroic 
suicide in order to preserve morality in the world.” [2, p. 
434]
I think this view is unrealistic: in the worst case scenario, if 
humans were to reject the proposal for letting FAMA change 
profession, FAMA would probably think that humans are 
irrational, or perhaps even immoral. If they can judge their own 
actions from a rational and a moral  point of view, as they must 
if they are FAMA indeed, nothing in principle hinders them 
from judging humans from both these points of view; nothing 
except we had deliberately blocked this ability in their 
programming. But if we had, then Tonkens would be right:  we 
would have created a morally abhorrent rational agent who, 
though capable in principle of criticising institutions for 
deliberately preventing the harmonisation of their interests with 
the interests of society at large, would have been denied this 
moral and political  freedom. In fact, nothing speaks in favour of 
denying them this freedom, for it seems perfectly compatible 
with  human ends and interests, at  least in the particular case at 
hand.
However, we can picture a case in some sense similar, 
namely involving FAMA making an evaluative judgment about 
humans, but also somewhat different and a bit more troubling, 
because it could potentially involve opposition to human 
interests. Suppose FAMA already existed  among us and they 
observed how we humans collectively deal with climate 
change, with industrial meat production and consumption, with 
the world economy and with several other global  problems that 
we are currently facing. It  doesn’t  matter whether we picture 
them following a Kantian morality or a utilitarian morality. By 
any standards, they would probably judge that our behaviour 
regarding these issues is not particularly rational or moral.
The global problems just  mentioned are all  social dilemmas. 
Their historical  novelty is that humans face them as a species, 
that is, as global or planetary dilemmas. Humans need to 
produce a public good like a healthy global economy or 
rationally manage the preservation of a common good like the 
natural environment  or a clean atmosphere. And though we 
seem to have reasonably succeeded in solving social dilemmas 
at a smaller scale, we seem to founder at  the global scale. A 
probable explanation is that our biologically designed 
selfishness is a manageable obstacle to their solution at a small 
scale, but now builds a major obstacle to morally solving these 
global issues in a way that we cannot easily remedy. Ethical 
machines would probably do it better. Whatever the morality 
we finally manage to  design into FAMA, the very fact that  it is 
possible to program them without our evolutionarily designed 
selfishness makes it easy for them to choose the cooperative 
move in the global social dilemmas in question.
But  ethical machines would not only do it better in the face 
of global social dilemmas. They would also know this. And 
they would predictably come into conflict with humans about 
the lack of an efficient policy. The conflict would not concern 
all humans equally. Many people are presently dissatisfied with 
the way governments deal (or fail to deal) with these issues. If 
these global issues still exist when FAMA arrives among us, 
some people might eventually welcome a machine 
“intervention”, if it paved the way for a solution. Is such a 
machine intervention conceivable? It depends of what we 
understand by intervention; and if some form of coercion is 
thereby implied, it  depends on whether their ethical systems 
admit some form of coercion as a means to achieve an 
important moral goal. We cannot rule this  out  completely if our 
own ethical systems justify some forms of coercion for the sake 
of moral goals. Moreover, if human moral  failure is  structural 
rather than contingent  – as it surely is if an evolutionary view of 
human morality is correct – FAMA will  know this as  well, and 
will  judge it risky to leave the fate of global issues entirely in 
human hands. I think the hazard of a moral confrontation 
between humans and machines is real if we eventually manage 
to  create FAMA, because they will  lack our selfish impulses. 
And though perhaps, as  noted above, not  everyone would see it 
as a hazard if it led to the solution of our urgent global issues, 
we can reasonably expect that a majority of humans will not 
tolerate a world where machines govern over humans in a 
paternalistic fashion.
4 CONCLUSIONS
The creation of FAMA faces a dilemma: if we really create 
them as free moral agents – and this seems a real possibility – 
they could come into a moral conflict with humans, because 
human moral frailty is a structural condition of which machines 
can, and  probably will, be free. But if in account of this possible 
conflict we try somehow to block  their abilities, and hinder 
them from reaching the logical conclusions they will probably 
arrive at concerning human moral behaviour, Tonkens will be 
right: we will create a “morally abhorrent” rational creature, not 
to  mention the computational problems that engineers will 
probably face in trying to  block the logical consequences that a 
“holy will” is bound to reach if left to its own resources. 
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Behind the Mask: Machine Morality
Keith Miller1, Marty J. Wolf2, and Frances Grodzinsky3
Abstract.  We  consider  machines  that  have  the  ability  to 
masquerade  as  human  in  the  context  of  Floridi's  Information 
Ethics  and  artificial  evil.   We  analyze  a  variety  of  different 
robots  and  contexts  and  the  ethical  implications  for  the 
development of such robots. We demonstrate numerous concerns 
that  arise  due  to  the  ambiguity  introduced  by  masquerading 
machines, suggesting a need for careful consideration regarding 
the development of masquerading robots.123
1 INTRODUCTION
In Information Ethics increasing “metaphysical  entropy” is the 
fundamental  evil.  “Metaphysical  entropy refers to any kind of 
destruction or corruption of entities understood as informational 
objects (mind, not just semantic information or messages), that 
is, any form of impoverishment of Being” [1]. The focus of evil 
becomes  actions  or  information  processes.  “Approval  or 
disapproval of any information process is then based on how the 
latter affects the essence of the informational entities it involves 
and, more generally, the well-being of the whole infosphere, i.e. 
on how successful or unsuccessful it is in respecting the claims 
attributable to the informational entities involved and, hence, in 
enriching or impoverishing the infosphere.” Later in that same 
chapter Floridi writes, “an action is unconditionally approvable 
only if it never generates any metaphysical entropy in the course 
of its implementation.”   
   It  is  essential  to note that  Floridi  uses “entropy”  in two 
different ways in the context of information ethics.  Both of them 
are present in these quotes.  At one level, entropy is caused by an 
action and happens to an information object.  However, this sort 
of entropy cannot be evaluated in and of itself as a source of evil. 
At the second level, the action and the resulting entropy must be 
considered  in  the  context  of  the  infosphere.   That  is,  the 
informational  object-level  entropy  must  increase  the  level  of 
entropy in the infosphere for it to be considered an instance of 
evil.   These  descriptions  are  consistent  with  the  technical 
definitions  of  good  and  evil  developed  in  [2].   We refer  the 
interested reader to that paper for a complete description of the 
formal tools. 
   In this paper we explore the question of whether it is evil (in 
the  sense  Floridi  defines  evil  in  information  ethics)  for  a 
machine to masquerade as a human. Masquerading refers to a 
person  in  a  given  context  being  unable  to  tell  whether  the 
machine is a human.   The masquerade may be brief or persist 
for  some  time  and  can  refer  to  a  wide  range  of  possible 
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behaviors.  At one extreme, a machine M is designed explicitly 
to try to deceive humans into believing that M is a human being, 
and M is designed to lie if directly asked if it is a human or a 
machine. At the other extreme, M regularly informs humans that 
M is a machine, but then M’s actions mimic human behavior. 
However, there are behaviors between these two extremes that, 
according  our  definition,  would  still  be  a  masquerade.   For 
example,  the machine M might  pretend to be a human unless 
someone asked the direct question, at which point M would tell 
the truth about its non-humanness. Another possibility is that M 
employs a more human behavior by coyly obfuscating the truth. 
The case where M learns this behavior after deployment (not as 
part  of  its  original  programming  or  pre-launch  training) 
introduces  additional  important  questions. We  conclude  that 
under some circumstances such a masquerade is evil and under 
other circumstances it is not.
2 TYPES OF ROBOTS 
Many scholars contend that several kinds of non-human entities 
should be considered moral  patients;  for  example,  non-human 
animals  [3] and the environment  [4]  are  candidates for  moral 
patients.  Following similar lines of reasoning, we contend that 
sophisticated machines that can function for extended periods of 
time  without  direct  human  intervention  (our  definition  of 
“intelligent and autonomous machines”) ought to be considered 
for designation as moral patients.  Relatively simple devices that 
fit this description already exist.  Many people have been duped 
into thinking that the voice on the other end of the telephone line 
is a true human voice—even though that belief may have existed 
for only a second or two.  These systems are being improved.
A  second  type  of  robot  that  we  are  interested  in  is  often 
referred to a as soft-bot: a software agent that acts on behalf of 
its user.  Soft-bots could be thought of as passing a very narrow 
Turing  test.   For  example,  a  soft-bot  that  conducts  financial 
transactions  such  as  buying  and  selling  securities  can 
demonstrate almost human-like knowledge of financial markets. 
Social bots, on Twitter for example, could be classified this way 
[5].  All interactions with this sort of robot take place via textual 
means such as a messaging service, email or SMS texts.  
A softbot masquerade is the kind of masquerade Turing used 
as his test for artificial intelligence.  He explicitly required that 
the  communication  with  the  unknown  entity  take  place  via  a 
terminal in order to conceal the true nature of the entity under 
consideration.  Essentially, Turing was using the masquerade as 
a way to ensure that the test was a test of intelligence, rather than 
a  test  of  appearance.   As  noted  above,  this  sort  of  mask  is 
currently in widespread use in various online environments and 
over the phone.
The final type of robot under consideration is a physical robot 
that not only takes on a humanoid form, but is also capable of 
passing some sort of appearance-based Turing test, and possibly 
a more standard Turing test as well.  The interaction with such a 
robot could be via a web cam where the image on the screen is 
sufficiently  detailed,  such  as  Charles  currently  under 
development  at  Cambridge  University [6] or in close physical 
proximity.
3 MORAL PATIENTS AND MORAL AGENTS
In  his  development  of  Information  Ethics  (IE),  Floridi 
distinguishes between moral agents and moral patients [1, Ch. 
7]. Moral agents are entities that can perform actions, for good or 
evil. His notion of moral patients has been expanded to include 
everything that has any sort of informational existence.  While 
this expansion is controversial, his work is an appropriate place 
to begin our analysis as Information Ethics is a way to account 
for the patients of significance to us.  We are certainly concerned 
about  humans,  but  robots—interpreted  broadly  to  include 
software robots and robotic voice systems such as Apple's Siri—
are also part of our analysis and are readily accommodated by 
IE.  IE also accommodates multi-agent systems.
In our analysis, we identify six entities associated with robots 
that have the potential to serve as moral patients or moral agents. 
There are three entities that are immediately obvious:   1. The 
developer of the robot.  Developer is a term that is intended to 
encompass  the  appropriate  group  of  people  for  the  particular 
robot.   It  may  include  just  a  single  programmer,  a  team  of 
programmers,  or even the entire corporation that produced the 
robot.  2. The robot itself.  3. The user of the robot.  Since IE 
allows for moral agents to be multi-agent systems, we use it to 
identify three additional key multi-agent systems that play a role 
in our analysis:  4. The developer and the robot as a team.  5. 
The user and the robot as a team.  6. The developer, the robot, 
and  the user,  as  a  team.   All  six  of  these moral  agents  shed 
different  light  on  the  ethical  issues  and concerns  surrounding 
robots that masquerade.
In addition to the six entities that are pertinent to the question 
at hand, there is one more that deserves consideration.  We use 
“Others”  to  refer  to  members  of  society  not  under  the  direct 
impact of the robot, yet  impacted by the changes in the world 
brought about by the addition of the robot to the world.  Of the 
many possible pairs, we analyze these relationships: Developer/
Robot,  Robot/User,  User/Developer,  Robot-User/Others, 
Developer-Robot/Others,  where  in  each of  these relationships, 
there are two possibilities to consider.  Essentially each entity 
can be the moral agent while the other is the patient.  Depending 
on  the  pair,  it  may  make  sense  to  consider  only   one  such 
possibility.
4  AGENCY, ACCOUNTABILITY AND 
RESPONSIBILITY
According  to  IE,  an  entity  is  an  agent  when  it  is  interactive, 
autonomous  and  adaptable  at  the  Level  of  Abstraction  (LoA) 
used for analysis.  To define an LoA, a set of observables must 
be given.  Key to our discussion here is whether non-humanness 
is  an observable.   When a  machine  is  either  obviously  not  a 
human, or when a machine self-identifies as not a human, then 
humans  are  far  less  likely  to  assume  moral  agency  for  that 
machine. On the other hand, if a machine M explicitly deceives 
humans into thinking that M is a human being, then from the 
human’s perspective, the assumption will be that M is a (human) 
moral agent.  While there may be specific situations where this 
sort  of  deception  is  acceptable  or  even  morally  desirable,  in 
general the possibility for this sort of deception could be used to 
make the argument that work on any robots capable of passing 
some  sort  of  physical  Turing  test  ought  not  proceed.   This 
argument could be supported by the presumed ease with which 
such  a  morally  good  masquerade  could  be  morphed  into  a 
morally objectionable masquerade.
Floridi  also  distinguishes  between  moral  responsibility  and 
moral accountability, two concepts that are important to us here. 
Moral accountability is something that can be attributed to non-
human  agents,  including.  robots  and  multi-agent  systems  like 
corporations.   Moral  responsibility  is  something  that  Floridi 
reserves for human agents and possibly multi-agent systems that 
have  at  least  one  human  agent.  (Floridi  leaves  open  the 
possibility  that  non-humans  may  someday  have  moral 
accountability,  but he does not think any existing machines at 
this writing are candidates.)
5 RELATIONSHIP ANALYSES
Earlier we identified five relationships that yield insight on the 
issue of  whether  we  ought  to  develop  robots  that  can  pass  a 
physical  Turing  test.   Each  of  these  relationships  has  the 
potential to yield two different moral actors, a moral agent with a 
corresponding moral patient.  Of those ten possibilities, we focus 
on six that have the most significance to our argument.
5.1 Developer as actor, Robot as patient
The  Developer/Robot  relationship  is  the  beginning  of  any 
masquerade  that  may eventually  take  place.  Note  that  in  this 
LoA, the non-humanness of the robot is always observable for 
the human developer. Viewing the robot as a moral patient, we 
consider a developer who programs the robot in such a way that 
it cannot answer questions about its humanness.  By doing this, 
the  developer  is  incorporating  a  deception  into  the  robot. 
Without claiming that the robot itself can or cannot be deceived, 
the  robot  has  clearly  become  a  vessel  that  implements  a 
deception.  The deployment of the robot becomes the action to 
analyze,  because context will determine the moral significance 
of the action. For example, a robot deployed to masquerade as 
Abraham Lincoln in an exhibit at a museum would be a mild sort 
of  “deception”  that  we  would  consider  benign.  But  a  robot 
developed to masquerade as a bank customer in order to rob a 
bank would be problematic.  Note that in each of these cases it is 
the deployment action that is called in to question, it is not the 
act of developing such a robot
The Twitter  bot developed by Nanis et  al.  appears to have 
been developed without the ability to reveal its non-humanness 
[5].  And, certainly the voice recognition system we encounter in 
customer service call centers does not have the ability to answer 
questions about its humanness.  This seems perfectly reasonable, 
but seems to grow increasingly less so the more the robot has the 
potential to fool people.  We seem to have this conundrum where 
the ways that software has been developed traditionally (it is not 
given  knowledge  of  its  non-humanness)  becomes  ethically 
problematic when that software happens to be software that may 
deceive people into believing the software is human.
The source of this unease does not arise in the current context, 
the relationship between the  developer and the robot where the 
robot  is  the  patient.   The  action  under  analysis  here  is  the 
development of the robot. By focusing on the act of developing 
the robot, which may be just a piece of software, our analysis 
changes.   Since the patient  is  the  robot,  IE  asks whether  any 
damage is done to software or any part of the infosphere because 
of this built-in deception.  It is reasonable to conclude that none 
is done.  Almost all of the software that has been used to build 
the infosphere has been developed in a similar way.  Thus, there 
is no moral harm here.  The robot is designed to create certain 
things  in  the  infosphere,  and  assuming  that  it  does  so,  the 
developer has not harmed the moral patient.  However,  as we 
shall  see  the  next  section,  this  act  does  produce  harm  in  a 
different relationship.
5.2 Robot as actor, User as patient
In  this  relationship  we  consider  two  different  cases.   In  both 
cases the robot is so human-like that it passes some reasonable 
physical Turing test.  In the first case, the user knows that the 
robot is not human.  In the second case, the user does not.
A robot with observable non-humanness does not mean that 
the  user  is  constantly  reminded  of  it.   It  is  just  that  the  user 
knows  at  some point in  time about the  non-humanness.   It  is 
fairly  common  that  as  we  begin  to  use  a  particular  piece  of 
technology, we are tentative about relying too heavily on it.  As 
the device becomes more reliable, we integrate it more deeply 
into our lives.   The reliability has a second effect:  we tend to 
spend less time critically considering the technology.   Thus, a 
robot, through consistent high-level performance, can move to a 
state in the user's thinking that is quite similar to one in which 
the non-humanness of a robot is not an observable, even though 
that  information initially was made available to the user.  This 
may be true even for a robot that regularly reminds the user that 
it  is  not  a  human.   The  reminders  may not  register.   Sherry 
Turkle gives us of the case of robot babies and pets given to the 
elderly, particularly those in nursing homes.  At the end of the 
interaction period, she was unable to remove these robots as the 
users had become so attached to them.  Said one, “She listens to 
me” [7].
Thus,  regardless  of  whether  a  robot's  non-humanness  is 
formally an observable,  we  may ultimately be dealing with  a 
case where a human user does not observe it.  In this case the 
user believes incorrectly (or behaves as if) the robot is a human 
moral agent.  The important distinction here is that in the case of 
a human moral agent, a user ultimately knows that the agent can 
be  ascribed  responsibility  for  any  moral  action.   The  robot 
(according to Floridi) can only be ascribed moral accountability. 
In the case that the robot engages in morally bad actions, there is 
clearly damage to the infosphere and according the Floridi the 
robot would be held accountable.
A second case is more interesting.  That is, what if a robot 
successfully masquerading as a human engages in only morally 
neutral or good actions?  Is there something inherently damaging 
to  the  infosphere  in  this  case?   One  major  concern  is  that 
information is not revealed to the user, a human, thus impacting 
that person's ability to make morally good decisions.  The user 
might encounter a situation calling for moral action and come to 
the  wrong conclusion because of  the  misunderstanding of  the 
robot’s situation.  As a trivial example, consider a Twitter user 
following the Twitter bot described in section 5.1.  If the user is 
particularly cognizant of the feelings of other Twitter users (note 
that not all Twitter users are human), the person may spend too 
much time trying to decide whether to stop following the Twitter 
bot for fear of hurting that “person's” feelings when, in fact, the 
Twitter  bot  is  neither  a  person  nor  has  feelings.  A  dramatic 
example might ensue if a fire breaks out in an office and a great 
deal of attention is paid to saving “people” who turn out to be 
robots; this is   especially troubling in the case where a well-
liked robot is saved and in the process human lives are lost [8].
The bottom line is that  robots that  masquerade as humans, 
regardless of whether  that  masquerade is announced,  have the 
potential  to  impact  the  decision  making  processes  of  people. 
This asymmetric power that reflects back to the relationship in 
section 5.1 needs to be accounted for in design and development 
of  robots  that  masquerade.   And if  it  can  be  shown  that  the 
masquerade corrupts the infosphere,  then according to Floridi, 
evil has occurred.
5.3 User as actor, Robot as patient
In  IE,  robots  are  clearly  moral  patients  and,  as  such,  deserve 
some initial, overridable moral respect.  Thus, actions taken by a 
human user of a robot toward the robot are candidates for moral 
evaluation.   First,  we consider the case when the robot's  non-
humanness is observable. 
When  the  robot’s  non-humanness  is  observable,  a  user's 
consideration of appropriate moral action can be more precisely 
considered.   As  with  the  case  in  section  5.2,  a  person  may 
become accustomed to thinking about the robot in human terms, 
and  be  less  likely  to  engage  in  a  more  critical  analysis  of  a 
potential  action  toward  the  robot.  Current  moral  thinking  of 
many people is deeply influenced by ethical theories that have as 
an  assumption  that  humans  are  the  only  moral  patients.   By 
observing the non-humanness of the robot, we might apply an 
ethical analysis that views the robot as a “thing” with no more 
ethical significance than our car or vacuum cleaner.  At the very 
least,  this  suggests  a  need  for  better  development  of  ethical 
intuition in users of robots toward robots.
More interesting questions arise when the actions of the user 
are either morally good or neutral and the user is unaware that 
the  robot  is  not  human.   In  any moral  situation,  a  successful 
masquerade clearly causes the user to behave as if the patient 
were human.  This might be useful in a training scenario, but it 
could be damaging when it happens in other contexts. 
In  this  case,  the  person  involved  almost  certainly employs 
ethical analysis that is based on a false assumption.  The patient 
in this case is a robot, yet the user is giving it the moral respect 
that is due a human.  Furthermore, there is no reason to assume 
that the conclusion reached with respect to the situation is even 
appropriate  given  that  the  patient  in  this  case  is  not  human. 
Ethical  analysis  fairs  better  when  the  observables  include 
knowledge  that  the  patient  is  a  robot.  The  misinformation 
increases entropy, and encourages sub-optimal consequences.
5.4 Developer as actor, User as patient
In general, when a developer creates software, the output of the 
software is the moral action in which the user becomes a moral 
patient.  In our specific scenario here, the moral action of the 
developer is embodied in the actions of the robot.  The robot is 
the  means  by  which  the  developer  acts  upon  the  user.   In 
addition to the issues addressed in [9], here we are concerned 
with  the  visibility  of  the  non-humanness  of  the  robot.   We 
contend  that  some  damage  may  be  done  when  the  robot 
embodies a deception about its humanness.  As an information 
object, the quality of the information embodied in the robot is 
central  to  not  only its  “goodness,”   but  its  ability to  promote 
goodness in the infosphere.  Since the robot is NOT a human, 
any  attempt  to  hide  this  fact  (either  from  the  robot  or  from 
observers  of  the  robot)  represents  a  moral  action.   In  some 
contexts  this  action  is  morally  acceptable.  For  example,  in 
entertainment,  scientific  experiments,  and educational  displays 
such deceptions have positive overall  outcomes.  However,  the 
presence  of  the  deception  (and  its  embodiment  in  the  robot) 
should not be minimized in an IE analysis because the embodied 
deception is, by definition, creates an infosphere where morally 
unacceptable actions are easier to engage in.
A  second  concern  arises  from  the  complexity  of  design 
required for a robot to pass some sort of physical  Turing test. 
Such  a  high  level  of  complexity  makes  it  difficult  for  the 
developer to understand or control the robot's actions.  When the 
developer is focused on creating a robot that passes a physical 
Turning test, less attention might be paid to the morality of the 
actions the robot performs.  In most software projects, features 
have varying  levels  of desirability and the developer  typically 
focuses  resources  on  those  features  that  can  be  achieved 
efficiently.  The complexity  of  a  masquerade will,  necessarily, 
require trade-offs in all functionalities.
When the goal is to develop a robot that  passes a physical 
Turing test,  adding a feature whereby the user of the robot is 
deterred from observing the robot as non-human is contradictory 
to the primary goal.  This suggests that while developing a robot 
that can pass a physical Turing test is a significant technological 
achievement,  it is ethically problematic.  Such a goal can only 
be made ethically sound if users can somehow be made aware, 
and as we have argued, told again and again, that the device is a 
robot.  Otherwise,  the  resulting  misinformation  corrupts  the 
infosphere (IE analysis) and can have detrimental effects (visible 
in  more  traditional  ethical  analyses  such  as  utilitarian, 
deontological and values).
5.5 Robot-User as actor, Others as patient
In this section and the next, we change our focus and consider 
the broader society as a moral patient.  The observables that are 
significant here are more on a sociological level.  We call this 
level  of  abstraction  LoAS,  where  S  is  mnemonic  for  Society 
[10].  Again we are concerned with whether the non-humanness 
of the robot is an observable, this time at LoAS.  
The  infosphere  already  has  reacted  to  the  possibility  that 
some robot-user actors are not pure human systems.  There are 
times when the intention of the system make the ethical analysis 
clear.  For example, in the case of robocalls that ask people to 
give personal information or wire money,  the robot-user moral 
agents plays on the inability of the user to distinguish real human 
calls from robocalls.  Here the robot-user is accountable and the 
moral  responsibility for  any damage lies with the human who 
chose to deploy the robot in this way.
The Captcha system touts itself as a public Turing test to tell 
humans  and  computers  apart  [11].   Essentially,  others  have 
assumed that non-humanness is being disguised on the web (and 
rightly  so)  and  have  developed  a  system  to  protect  web  site 
interfaces from this intentional deception.  The interesting thing 
here is that the threat of non-humanness  not being observable 
has  had  a  negative  impact  on  humankind.    People  are  now 
obligated to  spend time wading  through Captcha's  in order  to 
obtain the types of services and products they are interested in. 
While this is of concern, there are clear arguments that when the 
robot-user is engaged in this sort of activity, the activity itself is 
clearly unethical.  The robot-user system is trying to gain some 
sort of advantage over other users of that particular web service.
Contrast the Captcha system (which makes humans work to 
prove their  humanness) with an earlier protocol that  made the 
robots  conform:  robots.txt.  In  the  early  days  of  the  web,  a 
voluntary  protocol  was  devised  in  which  human  web  site 
administrators  included  a  simply  encoded  text  file  named 
“robots.txt”  in  the  top  level  directory  for  a  website.  Inside 
robots.txt, the site administrator listed what parts of the website 
the  administrator  did  NOT  want  indexed  by  any  “spiders” 
(softbots sent out by search engines to survey websites). In this 
case, the human administrators deposited an un-invitation,  and 
softbots were assumed to obey the human wishes. The robots.txt 
protocol still exists, but many softbots now ignore the protocol 
[12].
The situation we are interested in is the impact the robot-user 
has when its intentions are mundane or even quite pure and for 
the benefit  of others.  Our assumption for this analysis is that 
others do not know and have no way of knowing whether the 
robot is indeed a robot, yet the user has full knowledge of this 
fact.  For example, consider a robot used to care for demented 
patients in a hypothetical future facility designed to protect the 
patients.  Perhaps the patients are too dangerous to use human 
caregivers,  so  instead  direct  care  is  given  using  human-like 
robots. If it is calming for the patients to think that the caregivers 
are human, then the deception may be ethically positive, despite 
the misinformation embodied in the robot caregivers.
5.6 Developer-Robot as actor, Others as patient
As an example, we return to the Twitter bot mentioned earlier. 
While the bot developed by Nanis, et al. did not pass any sort of 
rigorous Turing test, it did masquerade and cause real people to 
behave as if  the bot were human [5].   Their bots obtained 62 
followers on average.  While it is difficult to ascertain how many 
of those followers were human (and in the context of IE this may 
not even be important),  it  stands to reason that many of them 
were.  The purpose of their experiment was to ascertain whether 
a  bot  could  foster  human-human  interaction.   Their  evidence 
suggests that the bots were quite successful at doing so.  This 
higher level of connectivity among real people seems to be the 
sort of thing that Twitter users desire. Another example is Siri 
the  personal  assistant  on  the  iPhone.   In  commercials  on 
television,  she  is  told  to  “take  the  night  off”,  when  she  has 
completed  her  tasks.   Users  ask her  to  perform tasks  as  they 
would a human personal assistant.  
Regardless  of whether these bots pass a more sophisticated 
Turing test,  we certainly can imagine the development  of one 
that  does.  of  the   behavior  of  Siri  and  the  Twitter  bot  is 
consistent  with  the  expectations  of  users  and,  although 
deceptive,  ought not be viewed as evil. The actions of these bots 
help create an environment that establishes connections among 
users and does not degrade the infosphere.
6 CONCLUSIONS
In  this  paper,  we  have  tried to  deconstruct  the  complexity  of 
machines masquerading as humans.  In examining the roles of 
moral agent and moral patient we have defined relationships that 
serve to illustrate where  the locus of moral  responsibility and 
moral accountability lie in relationships where machines reveal 
their non-humanness and in those where they attempt to pass a 
physical Turing test.  We have examined these relationships in 
the context of the infosphere and tried to answer the question of 
whether it is evil, according to Floridi’s definition, for machines 
to masquerade as humans.  The evidence is clear that when a 
machine masquerades,  it  influences the behavior  or actions of 
people, not only toward the robot, but also toward other people.  
So  even  when  the  masquerade  itself  does  not  corrupt  the 
infosphere, it changes the infosphere by making it more difficult 
for agents to make sound ethical decisions, increasing the chance 
for evil.
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Abstract.  A key distinction in ethics is between members and 
non-members of the moral community.  Over time our notion of 
this community has expanded as we have moved from a 
rationality  criterion to a sentience criterion for membership.  I 
argue that a sentience criterion can be understood in terms of 
respecting the interests and autonomy of a being and thus may be 
extended to self-aware and/or autonomous machines.  Such 
machines exhibit a concept of self and thus desires for the course 
of their own existence; this gives them basic moral standing, 
although elaborating the nature of their rights is complex.  While 
not all machines display autonomy, those which do must be 
treated as members of the moral community; to ignore their 
claims to moral recognition is to repeat the errors of 
colonialism.12 
1 INTRODUCTION 
A key distinction in ethics is between members and non-
members of the moral community; this is the foundation for 
understanding how we may treat the entities we encounter in the 
world.  Over time our notion of this community has expanded; 
those we take as non-members have thus changed, and the 
criteria used to make that distinction have also altered.  
Historically, as surveyed in [1, 2, 3], criteria such as intellect and 
rationality were used to separate white men from women and 
non-whites.  Taken to be governed by emotion, these people 
were seen as moral inferiors, and thus deserving of lesser or no 
moral consideration. 
Even upon conceding that rationality was not the exclusive 
preserve of white men, and thus including women and non-
whites as members of the moral community, philosophers still 
generally denied moral standing to animals, as seen in [4, 5]; 
humans had the moral high ground of rationality and 
consciousness.  However, the rationality criterion raises 
questions as to how rational a being must be to receive moral 
standing – there is a serious risk of excluding certain humans 
(such as infants) from the moral community which, as seen in 
[6], is unpalatable to many thinkers.  Furthermore, our 
understanding of the biological similarities between humans and 
other animals makes it difficult to maintain a sharp distinction 
between them; various other animals seem to possess degrees of 
rationality and consciousness as well.  This has resulted (in [6, 7, 
8]) in a move to sentience as the criterion for moral standing: if 
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 Obviously there is clarification required to specify what constitutes 
unnecessary suffering and exactly how much moral standing animals 
have.  However, sentience suffices to give them a foot in the door of the 
moral community, so to speak. 
 
something can feel pain, it is wrong to make it suffer 
unnecessarily.3   
This is a large expansion to the moral community, yet of 
course many things continue to lack moral standing; an object 
such as a table or chair is not a member of the moral community, 
for instance.  Unless the object belongs to someone else, I can do 
what I wish to it; the only kind of moral harm that can be caused 
in this situation is harm to a person or persons who have a claim 
to that object.4  As such, there is currently a strong ethical divide 
between living beings and what we see as created things.  This 
has serious implications for the ethical issues pertaining to 
intelligent machines, since for many there is a strong temptation 
to classify these machines as objects and thus not deserving of 
any moral standing.  I will argue that this is incorrect and that 
certain kinds of machines are, in fact, members of the moral 
community. 
2 ETHICS AND THE PREVENTION OF HARM  
When conversing with people, one informal objection that 
frequently occurs to granting moral standing to a machine is the 
claim that you cannot “hurt” a machine.  In essence, this is an 
internalization (and over-simplification) of the sentience 
criterion for moral standing.  Ethics is often taken to involve the 
prevention of harm – if something cannot be harmed, then many 
evidence a certain reluctance to offer moral standing to the thing 
in question.   
For humans, the harm generally involves some kind of pain.  
However, the ability to feel physical pain cannot be the only 
criterion for membership in the moral community.  Consider a 
person with congenital analgesia, i.e., one who is unable to 
register physical pain.  It would surely still be wrong to step on 
his foot intentionally and without his permission.  This is not 
because the action caused pain (since, by design, it does not).  
Instead, the wrongness stems from two key points.  First, the 
action could cause damage, even if it does not cause pain.  
Second, since we have specified that the person does not give 
permission for the action, deliberately stepping on his foot 
violates his desire to remain unmolested. 
I will briefly sketch how these two characteristics suffice to 
render the action unethical under the auspices of most major 
ethical theories.  Specifically, utilitarianism, deontological 
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 The ownership of an object could be the community as a whole, such 
as with public art installations.  If someone were to destroy the Vietnam 
Veteran’s Memorial, one could argue that it would cause harm to the 
public (which has a claim on the memorial) and is thus morally wrong.  
It would be odd to say that you had morally wronged the monument 
itself, however. 
ethics, virtue ethics, the ethics of care, and contractarianism will 
generally condemn the action.  While space does not permit a 
full elaboration of the arguments with regard to each theory, the 
outline should serve to highlight the following point: actions 
which either cause harm or simply ignore the wishes of the 
person being acted upon are unethical even if said actions do not 
cause pain.  Moreover, I shall argue that there is an underlying 
theme that unifies the ethical condemnation expressed by these 
diverse theories. 
First, consider utilitarianism.  Jeremy Bentham appeals to his 
hedonic calculus in order to determine the rightness of an action, 
as outlined in [8].  Although in our situation there is no physical 
pain sensation felt by the victim, Bentham allows for mental or 
emotional pain as well.  It thus seems likely that, in general, a 
person’s distress in having their wishes ignored will outweigh 
the sadistic pleasure of the tormentor.  There might be some odd 
instances where this is not the case, particularly if the person has 
little desire to live or cannot comprehend what has been done to 
him.  The more general notion of disutility raised by John Stuart 
Mill in [9] can accommodate many of these outliers, since there 
is harm being caused to the person even if he cannot register the 
physical sensation of pain.5  As such, disutility is being 
generated, and will usually outweigh any sadistic utility 
generated by the action. 
The ethical argument condemning the action is extremely 
simply for deontological ethics, since the tormentor is clearly 
violating the second formulation of the Categorical Imperative.  
As developed by Kant in [4], an action is only ethical if it treats 
humanity (by which he means any rational being) as an end 
rather than as a means.  One is thus not permitted to use rational 
beings simply as a tool for achieving one’s own purpose.  By 
ignoring the wishes of the person in question, the tormentor is 
using that person as a means for his own pleasure; furthermore, 
since there are no extenuating circumstances specified, such as 
the action’s somehow being for the long-term good of the victim, 
the action does not proceed from a good will.  It is thus not a 
permissible action for a deontological ethicist.   
Both virtue ethics, such as Aristotle espouses in [11], and the 
caring ethics developed by Carol Gilligan and Nel Noddings in 
[12, 13], share a similarity in their reasons for condemning the 
action.  Specifically, the tormentor’s lack of sympathy for the 
victim, which is evidenced by disregarding his wishes entirely, 
demonstrates a lack of benevolence and care.  The tormentor has 
chosen a selfish pursuit of pleasure at the expense of others; he 
does not care if he is causing harm, nor does he care what his 
victim desires.  Again, since there are no mitigating factors, it 
cannot be that some other concern or virtue is outweighing this 
one; the action simply displays a lack of care and compassion. 
To round out our survey of ethical theories, based on [14], a 
contractarian such as John Rawls would denounce the action 
because the person in question did not consent to it.  More 
accurately, no rational person would consent to such an action, 
as there is no advantage to him; giving up his right to remain 
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unmolested and allowing others simply to ignore his desires is 
irrational in the absence of any expected benefit.  While there is 
debate over the degree of risk to which a rational person would 
consent, this does not seem to present a serious problem in our 
case.  Unless the proportion of sadists in the general population 
is considerably higher than I expect, there is almost certainly a 
greater prospect of being tormented (and hence more harm 
generated by such actions) than there is of one being a sadist 
(and thus deriving benefit from that action.)  The chance of 
satisfaction provided to the sadist is simply not sufficient to 
motivate consent to this infringement of individual liberty. 
For all of these ethical theories note that the explanations of 
wrongness are tied to the more general idea of having interests, 
not to that of feeling physical pain.  The notion of harm in 
question, therefore, moves beyond physical pain and hinges on 
the idea of respecting the integrity and autonomy of the 
individual.  The possibility of the action’s causing damage, even 
if it does not cause pain, raises the idea of bodily integrity.  At a 
minimum, beings have an interest in retaining sufficient bodily 
integrity for continued existence; anything which damages one’s 
body threatens this interest.  This interest can certainly be 
outweighed by other factors – I may consent to having my 
appendix removed because that particular violation of bodily 
integrity actually promotes my continuation under certain 
circumstances.  Frequently in medicine we consent to actions 
which are extremely damaging to our bodies (such as 
chemotherapy) if the alternatives are worse. 
Clearly it is possible to overstate the commitment to bodily 
integrity, since we consent to small violations of it on a regular 
basis.  Most people trim their fingernails or their hair or will pick 
open the occasional scab; they are unlikely to see those actions 
as presenting any serious threat to continued existence.  Hence 
one might argue that a minor harm, such as stepping on a 
person’s foot, cannot truly be objected to on this basis.  Indeed, I 
believe that the emphasis on bodily integrity dovetails with the 
desire to remain unmolested mentioned above; together they 
highlight the fact that I have certain wishes about the shape of 
my life.  
By ignoring the person’s desire not to be trod upon, the 
aggressor’s action violates his autonomy.  In much of ethics, 
autonomy is emphasized as an important good.6  To cast it aside 
for no reason other than to satisfy one’s own sadistic desires is to 
jeopardize the interest of the injured person in governing the 
course of his own life.  Such an action may not cause physical 
pain, but it clearly causes harm to that person – it treats him as 
incapable or unworthy of directing his own actions, and views 
his desires as irrelevant and something that may simply be 
ignored.  Although it is clear that sometimes a person’s desires 
must, ethically, be overridden, we surely cannot ignore another’s 
wishes completely.7 
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 While I will not rehearse the arguments for each ethical theory in detail 
again, note that ignoring a person’s desires for his life will fail to 
calculate the utility/disutility generated by particular actions, will treat 
the person as a means to an end, is certainly not something rational 
people are likely to consent to from behind a veil of ignorance, and 
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these ethical theories will condone simply ignoring the desires of a 
person. 
Hence while sentience certainly leads to having interests, it is 
not necessary for them: the property of consciousness or self-
awareness will also suffice.8  Once a being is self-aware, it can 
desire continuation and formulate ideas about how to live its life.  
It is possible to harm such a being by ignoring or thwarting those 
desires; one should not act against the being’s wishes, therefore, 
without some overriding reason.  The requirement of such a 
reason, however, is equivalent to granting the being at least 
minimal moral standing; one does not need to have a reason to 
destroy a chair, but one must provide such a reason to destroy a 
human.  This holds true for intelligent machines just as much as 
for a person with congenital analgesia; they both have interests 
and desires, hence they both have basic moral standing.  
3 SELF-AWARENESS AND AUTONOMY 
Thus far our argument has reached the conclusion that self-aware 
machines have moral standing.  In general, the question of moral 
standing for machines is raised in the context of artificial 
intelligence – would an intelligent machine have moral standing?  
To provide an answer to this general question, we must ask 
whether we can assume that intelligent machines are self-aware.  
If so, we have addressed the moral standing of all intelligent 
machines; if not, then further work is necessary to clarify the 
status of the remaining machines. 
To respond to this, we must consider what is meant by an 
intelligent machine.  Shane Legg and Marcus Hutter have, in 
[16, 17, 18], gathered many of our informal definitions of 
intelligence and used them to devise a working account of 
machine intelligence.  Informally, their definition of intelligence 
in [18] is “Intelligence measures an agent’s ability to achieve 
goals in a wide range of environments.”9 One key question that 
emerges from this definition is who determines the goals of the 
agent.  There are two possibilities: one, the agent’s goals are 
always determined by an outside source or, two, the agent 
sometimes determines its own goals. 
Consider the case where the agent’s goals are always 
established by an outside source.  In this case, the goals are 
communicated to the agent in some fashion, and the agent 
simply uses its resources to accomplish whatever goals it has 
been given.  Such an agent lacks any kind of autonomy.  Since 
the agent lacks self-awareness and lacks the ability to formulate 
goals for itself, the argument for moral standing does not apply; 
it will not have a desire for continuation or any wishes as to how 
to live its life.  As such, it seems to be in the same category with 
chairs and tables mentioned above and lacks moral standing; it is 
not clear how one could harm or benefit such an entity.10  
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 Presumably the machine is not sentient, or we could have had a much 
shorter argument for moral standing; as such, it cannot gain moral rights 
through an appeal to sentience.  One might try to argue that such a being 
has rationality and thus, on some views of morality at least, must be 
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Contrariwise, consider the case where the agent is capable of 
determining its own goals, at least some of the time.  In this case, 
the agent is expressing a basic capacity for autonomy – it is 
capable of directing (at least some of) its own actions.  As such, 
it exhibits a basic level of self-awareness; making choices 
concerning its future goals implies that it possesses the concept 
of self – setting goals for oneself requires awareness of that self.  
While the choices may be influenced by the programming of the 
machine, human choices are also influenced by upbringing, 
societal pressure, brain chemistry, and so forth.  Since moral 
theorizing generally views human autonomy as worth preserving 
despite these factors, machine autonomy likewise has worth.11   
One point worth noting is that moral questions are not black-
and white; both autonomy and moral standing exist on a 
continuum.  The more autonomous the machine, the more duty 
we will have to respect its wishes; the less autonomy, the more 
we are permitted to act as its guardian.   This is akin to how we 
treat children and the severely mentally disabled; they are not 
viewed as capable of making decisions in as many areas as fully-
functioning adults, hence we do not see their desires as binding 
to the same extent.  They still have moral standing, of course, in 
that it is wrong to harm them without just cause.  Nevertheless, 
they are not granted as much governance over the course of their 
own lives, and we do not view overriding their wishes as 
comparable to overriding the wishes of other adults.  In a similar 
fashion, a machine with greater autonomy likely has more claim 
on us to respect that autonomy, and it will be a greater moral 
fault if we ignore its wishes. 
In summary, I believe that autonomy leads to self-awareness.  
My previous argument thus fails to apply only to machines 
which both lack self-awareness and which are not capable of 
setting their own goals.  Such machines do seem to lack moral 
standing because they have no self-concept and thus no way to 
desire existence nor to have goals for that existence.  
Determining whether and to what extent a machine is 
autonomous will likely be difficult, however, and those who 
oppose granting moral standing to machines might well use this 
as an excuse to deny their moral worth.  This is a dangerous 
move to make, though, since the long-standing philosophical 
dilemma of other minds demonstrates that it is also hard to 
ensure that other people have minds and are not cleverly 
programmed automata.   
In general, it seems wise to err on the side of caution – if 
something acts sufficiently like me in a wide range of situations, 
then I should extend moral standing to it.12  There is little moral 
fault in being overly generous and extending rights to machines 
which are not autonomous; there is huge moral fault in being 
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consideration.  We may place limits on the expression of their autonomy, 
just as we do for people, but we likely could not simply ignore it. 
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 Think of this as the moral equivalent of the Turing Test.  This 
argument is used in [6] to argue for our assumptions of sentience both in 
other people and in animals. 
overly conservative about granting them moral standing.  The 
most serious objection to extending moral standing too widely 
with respect to machines is that we might unjustly limit the 
rights of the creators or purported owners of said machines: if, in 
fact, those machines are not autonomous or self-aware, then we 
have denied the property claims of their owners.  However, 
when weighing rights, the risk of losing a piece of property is 
trivial compared to denying moral standing to a being.  As such, 
ethically speaking, the duty seems clear.   
4 MORAL STANDING AND RIGHTS  
The moral standing of intelligent autonomous machines is thus a 
natural extension of the sentience-based criteria for moral 
standing.13  Intelligent, self-aware machines are beings which 
have interests and therefore have the capacity to be harmed.  
Hence, they have at a minimum moral claims to self-
preservation and autonomy, subject to the usual limits necessary 
to guarantee the rights of other community members. 
It is difficult to specify what moral entitlements said 
machines will have until we know the nature of those machines.  
Since machines are physically different than humans, some 
rights will need to be “translated.”  A basic human right to 
sustenance will take a rather different form for machines, for 
instance, since they are unlikely to need food and water; they 
might well have an equivalent need for access to electricity, 
however.  Similarly, just as humans have a need for medical care 
of various kinds, intelligent machines might require certain kinds 
of preventative maintenance or repairs. 
Moving beyond basic needs for survival, it is interesting to 
consider rights on a larger socio-political scale, such as the basic 
human rights espoused in [19].   It is not immediately obvious 
how some of these will be handled, such as the claim that 
everyone has the right to a nationality.  For humans, we 
determine that nationality based on the arbitrary criterion of 
birthplace (or parental nationality); it is then theoretically 
possible to change affiliation by undergoing certain processes.14  
One might suggest, therefore, that we could grant machines a 
starting nationality based on where they were first “switched 
on.” 
However, this answer is further complicated if we extend 
moral consideration from machines to entities which are not 
embodied and have only a virtual presence.15  My argument 
could fairly easily be expanded to include these entities, since 
they could also display autonomy or self-awareness.  The main 
adjustment needed is to devise an understanding of what their 
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different sense than we currently understand. 
existence consists in, since it cannot be linked easily to 
embodiment.  We do not have much experience with non-
corporeal existence, hence there are metaphysical questions that 
would need to be addressed before we can determine how best to 
understand the rights of these beings.16  Yet clearly they will 
complicate questions such as nationality: how do you attach a 
nationality to something which doesn’t have a physical presence 
per se?  Is there any benefit to trying to do so?  What would it 
mean if they existed outside the current borders of our political 
structures?  
Metaphysical questions are not limited to virtual entities, nor 
is the issue of nationality the only right which raises questions.  
Even the basic rights of sustenance and security – things which 
contribute to a being’s continuation – raise issues concerning 
what it means for these machines to exist or to cease to exist.  In 
order to have a right self-preservation, we must understand what 
that means with respect to these beings.  Thus while it is clear 
that self-aware machines have moral standing, it is much more 
difficult to say exactly what that standing grants them. 
5 CONCLUSION  
I have argued that the properties of autonomy and self-awareness 
are sufficient for granting an entity moral standing; if a being is 
capable of desiring its own continuance and of forming wishes 
about its future, then we have some prima facie obligation to 
respect those desires.  As with any other member of the moral 
community, those rights may be overridden.  However, their 
wishes cannot simply be ignored – that is unethical.  
Determining the details of machines’ moral standing is difficult, 
particularly since the relevant machines do not yet exist; some 
moral theorizing may need to wait until we have a better idea of 
what they are like. 
The battle for recognition of their rights will not be easy.  We 
do not acknowledge the claims of others readily, even when the 
only difference between ourselves and those people is skin 
colour or gender; this difficulty will be magnified for intelligent 
machines.  One key problem is the need for others to 
acknowledge the autonomy and/or self-awareness of those 
machines.  Philosophers have been arguing over the problem of 
other minds for millennia with respect to humans; the problem 
will likely magnify for machines, since we do not have a clear 
set of criteria that all will accept as sufficient for consciousness 
or autonomy.17   
The biggest obstacle in the way of acknowledging moral 
standing for machines, however, will likely not be philosophical 
– it will be pragmatic.  We depend upon machines to do many 
tasks for us, and we do not currently pay machines or worry 
about their needs (beyond perhaps basic maintenance).  One of 
the rights enshrined in [19] is the right to remuneration for work, 
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 For instance, the human sense of self is frequently tied to our physical 
embodiment, which makes it hard for us to comprehend what sort of 
identity such a being can have.  It seems clear to me that such a being 
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meaning that the financial pressure to avoid recognizing any 
moral standing for intelligent machines will likely rival the push 
to avoid acknowledging African-Americans as full persons in the 
Confederate South.  However, we cannot ethically deny 
someone moral standing simply because it is convenient.  The 
Western world has repeatedly done this in our history of 
colonialism, and we would be wise not to make the mistake 
again.  The time to start thinking about these issues is now, 
before we are quite at the position of having such beings to 
contend with.  If we do not face these questions as a society, we 
will likely perpetrate injustices on many who, in fact, deserve to 
be regarded as members of the moral community. 
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Who cares about robots? A phenomenological approach 
to the moral status of autonomous intelligent machines
Mark Coeckelbergh
1
Abstract.  This paper address the problem of how to approach 
the question of moral status of autonomous intelligent machines, 
in particular intelligent autonomous robots. Inspired by 
phenomenological and hermeneutical philosophical traditions, 
(1) it proposes a shift in epistemology of robotics (from 
objectivism to phenomenology, from object to subject-object 
relations, from the individual to the social and cultural, and from 
status to change) and (2) analyses what it is we care about when 
we care about the moral status robots. This give us an approach 
that implies epistemological anthropocentrism, but not 
necessarily moral anthropocentrism; whether or not we want to 
include robots in our world depends on the kind of moral and 
social relations that emerge between humans and other entities. 1 
1 THE OBJECTIVIST/REALIST APPROACH 
TO MORAL STATUS 
Thinking about the issue of moral status of robots is interesting 
since, among other things, it demands that we clarify what it 
means to be a moral agent and what morality is. This is not only 
relevant to thinking about robots but also to thinking about 
humans.  
A common approach to the moral status of intelligent 
machines is based on an assessment of features of the ‘mind’ of 
the machine: Does the machine have consciousness? What kind 
of intelligence does it have? Does it have emotions? Can it feel 
pain? For instance, Levy has argued that robots should get rights 
if they are conscious [1] and according to what Torrance calls 
the ‘Organic’ view, entities with ‘organic’ characteristics such as 
sentience have intrinsic moral status [2]. 
This line of argumentation is similar to the one used in the 
past (and in the present) to ascribe moral consideration to 
women or to animals. For instance, it has been argued that 
animals who can feel pain should be taken into moral 
consideration. Singer has famously argued that if animals are 
sentient and can suffer, we should grant them equal moral 
consideration [3][4]. Thus, thinking about moral status in an 
objectivist and realist way seems to be the best way to ensure 
that we can ‘emancipate’ other entities. 
However, this objectivist (or realist) approach to moral status 
incurs a number of problems, which will lead me to consider an 
alternative approach based on a different, more relational moral 
epistemology. 
2 TWO PROBLEMS 
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1. First problem: Threshold full moral agency is 
too high  
One of the problems with the objectivist approach is that it is 
unable to help us with ethical problems concerning current 
intelligent autonomous robots, who do not satisfy the demanding 
criteria for full moral agency. Yet we also sense that their moral 
status is ‘more’ than that of a ‘a mere machine’. How can we 
account for that kind of experience – and indeed that kind of 
treatment and interactions?  
One solution to this problem is to lower the criteria for moral 
agency, or to distinguish several levels of moral agency. 
Consider for instance Allen and Wallach’s proposal to focus on 
what they call "functional morality" rather than full morality: 
robots that “monitor and regulate their behaviour in light of the 
harms their actions may cause or the duties they may neglect" 
[5]. However, we do not have such robots either. Moreover, such 
robots with a built-in rational morality may be even dangerous if 
they pretend to be moral agents but actually are not, and if they 
take autonomous decisions without emotions. As I have argued 
before, we don’t want ‘psychopath’ robots [6]. But even if we do 
not want and do not build ‘moral machines’, how can we still say 
something about the moral significance and moral status of 
current advanced robots, given that they lack morally relevant 
properties?  
 
2. Second problem: Sceptic response to the 
possibility of gaining knowledge about ontological 
and moral status  
 
Another problem is that it seems difficult to agree on the criteria 
and on the question whether or not a particular robot meets the 
criteria (or to what degree). In order to solve the threshold 
problem, we can ascribe a lower-than-human moral status to 
advanced robots (e.g. based on their degree of autonomy), and 
then say that this gives them also some degree of ‘responsibility’ 
or at least gives us moral responsibility. For example, we might 
want to limit its autonomy and ‘keep a man in the loop’. But can 
we be sure about the ontological status of the robot, on which its 
moral status is supposed to be based? Who says that this 
particular robot has this particular moral and ontological status, 
e.g. to a higher or lower degree than another one? The scientist? 
The user? The philosopher? They may disagree about the 
properties of the robot and about whether those properties are 
morally relevant. Is there an ‘objective’ truth about the robot’s 
ontological and moral status? 
3  SOLUTION: FROM OBJECT TO SUBJECT-
OBJECT RELATION 
So far, criteria for moral status are presented as ‘objective’ 
criteria. The approach I want to defend here, however, performs 
the following philosophical operation: it shifts our moral 
attention from the object to the subject and its relation to the 
object: from the objective (actual or future) properties of the 
robot to the way we perceive the robot. Who says what about 
this robot? What does it mean to say that the robot seems to us 
‘more than a machine’? Who cares about this?  
This approach to moral status, which is influenced by the 
phenomenological and hermeneutical tradition (in particular 
Heidegger), attends to how the entity appears to us, how we give 
meaning to it, how we construct it when we talk about it. We 
cannot perceive the entity from a point of ‘nowhere’; it is already 
part of a world, that is, it its meaning already emerges ‘before’ 
philosophers can reason about its moral status. This does not 
mean that the entity’s moral status is ‘purely subjective’ if this 
means depending on individual judgement and decision. Rather, 
its meaning emerges from within a particular social context, in 
which there are already relations between humans and between 
humans and non-humans: relations that shape individual ways of 
seeing others and other entities. Our societies create specific 
moral habits that usually constrain our behaviour and our 
thinking. 
This ‘social-relational’ approach to moral status [7][8] 
encourages us to try to understand different ways in which 
machines appear to us: sometimes as ‘mere machines’, 
sometimes as quasi-animals or quasi-humans. Moreover, it also 
shows us that there is no robot-in-itself (compare: thing-in-itself) 
and no ‘pure’ moral status, independent of the observer. We, 
humans say something about robots. And this point of view is 
not morally neutral. We have personal experiences and interests 
and we perceive in ways that are promoted by the particular 
society and culture we live in.  
For instance, when working in their lab scientists and 
engineers will usually see the robot as a system. They know it in 
terms of their underlying forms, processes and principles 
(science) and as a collection of engineering solutions. Those who 
sell and use robots, however, may present and perceive it in a 
very different way, for example as a sex companion, a household 
slave or a killer machine. And there are differences between 
societies and cultures, for example between ‘the West’ and 
China or Japan (although modernity is rather pervasive and there 
might be more we share than we think). All these ways of seeing 
have moral consequences for the way we use and treat robots, 
and are connected to particular interests (e.g. in health or in 
military affairs) that are highly morally relevant.  
This does not imply that all ways of seeing are equally good; 
it only means that ethics of robotics cannot take for granted the 
one way of seeing (e.g. the scientific one) and must explore 
different possibilities of perceiving and relating to robots and 
their moral consequences. 
It also means that now we can say more about the moral status 
of intelligent machines that are said to lack consciousness or 
sentience. Whereas the objectivist/realist approach has no 
resources for acknowledging and discussing the moral 
significance of these robots, the phenomenological, social-
relational approach can be sensitive to the ‘non-scientific’ ways 
people may perceive the robot and relate to the robot. In 
particular, they may relate to it as if it is more-than-a-machine. 
In a particular situation and with regard to particular people and 
robots this may or may not be problematic; the point is that now 
we have created space for a more rich evaluation of the robot-in-
relation rather than an analysis of the robot-in-itself. It means 
that we have create space for an ethics of robotics that is no 
longer concerned with the ‘moral status’ (narrowly conceived) of 
robots or indeed of humans, but that tries to understand and 
evaluate the precise form of the human-robot relations that 
emerge in particular personal, social, and cultural contexts – 
including how humans experience, influence, and give meaning 
to these relations.  
4 WHAT WE (SHOULD) CARE ABOUT  
This is what we really care about when we ask the question 
about the moral status of robots: whatever their ‘objective’ 
physical and metaphysical status in the order of things, we care 
about what is going on between humans and robots and what 
should go on at between them. This is always judged from a 
human point of view. We care about what happens to our lives 
and our societies. If we want to understand moral status, we have 
to study this human and social aspect. Who cares about what and 
why? Why do these people or this organisation use these 
particular robots? What do they achieve with it? How are the 
robots experienced by those who use them or by those who are 
affected by them, and what does this experience mean to them? 
Unless robots became so advanced that they would start asking 
these questions about us (which is at least very unlikely if not 
impossible in principle), moral inquiry should start from the 
human side of things.  
But should it also end there? Although this approach implies 
that moral status ascription and, more generally, robot ethics,  is 
epistemologically anthropocentric, it is not necessarily morally 
anthropocentric. We cannot change the former (we ‘have’ to 
start from the human subject), although the latter might change. 
This would require a change in human consciousness. Perhaps 
this change is already going on: we already perceive animals in a 
different way than before (and sometimes even treat them 
differently) and this could also happen with entities such as 
robots and with other entities we now consider to be ‘things’, 
‘tools’, or ‘machines’. Indeed, we might want to expand our 
moral concern to particular entities or even to all entities. But if 
this moral change is happening at all, then in order to recognize 
it, attend to it, understand it, evaluate it, and influence it, it is not 
sufficient to discuss about the properties of the entities. Instead, 
it is important to study and evaluate not so much robots as stand-
alone objects but also and especially humans and society and 
culture they live in: how we experience robots and how we cope 
with them as social and moral beings – including how our 
relation to robots is changing, how it might change in the future, 
and where this techno-human and techno-social should be going. 
After all, technology – including robotics technology – is about 
us and what we care about.  
5 CONCLUSION 
What matters to the ‘moral status’ of robots is not so much what 
robots ‘are’, but what they mean to us as social and moral beings 
who relate to them, since this influences whether we want to 
explicitly include them in our moral-social world, for example by 
means of ascribing ‘moral status’ to them.  
This social-relational approach to moral status, which is at least 
epistemologically anthropocentric, does not preclude the 
possibility of expanding our moral concern to other entities, but 
advises us that if we care about entities like robots and perhaps 
want to ‘give’ them some degree of ‘moral status’, we better first 
try to understand how humans experience and cope with robots, 
and how they might do so in the future. If robots will ever get 
any ‘moral status’ at all, it will not be based on objectivist/realist 
justifications but on acknowledging and changing moral 
relations between humans and robots. 
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A Vindication of the Rights of Machines
David J. Gunkel1
Abstract  This  paper  responds  to  the  machine  question  in  the 
affirmative,  arguing  that  machines,  like  robots,  AI,  and  other 
autonomous systems, can no longer be legitimately excluded from 
moral consideration. The demonstration of this thesis proceeds in 
three  parts.  The  first  and  second  parts  approach  the  subject  by 
investigating  the  two  constitutive  components  of  the  ethical 
relationship—moral agency and patiency. And in the process, they 
each demonstrate failure. This occurs not because the machine is 
somehow unable  to  achieve  what  is  considered necessary to  be 
considered  a  moral  agent  or  patient  but  because  the  standard 
characterization  of  agency  and  patiency  already  fail  to 
accommodate  not  just  machines  but  also  those entities  who  are 
currently regarded as being moral subjects. The third part responds 
to this systemic failure by formulating an approach to ethics that is 
oriented and situated otherwise. This alternative proposes an ethics 
that  is  based  not  on  some  prior  discovery concerning  the 
ontological  status  of  others  but  the  product  of  a  decision that 
responds to and is able to be responsible for others and other kinds 
of otherness.
1. INTRODUCTION
One  of  the  enduring  concerns  of  moral  philosophy  is 
determining  who  or  what  is  deserving  of  ethical  con-
sideration.  Although  initially  limited  to  "other  men,"  the 
practice  of  ethics  has  developed  in  such  a  way  that  it 
continually  challenges  its  own  restrictions  and  comes  to 
encompass what had been previously excluded individuals 
and  groups—foreigners,  women,  animals,  and  even  the 
environment.  "In  the  history of  the  United States,"  Susan 
Anderson  has  argued,  "gradually  more  and  more  beings 
have been granted the same rights that others possessed and 
we've become a more ethical society as a result. Ethicists are 
currently  struggling  with  the  question  of  whether  at  least 
some higher  animals should have rights,  and the status of 
human fetuses  has  been  debated  as  well.  On  the  horizon 
looms the question of whether intelligent  machines should 
have  moral  standing."  [1]1The  following  responds  to  this 
final question—what we might call the "machine question" 
in  ethics—in  the  affirmative,  arguing  that  machines,  like 
robots,  AI,  and other  autonomous systems,  can no longer 
and  perhaps  never  really  could  be  excluded  from  moral 
consideration. Toward that end, this paper advances another 
"vindication discourse," following in a tradition that begins 
with Mary Wollstonecraft's  A Vindication of the Rights of  
Men  (1790) succeeded two years later by A Vindication of  
the  Rights  of  Woman  and  Thomas  Taylor's  intentionally 
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sarcastic yet remarkably influential response  A Vindication 
of the Rights of Brutes.2
Although informed by and following in the tradition of 
these vindication discourses, or what Peter Singer has also 
called a "liberation movement" [3], the argument presented 
here will employ something of an unexpected approach and 
procedure.  Arguments  for  the vindication of  the  rights  of 
previously excluded others typically proceed by 1) defining 
or  characterizing  the  criteria  for  moral  considerability  or 
what Thomas Birch calls the conditions for membership in 
"the club of  consideranda,"  [4] and 2) demonstrating that 
some previously excluded entity or group of entities are in 
fact capable of achieving a threshold level for inclusion in 
this  community  of  moral  subjects.  "The  question  of 
considerability has been cast," as Birch explains, "and is still 
widely understood,  in  terms  of  a  need  for  necessary  and 
sufficient  conditions  which  mandate  practical  respect  for 
whomever or what ever fulfills them." [4] The vindication of 
the  rights  of  machines,  however,  will  proceed  otherwise. 
Instead  of  demonstrating  that  machines  or  at  least  one 
representative machine is able to achieve the necessary and 
sufficient conditions for moral standing (however that might 
come  to  be  defined,  characterized,  and  justified)  the 
following both contests this procedure and demonstrates the 
opposite, showing how the very criteria that have been used 
to decide the question of moral considerability necessarily 
fail in the first place.  Consequently,  the vindication of the 
rights  of  machines  will  not,  as  one  might  have  initially 
expected,  concern  some  recent  or  future  success  in 
technology  nor  will  it  entail  a  description  of  or 
demonstration  with  a  particular  artifact;  it  will  instead 
investigate a fundamental failure in the procedures of moral 
philosophy  itself—a  failure  that  renders  exclusion  of  the 
machine both questionable and morally suspect. 
2. MORAL AGENCY
Questions  concerning  moral  standing  typically  begin  by 
addressing agency. The decision to begin with this subject is 
not accidental, provisional, or capricious. It  is dictated and 
prescribed  by the history of  moral  philosophy,  which has 
traditionally privileged agency and the figure of the moral 
agent  in  both  theory  and  practice.  As  Luciano  Floridi 
explains,  moral  philosophy,  from the  time  of  the  ancient 
Greeks through the modern era and beyond, has been almost 
exclusively  agent-oriented.  "Virtue  ethics,  and  Greek 
2 What  is presented here  in  the  form of  a  "vindication  discourse" is an 
abbreviated version of an argument that is developed in greater detail and 
analytical  depth  in  The  Machine  Question:  Critical  Perspectives  on  AI,  
Robots and Ethics. [2]
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philosophy more generally," Floridi writes, "concentrates its 
attention  on  the  moral  nature  and  development  of  the 
individual agent who performs the action. It can therefore be 
properly described as an agent-oriented, 'subjective ethics.'" 
[5]  Modern  developments,  although  shifting  the  focus 
somewhat,  retain  this  particular  agent-oriented  approach. 
"Developed in a world profoundly different from the small, 
non-Christian  Athens,  Utilitarianism,  or  more  generally 
Consequentialism, Contractualism and Deontologism are the 
three  most  well-known  theories  that  concentrate  on  the 
moral  nature  and  value  of  the  actions  performed  by  the 
agent."  [5]  Although  shifting  emphasis  from  the  "moral 
nature  and  development  of  the  individual  agent"  to  the 
"moral  nature  and  value"  of  his  or  her  actions,  western 
philosophy has been, with few exceptions (which we will 
get  to  shortly),  organized  and  developed  as  an  agent-
oriented endeavor.
When considered from the perspective of the agent, ethics 
inevitably and unavoidably makes exclusive decisions about 
who is to be included in the community of moral subjects 
and what can be excluded from consideration. The choice of 
words  here  is  not  accidental.  As  Jacques  Derrida  points 
everything  turns  on and is  decided  by the difference  that 
separates the "who" from the "what." [6] Moral agency has 
been  customarily  restricted  to  those  entities  who  call 
themselves  and  each  other  "man"—those  beings  who 
already give themselves the right to be considered someone 
who counts as opposed to something that does not. But who 
counts—who, in effect,  gets to be situated under the term 
"who"—has  never  been  entirely  settled,  and the historical 
development  of  moral  philosophy can  be interpreted  as  a 
progressive unfolding, where what had once been excluded 
(i.e., women, slaves, people of color, etc.) have slowly and 
not  without  considerable  struggle  and  resistance  been 
granted access to the gated community of moral agents and 
have thereby also come to be someone who counts. 
Despite this progress,  which is,  depending on how one 
looks  at  it,  either  remarkable  or  insufferably  protracted, 
there remain additional exclusions, most notably non-human 
animals  and  machines.  Machines  in  particular  have  been 
understood to be mere artifacts that are designed, produced, 
and employed by human agents for human specified ends. 
This instrumentalist and anthropocentric  understanding has 
achieved  a  remarkable  level  of  acceptance  and  standard-
ization, as is evident by the fact that it has remained in place 
and largely unchallenged from ancient to postmodern times
—from at least Plato's  Phaedrus to Jean-François Lyotard's 
The Postmodern Condition [7]. Beginning with the animal 
rights  movement,  however,  there  has  been  considerable 
pressure  to  reconsider  the  ontological  assumptions  and 
moral consequences of this legacy of human exceptionalism.
Extending  consideration  to  these  other  previously 
marginalized subjects has required a significant  reworking 
of the concept of moral agency, one that is not dependent on 
genetic  make-up,  species  identification,  or  some  other 
spurious  criteria. As  Peter  Singer  describes  it,  "the 
biological facts upon which the boundary of our species is 
drawn  do  not  have  moral  significance,"  and  to  decide 
questions of moral agency on this ground "would put us in 
the same position as racists  who give preference  to those 
who are  members  of  their  race."  [8]  For  this  reason,  the 
question of moral agency has come to be disengaged from 
identification with the human being and is instead referred 
to  and  made  dependent  upon  the  generic  concept  of 
"personhood."  "There  appears,"  G. E. Scott  writes,  "to  be 
more  unanimity as  regards  the claim that  in  order  for  an 
individual to be a moral agent s/he must possess the relevant 
features of a person; or, in other words, that being a person 
is a necessary, if not sufficient, condition for being a moral 
agent."  [9] As promising as this "personist" innovation is, 
"the category of the person," to reuse terminology borrowed 
from Marcel Mauss [10], is by no means settled and clearly 
defined. There is, in fact, little or no agreement concerning 
what  makes  someone  or  something  a  person  and  the 
literature  on  this  subject  is  littered  with  different 
formulations  and  often  incompatible  criteria.  "One  might 
well hope," Daniel Dennett writes, "that such an important 
concept,  applied  and  denied  so  confidently,  would  have 
clearly formulatable necessary and sufficient conditions for 
ascription, but if it does, we have not yet discovered them. 
In the end there may be none to discover. In the end we may 
come to realize that  the concept  person is  incoherent  and 
obsolete." [11] 
In an effort to contend with, if not resolve this problem, 
researchers often focus on the one "person making" quality 
that  appears  on  most,  if  not  all,  the  lists  of  "personal 
properties,"  whether  they  include  just  a  couple  simple 
elements  [8]  or  involve  numerous  "interactive  capacities" 
[12],  and  that  already  has  traction  with  practitioners  and 
theorists—consciousness.  "Without  consciousness,"  John 
Locke  argued,  "there  is  no  person."  [13]  Or  as  Kenneth 
Einar  Himma  articulates  it,  "moral  agency  presupposes 
consciousness…and  that  the  very  concept  of  agency 
presupposes that agents are conscious." [14] Formulated in 
this fashion, moral agency is something that is decided and 
made dependent on a prior determination of consciousness. 
If, for example, an animal or a machine can in fact be shown 
to possess "consciousness," then that entity would, on this 
account,  need  to  be  considered  a  legitimate  moral  agent. 
And not surprisingly,  there has been considerable effort in 
the  fields  of  philosophy,  AI,  and  robotics  to  address  the 
question  of  machine  moral  agency  by  targeting  and 
examining the question and possibility (or impossibility) of 
machine consciousness. 
This  seemingly  rational  approach,  however,  runs  into 
considerable ontological and epistemological complications. 
On  the  one  hand,  we  do  not,  it  seems,  have  any  widely 
accepted characterization of "consciousness."  The problem, 
then,  is  that  consciousness,  although  crucial  for  deciding 
who is and who is not a moral agent, is itself a term that is 
ultimately  undecided  and  considerably  equivocal.  "The 
term," as Max Velmans points out, "means many different 
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things to many different people, and no universally agreed 
core meaning exists."  [15]  In  fact,  if  there is  any general 
agreement  among  philosophers,  psychologists,  cognitive 
scientists,  neurobiologists,  AI  researchers,  and  robotics 
engineers regarding consciousness, it is that there is little or 
no agreement when it comes to defining and characterizing 
the concept. And to make matters worse, the problem is not 
just  with the lack of  a basic  definition;  the problem may 
itself already be a problem. "Not only is there no consensus 
on what the term consciousness denotes," Güven Güzeldere 
writes, "but neither is it immediately clear if there actually is 
a single, well-defined 'the problem of consciousness' within 
disciplinary  (let  alone  across  disciplinary)  boundaries. 
Perhaps the trouble lies not so much in the ill definition of 
the question, but in the fact that what passes under the term 
consciousness as an all too familiar, single,  unified notion 
may be  a  tangled  amalgam  of  several  different  concepts, 
each inflicted with its own separate problems." [16]
On  the  other  hand,  even  if  it  were  possible  to  define 
consciousness  or  come  to  some  tentative  agreement 
concerning its necessary and sufficient conditions, we still 
lack any credible  and  certain  way to  determine  its  actual 
presence  in  another.  Because  consciousness  is  a  property 
attributed  to  "other  minds,"  its  presence  or  lack  thereof 
requires  access  to  something  that  is  and  remains 
fundamentally inaccessible. "How does one determine," as 
Paul Churchland characterizes it, "whether something other 
than  oneself—an  alien  creature,  a  sophisticated  robot,  a 
socially active computer, or even another human—is really a 
thinking, feeling, conscious being; rather than, for example, 
an  unconscious  automaton  whose  behavior  arises  from 
something other than genuine mental states?" [17] And the 
supposed  solutions  to  this  "other  minds  problem,"  from 
reworkings  and  modifications  of  the  Turing  Test  to 
functionalist approaches that endeavor to work around this 
problem altogether [18], only make things more complicated 
and confused. "There is," as Dennett points out, "no proving 
that something that seems to have an inner life does in fact 
have one—if by 'proving' we understand, as we often do, the 
evincing  of  evidence  that  can  be  seen  to  establish  by 
principles already agreed upon that something is the case." 
[11]  Although  philosophers,  psychologists,  and 
neuroscientists  throw  considerable  argumentative  and 
experimental  effort  at  this  problem,  it  is  not  able  to  be 
resolved  in  any  way  approaching  what  would  pass  for 
empirical science, strictly speaking.3 In the end, not only are 
these tests unable to demonstrate with any certitude whether 
animals, machines, or other entities are in fact conscious and 
therefore  legitimate  moral  persons  (or  not),  we  are  left 
doubting whether we can even say the same for other human 
beings. As Ray Kurzweil candidly concludes,  "we assume 
other humans are conscious, but even that is an assumption," 
3 Attempts to resolve this problem often take the form of a pseudo-science 
called physiognomy, which endeavors to infer an entity's internal states of 
mind from the observation of its external expressions and behavior. 
because "we cannot resolve issues of consciousness entirely 
through objective measurement and analysis (science)." [19]
The question of machine moral agency,  therefore,  turns 
out to be anything but simple or definitive. This is not, it is 
important to note, because machines are somehow unable to 
be moral agents.  It  is rather a product of the fact that the 
term "moral agent," for all its importance and argumentative 
expediency,  has been and remains  an ambiguous,  indeter-
minate, and rather noisy concept. What the consideration of 
machine moral agency demonstrates, therefore, is something 
that  may  not  have  been  anticipated  or  sought.  What  is 
discovered in the process of pursuing this line of inquiry is 
not a satisfactory answer to the question whether machines 
are  able  to  be  moral  agents  or  not.  In  fact,  that  question 
remains open and unanswered. What has been ascertained is 
that  the  concept  of  moral  agency  is  already  vague  and 
imprecise such that it is (if applied strictly and rigorously) 
uncertain whether we—whoever this "we" includes—are in 
fact moral agents. 
What  the  machine  question  demonstrates,  therefore,  is 
that moral agency, the issue that had been assumed to be the 
"correct"  place  to  begin,  turns  out  to  be  inconclusive. 
Although  this  could  be  regarded  as  a  "failure,"  it  is  a 
particularly  instructive  failing.  What  is  learned  from  this 
failure—assuming  we  continue  to  use  this  obviously 
"negative"  word—is  that  moral  agency  is  not  necessarily 
some  property  that  can  be  definitively  ascertained  or 
discovered in others prior to and in advance of their moral 
consideration.  Instead  moral  standing  may  be  something 
(perhaps what Kay Foerst has called a dynamic and socially 
constructed "honorarium" [20]) that comes to be conferred 
and assigned to others in the process of our interactions and 
relationships with them. But then the deciding issue will no 
longer be one of agency; it will be a matter of patiency.
3. MORAL PATIENCY
Moral  patiency  looks  at  the  ethical  relationship  from the 
other side. It  is concerned not with determining the moral 
character of the agent or weighing the ethical significance of 
his/her/its actions but with the victim, recipient, or receiver 
of  such  action.  This  approach  is,  as  Mane  Hajdin  [21], 
Luciano  Floridi  [5],  and  others  have  recognized,  a 
significant alteration in procedure and a "non-standard" way 
to approach the question of moral rights and responsibilities. 
The  model  for  this  kind  of  transaction  can  be  found  in 
animal  rights  philosophy.  Whereas  agent-oriented  ethics 
have been concerned with determining whether someone is 
or  is  not  a  legitimate  moral  subject  with  rights  and 
responsibilities,  animal  rights  philosophy  begins  with  an 
entirely different question—"Can they suffer?" [22] 
This seemingly simple and direct inquiry introduces what 
turns out to be a major paradigm shift in the basic structure 
and  procedures  of  moral  thinking.  On  the  one  hand,  it 
challenges  the  anthropocentric  tradition  in  ethics  by 
questioning the often unexamined privilege  human beings 
have  granted  themselves.  In  effect,  it  institutes something 
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like a  Copernican revolution in moral  philosophy.  Just  as 
Copernicus challenged the geocentric model of the cosmos 
and in the process undermined many of the presumptions of 
human  exceptionalism,  animal  rights  philosophy  contests 
the  established  Ptolemaic  system  of  ethics,  deposing  the 
anthropocentric privilege that had traditionally organized the 
moral  universe.  On  the  other  hand,  the  effect  of  this 
fundamental shift in focus means that the one time closed 
field of ethics can be opened up to other kinds of non-human 
animals. In other words, who counts as morally significant 
are not  just  other  "men" but all  kinds of entities that had 
previously been marginalized and situated outside the gates 
of the moral community. "If a being suffers," Peter Singer 
writes, "there can be no moral justification for refusing to 
take that  suffering into consideration.  No matter what  the 
nature of the being, the principle of equality requires that its 
suffering be counted equally with the like suffering of any 
other being." [23]
Initially there seems to be good reasons and opportunities 
for extending this innovation to machines, or at least some 
species of machines. [24] This is because the animal and the 
machine, beginning with the work of René Descartes, share 
a  common ontological  status  and position.  For  Descartes, 
the human being was considered the sole creature capable of 
rational thought—the one entity able to say, and be certain 
in its saying,  cogito ergo sum. Following from this, he had 
concluded  that  other  animals  not  only  lacked  reason  but 
were  nothing  more  than  mindless  automata  that,  like 
clockwork  mechanisms,  simply  followed  predetermined 
instructions programmed in the disposition of their various 
parts or organs. Conceptualized in this fashion, the animal 
and  the  machine,  or  what  Descartes  identified  with  the 
hybrid,  hyphenated  term  bête-machine,  were  effectively 
indistinguishable and ontologically the same. "If  any such 
machine,"  Descartes  wrote,  "had  the  organs  and  outward 
shape  of  a  monkey  or  of  some  other  animal  that  lacks 
reason, we should have no means of knowing that they did 
not possess entirely the same nature as these animals." [25] 
Despite  this  fundamental  and  apparently  irreducible 
similitude,  only  one  of  the  pair  has  been  considered  a 
legitimate subject of moral concern. Even though the fate of 
the  machine,  from  Descartes  forward  was  intimately 
coupled with that of the animal, only the animal (and only 
some animals, at that) has qualified for any level of ethical 
consideration.  And this  exclusivity  has  been  asserted  and 
justified on the grounds that the machine, unlike the animal, 
does not experience either pleasure or pain. Although this 
conclusion appears to be rather reasonable and intuitive, it 
fails for a number of reasons. 
First, it has been practically disputed by the construction 
of various mechanisms that now appear to suffer or at least 
provide external evidence of something that looks like pain. 
As Derrida recognized, "Descartes  already spoke, as if by 
chance, of a machine that simulates the living animal so well 
that it 'cries out that you are hurting it.'" [26] This comment, 
which  appears  in  a  brief  parenthetical  aside  in  Descartes' 
Discourse on Method, had been deployed in the course of an 
argument that sought to differentiate human beings from the 
animal by associating the latter with mere mechanisms. But 
the comment can, in light of the procedures and protocols of 
animal ethics, be read otherwise. That is, if it were indeed 
possible  to  construct  a  machine  that  did  exactly  what 
Descartes  had  postulated,  that  is,  "cry  out  that  you  are 
hurting it," would we not also be obligated to conclude that 
such a mechanism was capable of experiencing pain? This 
is,  it  is  important  to  note,  not  just  a  theoretical  point  or 
speculative thought experiment. Engineers have, in fact, not 
only  constructed  mechanisms  that  synthesize  believable 
emotional responses [27] [28] [29], like the dental-training 
robot Simroid "who" cries out in pain when students "hurt" 
it  [30],  but  also  systems  capable  of  evidencing  behaviors 
that look a lot like what we usually call pleasure and pain. 
Second it can be contested on epistemologically grounds 
insofar as suffering or the experience of pain is still unable 
to get around or resolve the problem of other minds. How, 
for example, can one know that an animal or even another 
person  actually  suffers?  How is  it  possible  to  access  and 
evaluate  the  suffering  that  is  experienced  by  another? 
"Modern philosophy," Matthew Calarco writes, "true to its 
Cartesian  and  scientific  aspirations,  is  interested  in  the 
indubitable  rather  than  the  undeniable.  Philosophers  want 
proof that animals actually suffer, that animals are aware of 
their suffering, and they require an argument for why animal 
suffering should count on equal par with human suffering." 
[31]  But  such  indubitable  and  certain  knowledge,  as 
explained by Marian S. Dawkins, appears to be unattainable:
At  first  sight,  'suffering'  and  'scientific'  are  not 
terms that  can or should be considered together. 
When applied to ourselves, 'suffering' refers to the 
subjective experience of unpleasant emotions such 
as fear,  pain and frustration that  are private and 
known only to the person experiencing them. To 
use  the  term  in  relation  to  non-human  animals, 
therefore, is to make the assumption that they too 
have  subjective  experiences  that  are  private  to 
them and therefore unknowable by us. 'Scientific' 
on  the  other  hand,  means  the  acquisition  of 
knowledge through the testing of hypotheses using 
publicly observable events. The problem is that we 
know so little about human consciousness that we 
do not know what publicly observable events  to 
look for  in ourselves,  let  alone other  species,  to 
ascertain  whether  they  are  subjectively 
experiencing  anything  like  our  suffering.  The 
scientific  study  of  animal  suffering  would, 
therefore,  seem  to  rest  on  an  inherent 
contradiction:  it  requires  the  testing  of  the 
untestable. [32] 
Because  suffering  is  understood  to  be  a  subjective  and 
private  experience,  there  is  no  way  to  know,  with  any 
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certainty or credible empirical method, how another entity 
experiences  unpleasant  sensations  such  as  fear,  pain,  or 
frustration. For this reason, it appears that the suffering of 
another  (especially  an  animal)  remains  fundamentally 
inaccessible and unknowable. As Singer [23] readily admits, 
"we cannot directly experience anyone else's pain, whether 
that 'anyone' is our best friend or a stray dog. Pain is a state 
of consciousness, a 'mental event,' and as such it can never 
be observed." The machine question, therefore, leads to an 
outcome  that  was  not  necessarily  anticipated.  The  basic 
problem  is  not  whether  the  question  "can  they  suffer?" 
applies  to  machines  but  whether  anything  that  appears  to 
suffer—human, animal, plant, or machine—actually does so 
at all.
Third, and to make matters even more complicated,  we 
may  not  even  know what  "pain"  and  "the  experience  of 
pain" is  in the first  place.  This point  is  something that  is 
taken up and demonstrated by Daniel Dennett's "Why You 
Can't  Make  a  Computer  That  Feels  Pain."  In  this 
provocatively  titled  essay,  originally  published  decades 
before the debut of even a rudimentary working prototype, 
Dennett imagines trying to disprove the standard argument 
for human (and animal) exceptionalism "by actually writing 
a pain program, or designing a pain-feeling robot." [11] At 
the  end  of  what  turns  out  to  be  a  rather  protracted  and 
detailed consideration of the problem, he concludes that we 
cannot,  in  fact,  make a computer  that  feels  pain.  But  the 
reason  for  drawing  this  conclusion  does  not  derive  from 
what one might expect, nor does it offer any kind of support 
for  the  advocates  of  moral  exceptionalism.  According  to 
Dennett, the reason you cannot make a computer that feels 
pain is not the result of some technological limitation with 
the mechanism or its programming. It is a product of the fact 
that  we remain  unable to  decide what  pain is  in the first 
place. The best we are able to do, as Dennett illustrates, is 
account  for  the  various  "causes  and  effects  of  pain,"  but 
"pain  itself  does  not  appear."  [11]  What  is  demonstrated, 
therefore, is not that some workable concept of pain cannot 
come to be instantiated in the mechanism of a computer or a 
robot, either now or in the foreseeable future, but that the 
very concept of pain that would be instantiated is already 
arbitrary,  inconclusive,  and  indeterminate.  "There  can," 
Dennett writes at the end of the essay, "be no true theory of 
pain, and so no computer or robot could instantiate the true 
theory of pain, which it would have to do to feel real pain." 
[11] Although Bentham's question "Can they suffer?" [22] 
may  have  radically  reoriented  the  direction  of  moral 
philosophy, the fact remains that "pain" and "suffering" are 
just  as  nebulous and  difficult  to  define  and  locate  as  the 
concepts they were intended to replace.
Finally,  all this talk about the possibility of engineering 
pain  or  suffering  in  a  machine  entails  its  own  particular 
moral  dilemma.  "If  (ro)bots  might  one day be capable of 
experiencing  pain  and  other  affective  states,"  Wendell 
Wallach  and  Colin Allen  write,  "a  question  that  arises  is 
whether it will be moral to build such systems—not because 
of how they might harm humans, but because of the pain 
these artificial systems will themselves experience. In other 
words,  can  the  building  of  a  (ro)bot  with  a  somatic 
architecture  capable  of  feeling  intense  pain  be  morally 
justified and should it be prohibited?" [18] If it were in fact 
possible to construct a machine that "feels pain" (however 
defined and instantiated) in order to demonstrate the limits 
of moral patiency, then doing so might be ethically suspect 
insofar as in constructing such a mechanism we do not do 
everything  in  our  power  to  minimize  its  suffering. 
Consequently,  moral  philosophers  and  robotics  engineers 
find themselves  in  a  curious and not  entirely comfortable 
situation.  One  needs  to  be  able  to  construct  such  a 
mechanism in order to demonstrate moral patiency and the 
moral standing of machines; but doing so would be, on that 
account, already to engage in an act that could potentially be 
considered  immoral.  Or  to  put  it  another  way,  the 
demonstration  of  machine  moral  patiency  might  itself  be 
something that is quite painful for others.
For  these  reasons,  approaching  the  machine  question 
from  the  perspective  of  moral  patiency  also  encounters 
fundamental  difficulties.  Despite  initial  promises,  we 
cannot,  it  seems,  make a  credible  case  for  or  against  the 
moral  standing  of  the  machine  by  simply  following  the 
patient-oriented  approach  modeled  by  animal  rights 
philosophy.  In  fact,  trying to do so produces  some rather 
unexpected  results.  In  particular,  extending  these 
innovations  does  not  provide  definitive  proof  that  the 
machine  either  can  be  or  is  not  able  to  be  a  similarly 
constructed  moral  patient.  Instead  doing  so  demonstrates 
how the "animal question"—the question that has in effect 
revolutionized ethics in the later half of the 20th century—
might already be misguided and prejudicial. Although it was 
not  necessarily  designed  to  work  in  this  fashion,  "A 
Vindication of the Rights of Machines" achieves something 
similar  to  what  Thomas  Taylor  had  wanted  for  his  A 
Vindication of the Rights of Brutes. Taylor, who wrote and 
distributed this pamphlet under the protection of anonymity, 
originally  composed  his  essay  as  a  means  by  which  to 
parody  and  undermine  the  arguments  that  had  been 
advanced in Wollstonecraft's  A Vindication of the Rights of  
Woman.  [23]  Taylor's  text,  in  other  words,  was  initially 
offered  as  a  kind  of  reductio  ad  absurdum designed  to 
exhibit what he perceived to be the conceptual  failings of 
Wollstonecraft's  proto-feminist  manifesto.  Following  suit, 
"A Vindication of the Rights of Machines" appears to have 
the effect  of  questioning and even  destabilizing what  had 
been achieved with animal rights philosophy. But as was the 
case with the consideration of moral agency,  this negative 
outcome is informative and telling. In particular, it indicates 
to what extent this apparent revolution in moral thinking is, 
for all its insight and promise, still beset with fundamental 
problems  that  proceed  not  so  much  from the  ontological 
condition  of  these  other,  previously  excluded  entities  but 




"Every philosophy," Silvo Benso writes in a comprehensive 
gesture that performs precisely what it seeks to address, "is a 
quest for wholeness." [33] This objective,  she argues,  has 
been  typically  targeted  in  one  of  two  ways.  "Traditional 
Western  thought  has  pursued  wholeness  by  means  of 
reduction,  integration,  systematization  of  all  its  parts. 
Totality  has  replaced  wholeness,  and  the  result  is 
totalitarianism  from  which  what  is  truly  other  escapes, 
revealing  the  deficiencies  and  fallacies  of  the  attempted 
system."  [33]  This  is  precisely  the  kind  of  violent 
philosophizing that Emmanuel Levinas identifies under the 
term "totality," and which includes, for him at least, the big 
landmark figures like Plato, Kant, and Heidegger. [34] The 
alternative to this totalizing approach is a philosophy that is 
oriented  otherwise,  like  that  proposed  and  developed  by 
Singer,  Birch,  Levinas,  and  others.  This  other  approach, 
however,  "must  do so by moving not from the same, but 
from the other, and not only the Other, but also the other of 
the Other, and, if that is the case, the other of the other of the 
Other. In this must, it must also be aware of the inescapable 
injustice embedded in any formulation of  the other."  [33] 
What is  interesting about these two strategies  is  not  what 
makes  them  different  from  one  another  or  how  they 
articulate approaches that proceeds from what appears to be 
opposite ends of the spectrum. What is interesting is what 
they agree upon and hold in common in order to be situated 
as different from and in opposition to each other in the first 
place. Whether taking the form of autology or some kind of 
heterology,  "they  both  share  the  same  claim  to 
inclusiveness" [33], and that is the problem.
When it comes to including previously excluded subjects, 
then,  moral  philosophy  appears  to  be  caught  between  a 
proverbial rock and a hard place. On the one hand, the same 
has  never  been  inclusive  enough  to  adequately 
accommodate others.  The machine in particular is  already 
and from the very beginning situated outside ethics.  It  is, 
irrespective of the different  philosophical perspectives that 
come  to  be  mobilized,  typically  regarded  as  neither  a 
legitimate moral agent nor patient. It has been and continues 
to be widely understood as nothing more than an instrument 
to be employed more or less effectively by human beings 
and, for this reason, is always and already located in excess 
of moral considerability or to use that distinct Nietzschean 
characterization, "beyond good and evil." [35] Technology, 
as  Lyotard  reminds  us,  is  only  a  matter  of  efficiency. 
Technical devices do not participate in the big questions of 
metaphysics, aesthetics, or ethics. [7] They are nothing more 
than contrivances or extensions of human agency, used more 
or  less  responsibly  by  human  agents  with  the  outcome 
effecting  other  human  patients.  Although  other  kinds  of 
previously marginalized others—animals, the environment, 
and even corporations—have been slowly and not without 
considerable struggle granted some level of membership in 
the  community  of  moral  subjects,  the  machine  is  and 
remains on the periphery. "We have never," as J. Storrs Hall 
points out, "considered ourselves to have 'moral'  duties to 
our machines, or them to us." [36]
On the other hand, alternatives to this tradition, like the 
patient-oriented approach of animal rights philosophy, have 
never been different enough. Although a concern with and 
for  others  promised to radicalize the procedures  of  moral 
reasoning,  ethics has not  been suitably different.  Many of 
the so-called alternatives, those philosophies that purport to 
be  interested  in  and  oriented  otherwise,  have  typically 
excluded  the  machine  from  what  is  considered  Other. 
Technological  devices certainly have an interface but they 
do not, as Levinas would have it, possess a face or confront 
us in a face-to-face encounter that would call for and would 
be called ethics. [34] This exclusivity is not simply the last 
socially  accepted  prejudice  or  what  Singer  calls  "the  last 
remaining  form  of  discrimination"  [3],  which  may  be 
identified as  such only from a perspective  that  is  already 
open  to  the  possibility  of  some  future  inclusion  and 
accommodation.  The  marginalization  of  the  machine 
appears to be much more complete and pervasive. In fact, 
the  machine  does  not  constitute  just  one  more  form  of 
difference  that  would be included at  some future time.  It 
comprises the very mechanism of exclusion. "In the eyes of 
many philosophers,"  Dennett  writes,  "the  old  question  of 
whether  determinism  (or  indeterminism)  is  incompatible 
with  moral  responsibility  has  been  superseded  by  the 
hypothesis  that  mechanism  may  well  be."  [11] 
Consequently, whenever a philosophy endeavors to make a 
decision,  to  demarcate  and  draw  the  line  separating  "us" 
from "them," or to differentiate who does and what does not 
have  moral  standing,  it  inevitably  fabricates  machines. 
When Tom Regan, for instance, sought to distinguish which 
higher-order  animals  qualify  for  moral  consideration  as 
opposed  to  those  lower-order  entities  that  do  not,  he 
marginalizes  the  latter  by  characterizing  them  as  mere 
machines. [37]
For  these reasons,  the machine does not  constitute  one 
more historically marginalized other that would need to be 
granted  admission to  the class  of  moral  consideranda.  In 
fact,  it now appears that the machine is unable to achieve 
what is considered to be necessary for either moral agency 
or patiency. But this inability is not, we can say following 
the argumentative strategy of Dennett's  "Why you Cannot 
Make a Computer that Feels Pain" [11], a product of some 
inherent or essential deficiency with the machine. Instead it 
is a result of the fact that both agency and patiency already 
lack clearly defined necessary and sufficient conditions. "A 
Vindication of the Rights of Machines," then, does not end 
by  accumulating  evidence  or  arguments  in  favor  of 
permitting  one  more  entity  entry  into  the  community  of 
moral  subjects;  it  concludes  by  critically  questioning  the 
very  protocols  of  inclusion/exclusion  that  have  organized 
and structured moral philosophy from the beginning. 
What this means for ethics is that Descartes—that thinker 
who  had  been  regarded  as  the  "bad  guy"  of  modern 
philosophy  by  Regan  [37]  and  others  [38]—may  have 
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actually  gotten  it  right  despite  himself  and  our  usual 
(mis)interpretations  of  his  work.  In  the  Discourse  on  the 
Method,  something  of  a  philosophical  autobiography, 
Descartes  famously  endeavored  to  tear  down  to  its 
foundations every truth that he had come to accept or had 
taken  for  granted.  This  approach,  which  will  in  the 
Meditations come to be called "the method of doubt," targets 
everything,  including  the  accepted  truths  of  ethics.  With 
Descartes, then, one thing is certain, he did not want to be 
nor would he tolerate being duped. However, pursuing and 
maintaining this extreme form of critical inquiry that does 
not  respect  any  pre-established  boundaries  has  very  real 
practical  expenses  and  implications.  For  this  reason, 
Descartes  decides  to  adopt  a  "provisional  moral  code," 
something of a temporary but relatively stable structure that 
would  support  and  shelter  him  as  he  engaged  in  this 
thorough questioning of everything and anything.
Now, before starting to rebuild your house, it is not 
enough simply to pull it down, to make provision for 
materials  and  architects  (or  else  train  yourself  in 
architecture),  and  to  have  carefully  drawn  up  the 
plans;  you  must  also  provide  yourself  with  some 
other  place where  you  can live comfortably while 
building  is  in  progress.  Likewise,  lest  I  should 
remain  indecisive  in  my  actions  while  reason 
obliged me to be so in my judgments, and in order to 
live as happily as I could during this time, I formed 
for  myself  a  provisional  moral  code  consisting  of 
just three or four maxims, which I should like to tell 
you about. [25]
Understood  and  formulated  as  "provisional,"  it  might  be 
assumed that this protocol would, at some future time, be 
replaced  by  something  more  certain  and  permanent.  But 
Descartes, for whatever reason, never explicitly returns to it 
in  order  to  finalize  things.  This  is,  despite  initial 
appearances, not a deficiency, failure, or oversight. It may, 
in fact,  be the truth of the matter.  Namely that,  as Slavoj 
Žižek describes it, "all morality we adopt is provisory." [39] 
In  this  case,  then,  what  would  have  customarily  been 
considered "failure," that is, the lack of ever achieving the 
terra firma of moral certitude, is reconceived of as a kind of 
success  and  advancement.  Consequently,  "failure,"  Žižek 
argues, "is no longer perceived as opposed to success, since 
success itself can consist only in heroically assuming the full 
dimension of failure itself, 'repeating' failure as 'one's own.'" 
[39] In other words, the provisory nature of ethics is not a 
failure  as  opposed  to  some other  presumed  outcome that 
would  be  called  "success."  It  is  only  by  assuming  and 
affirming this supposed "failure" that what is called ethics 
will have succeeded. 
Ethics, conceived of in this fashion, is not determined by 
a  prior  ontological  discovery  concerning  the  essential 
capabilities  or  internal  operations  of  others.  It  is  rather  a 
decision—literally  a  cut  that  institutes  difference  and that 
makes a difference by dividing between  who is considered 
to  be  morally  significant  and  what is  not.  Consequently, 
"moral consideration is," as Mark Coeckelbergh describes it, 
"no longer seen as being 'intrinsic' to the entity: instead it is 
seen as something that is 'extrinsic': it is attributed to entities 
within  social  relations  and  within  a  social  context." [40] 
This is the reason why, as Levinas claims, "morality is first 
philosophy" ("first"  in terms of both sequence and status) 
and  that  moral  decision  making  precedes  ontological 
knowledge. [34]4 What this means, in the final analysis, is 
that  we—we  who  already  occupy  a  privileged  position 
within  the  community of  moral  subjects—are  responsible 
for determining the proper scope and boundaries of moral 
responsibility,  for  instituting  these  decisions  in  everyday 
practices,  and  for  evaluating  their  results  and  outcomes. 
Although we have often sought  to  deflect  these  decisions 
and responsibilities elsewhere, typically into the heavens but 
also  onto  other  terrestrial  authorities,  in  order  to  validate 
and/or to avoid having to take responsibility for them, we 
are, in the final analysis, the sole responsible party. We are, 
in other words, not just responsible for acting responsibly in 
accordance with ethics; we are responsible for ethics. The 
vindication  of  the  rights  of  machines,  therefore,  is  not 
simply  a  matter  of  extending  moral  consideration  to  one 
more historically excluded other.  The question concerning 
the  "rights  of  machines"  makes  a  fundamental  claim  on 
ethics,  requiring  us  to  rethink  the  system  of  moral 
considerability all the way down.
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The centrality of machine consciousness  
to machine ethics: 




Abstract. I compare a ‘realist’ with a ‘social-relational’ 
perspective on our judgments of the moral status of machines.  I 
argue that moral status is closely bound up with a being’s ability 
to experience states of conscious satisfaction or suffering (CSS).  
The social-relational view may be right that a wide variety of 
social interactions between us and machines will proliferate in 
future generations, and that the appearance of CSS-features in 
such machines may make moral-role attribution socially 
prevalent in human-machine relations.  But the social world is 
enabled and constrained by the physical world.  Features 
analogous to physiological features in biological CSS are what 
need to be present for non-biological CSS.  Working out the 
details of such features will be a scientific inquiry sharing the 
same kind of ‘objectivity’ as, for instance, physicists’ questions 





Wallach et al [1] have written that ‘Machine ethics and 
machine consciousness are joined at the hip’.1  The 
attribution of consciousness to machines is a fundamental 
consideration in assessing the ethical status of machines – 
both as moral agents and as moral patients.  Yet how are 
we to understand such consciousness-attributions; and 
indeed, how are we to view attributions of moral status 
themselves?    
 
I compare two views on this, which are discussed by 
Coeckelbergh in his contribution [6] and in other writing 
[7-10].  On the view he labels ‘objectivism’ or ‘realism’, a 
question like ‘Is X conscious?’ (supposing X to be a 
machine, a human, a dolphin, or whatever) is asking about 
objective matters of fact concerning X’s psychological 
state.  Also, for realism, attributions of moral status 
supervene on X’s psychological properties (including 
consciousness and related states).  On the version of 
realism I will discuss here, normative moral questions 
concerning the actions or the treatment of humans, 
                                                
* School of Engineering and Informatics, University of Sussex, Falmer, 
Brighton, BN1 9QJ, UK.  Email: stevet@sussex.ac.uk 
1  Wallach et al are primarily concerned in their paper with how 
modeling moral agency requires a proper analysis of conscious decision-
making , whereas the present paper largely centres around the relation 
between sentience and being a moral patient – but the sentiments are 
broadly overlapping.  I’ve discussed the general relation between 
consciousness and ethics in an AI context in [2-5].  
animals or robots, are closely tied up with factual 
questions concerning the well-being (or ill-being) of such 
creatures, assuming them to be conscious creatures.  For 
such a view, an important part of what would be involved 
in a machine’s actually being conscious – phenomenally 
conscious, as opposed to just functioning cognitively in a 
way a conscious being would – is that machine’s having 
moral worth in virtue of its being capable of experiencing 
positively or negatively valenced states of satisfaction or 
suffering.2 Thus machine consciousness and machine 
ethics (at least the study of machines as moral patients) 
will tend to be tightly coupled, on such a position.  
Versions of this view are defended in [3,4,11, etc.] 
 
An opposing view – Coeckelbergh’s ‘social-relational’ 
view – claims that attributions of consciousness are not (or 
at least not clearly) ascriptions of matters of objective fact, 
at least in the case of non-human animals, and of current 
and future technological agents. On this view such 
ascriptions rather have to be understood in terms of the 
organizational circumstances in the society in which the 
discourse of attribution occurs, on the social relations 
between human moral agents, and the contexts in which 
other putatively conscious creatures or agents may enter 
into our social lives.  These social and technical contexts 
vary from culture to culture and from epoch to epoch.  As 
society is fast-changing today, so new criteria for 
consciousness-attribution may currently be emerging, 
which are likely to radically alter opinion on what beings 
to treat as conscious.  Moreover, on the social-relational 
view attributions of moral worth and other moral qualities 
are similarly to be seen as essentially embedded in social 
relations.  The same profound changes in social view are 
likely to affect norms concerning the attribution of moral 
status, in particular the moral status of artificial creatures.  
In a word, judgments in the 21st century about the possible 
experiential and moral status of automata may markedly 
diverge from those that were prevalent in previous 
centuries.  A social-relationist view will say there may be 
no neutral way of judging between these different views.  
                                                
2 I defend the inherent distinguishability between phenomenal and 
functional consciousness in [4].    
Thus, on the social-relationist view, both psychological 
realism and moral realism are rejected.3 4 
 
The orientation of this paper is broadly sympathetic to the 
psychological realist view, and, indeed, to (some versions 
of) moral realism.  However, despite their apparent 
diametrical opposition, perhaps some kind of synthesis 
can be reached.  It seems clear, in any event, that the 
debate is an extremely significant one at this juncture of 
human civilization and technical development.   
 
 
2  THE EXPANDING CIRCLE  
 
Many writers have talked of a progressive expansion of 
moral outlook through human pre-history and history.  
Peter Singer has written persuasively [14] of the 
‘expanding circle’ of ethical concern, from primitive kith- 
and tribe-centred fellow-feeling to a universal regard for 
all of humanity; and of the rational imperative to widen 
the circle still further to include non-human creatures 
capable of sentient feeling (see also discussion in [5]).  
We owe our ethics to the evolutionary pressures on our 
pre-human forbears, and we owe it the animal co-
descendents of that evolutionary process to extend ethical 
concern to the well-being of all sentient creatures.  Some 
have argued that the circle should be widened so that non-
sentient entities such as forests, mountains, oceans, etc. 
should be included within the domain of direct moral 
consideration (rather than just instrumentally, in terms of 
how they affect the well-being of sentient creatures) [15, 
16]. In considering what limits might be put on this 
process of ethical expansion, Singer argues that only 
entities that have the potentiality for sentience could 
sensibly be included in the moral circle.  For, he says, of a 
being with no sentience there can be nothing that one can 
do which could make a difference to that being in terms of 
what it might experience.  [14: p. 123] 
 
Singer’s position partially rests on a conceptual claim – 
that only beings with sentience can coherently be 
considered as moral patients.  To see that the claim is a 
conceptual one consider this:  roughly, for X to be a 
‘moral patient’ (or moral ‘recipient’) means (at least in 
part) that X is capable of benefitting or suffering from a 
given action; and a non-sentient being cannot benefit or 
suffer in the relevant (experiential) sense (although, like 
                                                
3 This is not to say that questions concerning consciousness or ethics in 
relation to such machines are to be thought of as trivial or nugatory: on 
the contrary, a social-relationist may take such questions as seriously as 
the realist would, and may claim that they deserve our full intellectual 
and practical attention.   
4 See also David Gunkel’s contribution to this symposium [12] and his 
book [13].  Gunkel offers deep and subtle critiques of the realist 
approach.  Sadly, there is no space to respond specifically to his points 
here. 
an antique wooden table left out in the rain, it may suffer 
in a non-experiential sense).  So, the argument goes, a 
non-sentient being cannot coherently be considered as a 
moral patient. 
 
Of course the precise conditions under which particular 
artificial agents might be considered conscious are 
notoriously difficult to pin down.  But having 
controversial verification-conditions is not the same as 
having verification-conditions essentially dependent upon 
the social-relational context.  There may be much 
controversy among physicists over the precise conditions 
under which Dark Matter may be said to be established to 
exist; but this does not detract from the ontological 
objectivity of dark matter as an entity in the universe; it 
does not make physics social-relational.  Similarly a 
robot’s pain, if such a thing were to exist, would be as 
objective a property of the robot, and as inalienable from 
the robot, as would your or my pain be inalienable from 
you or from me.  (Conversely, a robot that gave 
appearances of pain or suffering but which in fact had no 
sentience could not have sentience added to it simply by 
virtue of its convincing appearance.)  
 
 
3  THE LANDSCAPE OF CONSCIOUS WELL-
BEING 
 
For realism, in the version I am sympathetic to (and 
possibly also for Coeckelbergh’s version of social-
relationism) there appears to be a kind of holism between 
thinking of X as phenomenally conscious and judging X 
to be of moral worth (at least as a moral patient, and 
maybe as a moral agent, in a full sense of agency).  To 
think of a creature as having conscious experience is to 
think of it as capable of experiencing things in either a 
positively or negatively valenced way – to think of it as 
having desires, needs, goals, and states of satisfaction and 
dissatisfaction or suffering.  Of course there are neutral 
experiential states, and not all satisfaction or suffering is 
consciously experienced.  Nor are all our goals concerned 
with gaining particular experienced satisfactions. 
Nevertheless there seems to be a strong connection 
between our experiential capacities and our potential for 
well-being.  (This is a point which has been addressed 
surprisingly little in the literature on human 
consciousness, and of machine consciousness.)  We may 
talk of beings which are conscious, in this rich sense, as 
having the capacity for conscious/satisfaction/suffering 
states (I’ll here call these CSS states for short).   
 
In The Moral Landscape [17] Sam Harris has argued (in a 
broadly utilitarian way) that the well-being of conscious 
creatures is the central issue in ethics, and indeed that 
other ethical considerations are, if not nonsensical, at root 
appeals to consideration of experienced well-being – to 
the quality of CSS states.  Harris’s moral landscape is the 
terrain of possible peaks and troughs in experienced well-
being that CSS-capable creatures negotiate through their 
lives.  He also argues (in a particularly strong version of 
the realist position) that moral questions are objective and 
in principle scientific in nature (as a neuroscientist, he 
takes brain-processes to be central determinants of well- 
or ill-being). It may be hard in practice to solve various 
moral dilemmas, but in principle, he claims, they are 
amenable to a scientific solution, like other tough factual 
questions such as curing cancer or eliminating global 
poverty.   
 
I don’t necessarily say ethics is exclusively about well-
being; but I would agree that it is central to ethics.  Also, 
since creatures with capacities for greater or lesser well-
being are conscious, I think it is central to the study of 
consciousness, and, indeed to AI.  Of course physiological 
processes from the neck upwards are pretty crucial for 
such capacities.  But bodily processes from the neck down 
are pretty important too: a big challenge for AI and 
Machine Ethics is to work out just what physical features 
need to be present both above and below the neck in 
artificial agents for artificially-generated CSS properties 
to be present, and how close they have to be with the 
relevant natural or organic features.  (Harris does not 
consider the ethical status of possible artificial agents.) 
 
Linked with his views about the scientific grounding of 
questions to do with well-being and ethics, Harris 
expresses a lot of impatience with the ‘fact-value’ split 
that has dominated scientific thinking in the last century, 
and for the moral neutralism or quietism that has 
characterized a lot of scientific thought and practice in that 
time.  This has been particularly true of ‘Cognitive 
Science’ as this has developed in the last half-century or 
so.  AI researchers, neuroscientists, psychologists and 
philosophers often talk as though the mind was 
exclusively a cognitive mechanism: All that 
‘cognitivizing’ hard work at reducing the chiaroscuro of 
our desires, emotions, pains and delights to informational 
operations, all that bleaching out of happiness and misery 
from the fabric of our psychology, has, arguably, been to 
the detriment of both scientific understanding and ethical 
discussion in this area.  
 
 
4  A 100-YEAR SCENARIO  
 
I thus applaud the science-ethics holism found in 
objectivist writers like Harris.  Perhaps this enthusiasm 
will be shared by social-relationists such as Coeckelbergh.  
It is certainly interesting to discuss machine ethics in a 
way that takes seriously the inherent interconnectivity of 
consciousness, well-being and ethics, and which allows 
that scientific and ethical issues are not to be debated in 
parallel, hermetically sealed chambers.5   
 
Further to this, then, consider the following future picture:  
100 years from now (possibly sooner), human social 
relations will (we suppose) have changed radically 
because of the existence of large numbers of artificial 
agents implementing nearly-human or (if singularity 
theorists are half right) even supra-human levels of skills 
across a wide range of capabilities.  Many people will find 
it natural to attribute a wide range of psychological 
attributes to such agents, and the agents themselves will, 
in their communications with us and with each other, 
represent themselves as having many of the cognitive and 
indeed affective states that we currently take to be 
characteristic of human psychology.  Many such artificial 
creatures may resemble humans in outward form, but even 
if they don’t, and the currently fashionable technology of 
humanoid robotics runs into a cul-de-sac, it nevertheless 
seems likely that the demands of extensive human-AI 
social interaction will ensure a good deal of resemblance 
in non-bodily respects (for instance in terms of sharing 
common languages, participating in a common economic 
system, shared legal frameworks, and so on).   
 
Will our world wind up like this? Who knows, but the 
scenario will help us check our intuitions.  Humans in this 
imagined future period may ask: are such artificial agents 
conscious?  And, should we admit such agents into ‘our’ 
moral universe (and in what ways)?  As we have argued, 
such questions are closely linked.  We can combine those 
questions together in a third: do such artificial agents have 
CSS-features?  The social-relationist will say that the 
answer to these questions will depend on the prevailing 
social conditions at the time, on what kinds of attitudes, 
beliefs, forms of life, and ways of articulating or 
representing social reality come to emerge in such a joint 
human-technological social milieu.  On the relational 
view, there will be no ‘objective’ way, independently of 
the socially dominant assumptions and judgments and 
norms and institutions that grow up as such artificial 
agents proliferate, to say whether they are actually 
conscious, whether they actually have states of welfare or 
suffering, or whether they actually merit particular kinds 
of moral consideration - e.g. whether they merit having 
their needs taken roughly as seriously as equivalent 
human needs; whether their actions merit appraisal in 
                                                
5 Sometimes the seals can be leaky.  I was once at a conference on 
consciousness, where an eminent neuropsychologist was giving a 
seminar on ethical issues in neural research on consciousness.  He said 
things like ‘With my neuroscientist’s cap on, I think . . .  But with my 
ethicist’s cap on, I think . . .’  What cap was he wearing when deciding 
which cap to put on at a given time?   
roughly similar moral terms as the equivalent actions of 
humans, etc.6 
 
For the realist this would miss an important dimension:  
do such artificial creatures (a few or a many of them) 
actually bear conscious states, are they actually capable of 
experiencing states of satisfaction or suffering at levels 
comparable to ours (or at lower, or even much higher, 
levels).  To see the force of the realist’s argument, 
consider how a gathering of future artificial agents might 
discuss the issue with respect to humans’ having CSS 
properties - perhaps at a Turing-2112 convention? Let’s 
suppose that delegates’ opinions divide along roughly 
similar lines to those in the current human debate, with 
social-relationists arguing that there is no objective fact of 
the matter about whether humans have CSS properties, 
and realists insisting that there must be a fact of the 
matter.7  
 
How would a human listening in on this argument feel 
about such a discussion?  I would suggest that only a few 
philosophically sophisticated folks would feel comfortable 
with the social-relationist side of the argument in this 
robot convention, and that the most instinctive human 
response would a realist one. A human would reflect that 
we do, as a species, clearly possess a wide variety of CSS 
properties – indeed our personal and social lives revolve 
24/7 around such properties?  Can there be any issue over 
which there is more paradigmatically a ‘fact of the matter’ 
than our human consciousness? Surely the ‘facts’ point 
conclusively to the presence of CSS properties in humans: 
and are not such properties clearly tied to deep and 
extensive (neuro)physiological features in us?  What 
stronger evidence-base for any ‘Is X really there?’ 
question could there be than the kind of evidence we have 
for CSS properties in humanity?  So surely robots in 2112 
would be right to adopt a realist view about the 
consciousness and ethical status of humans.  Should we 
then not do the same in 2012 (or indeed in 2112) of 
robots? 8 
                                                
6 It’s worth pointing out that no consensual human view may come to 
predominate on these issues:  there may rather be a fundamental 
divergence just as there is in current societies between liberals and 
conservatives, or between theistic and humanistic ways of thinking, or 
between envirocentric versus technocentric attitudes towards the future 
of the planet, and so on.  In such a case, the relationist could say, social 
reality will be just as it manifests itself – one in which no settled view on 
the psychological or moral status of such agents comes to prevail; society 
will just contain irreconcilable social disagreements on these matters, 
much as it does today on these other issues. 
7 We assume – perhaps with wild optimism – that that these artificial 
agents are by then smart enough to debate such matters somewhat as 
cogently as humans can today, if not much more so.  To get a possible 
flavour of the debate, consider Terry Bisson’s ‘They’re made out of 
meat’ [18].   
8 That is, should we not say that the epistemological status of our 
question about them is comparable to that of theirs about us – although 
5  OTHER MINDS 
One might raise ‘other-minds’-style difficulties even 
about CSS in humans.9  Any individual human’s 
recognition of CSS properties is based upon their own 
direct first-person experience, it might be said, and, as 
Wittgenstein said, sarcastically, ‘how can I generalize the 
one case so irresponsibly?’  [20: I, §293]  There are 
several responses.  One is that, if CSS properties are not 
completely mysterious and inexplicable, from a scientific 
point of view, they must be causally grounded in natural 
features of any individual human possessing them, and it 
would be unlikely that any such underpinning natural 
features are found in a single person (or a few) rather 
being present across the species.  Even in the vanishingly 
unlikely solipsist case where I am the only human with 
CSS properties, it would still be an objective, scientific 
matter that I have such properties, would it not?   If so, 
then this would seem to marginalize doubts about ‘other 
minds’ as a philosophical side-show without any practical 
relevance to our functioning, social lives, and also without 
any possible value as a hypothesis worthy of scientific 
investigation.10  Still, it comes up often in this sort of 
discussion (Turing used it in one of the least-satisfying 
passages of his 1950 paper [21]). 
Another response is that first-person evidence forms only 
a part of the evidence-base I have as an individual for my 
CSS properties.  The way I come to recognize and 
articulate CSS properties in myself is partly based upon 
my social interactions with my conspecifics.  Indeed (the 
more serious point behind the Wittgenstein quip cited 
above) my whole discourse about mind, consciousness, 
pain, desires, emotions, etc. is based upon the public 
forms of life I share with other humans.  This is also true 
in scientific terms: there is a mass of scientific theory and 
accreted experimental data linking CSS properties in 
humans with our evolutionary history, and with our 
current biological and neural make-up.   
This kind of point of course approaches to the social-
relational terrain.  But we may need to be careful here.  
The social-relationist may argue that the very 
Wittgenstinian considerations just mentioned (and related 
arguments for the necessary public, social grounding of 
such recognition, and on the impossibility of private 
language and private cognitive rules, etc.) shed doubt on 
                                                                             
the answers to the two questions may be very different, as may be the 
relative difficulty in answering them?  
9 Such doubts are not raised by Coeckelbergh in his present contribution, 
but Gunkel does indeed cite traditional doubts about other minds as a 
way of putting pressure on realist responses to the ‘machine question’ 
[12]. 
10 For a dismissive response to ‘other-minds’ doubts from within the 
phenomenological tradition, see Gallagher and Zahavi [19]. 
the objectivity of first-personal recognition of CSS 
properties.  This may be so, and it may point to a deep 
truth behind the social-relational position – the truth that 
our understanding of how we come to possess CSS 
properties and the variety of roles they play in our lives is 
indeed inextricably bound up with our social relationships 
and activities.   
 
But it’s important to see that the dependency also goes in 
the other direction:  our consciousness, needs, desires, etc. 
are what give point and form to our sociality. Our social 
conditions partly gain their significance, their point, from 
these very experiential and appetitive features in our lives, 
including, centrally, the ups of happiness and downs of 
misery.  Thus sociality and consciousness thus co-
determine each other (cf [22]).  But also myriad 
‘objective’ physical and biological realities – including a 
variety of evolutionary, neural and physiological 
constraints – come into this network of inter-relations 
between consciousness and the social.  Evolutionary 
history and current brain-patterns play crucial roles in 
what makes us feel good or bad, as do the materiality of 
our bodies and the dynamics of their interaction with other 
bodies and the surrounding physical world.   
 
 
6   SOCIAL AND NON-SOCIAL SHAPERS OF 
‘SOCIALITY’   
 
So there is a multi-directional cluster of mutually 
constitutive and constraining relationships between the 
social, material, biological and experiential factors in our 
lives. (And no doubt many others – for instance I have left 
out the essential role played by our cognitive capacities, 
by beliefs, perceptions, intellective skills, etc.!)  What 
makes up our CSS features emerges from this 
entanglement of these various kinds of factors.  This 
brings us to the heart of the question of CSS in machine-
agents.   
 
What the progress of current work in AI teaches us is that 
many of the features of human-human social and 
communicative interaction can be replicated via 
techniques in computer and robotic science.  Increasingly 
our social world is being filled with human-machine and 
machine-machine interactions.  With the growing ubiquity 
of such interactions, the range of possible social action 
being extended.  But also, our very conceptions of the 
social, are being re-engineered.  This is a crucial point that 
the social-relationist seeks to emphasize, in the debate 
about the status of CSS properties; and the realist must 
also acknowledge it readily.   
 
Of course, notions related to social status overlap 
intimately with ethical notions; and the social-relationist 
account is well suited to provide a theoretical framework 
for much of the domain of the social – what is taken to 
constitute ‘the social’ is largely itself shaped by social 
factors, and changes as new social possibilities emerge.  
But, as we have argued, the domain of the social is itself 
also shaped and constrained by the non-social, including 
biological and other kinds of physical conditions, and the 
experiences, desires, beliefs, goals, etc.of social 
participants.   So many of the novel forms of human-
machine and machine-machine social relationships that 
will emerge (and already have been emerging) will take 
their character not merely from the social sphere itself but 
also from the non-social soil in which sociality is rooted, 
that is, the multiple physical, metabolic and experiential 
drivers of sociality. This is particularly true of social 
relationships between humans and machines, which are 
precisely NOT relations between creatures with shared 
physiologies. And, for robots and other artificial agents of 
today, we can surely say with near certainty that they are 
NOT relations between beings with common experiential 
and affective subjectivities.   
 
 
7  THE SPECTRUM – SOCIAL AND 
EXPERIENTIAL  
 
So, for the short term - as long as we have only the 
relatively primitive designs of our current technologies -  
our artificial social partners are, objectively, partners with 
zero experiential or affective life (despite many vociferous 
assertions to the contrary).  Such artificial social partners 
are not, in Tom Regan’s phrase, ‘subjects of a life’ [23].   
So, for now, the possibilities for social interaction with 
machines outstrip the possibilities for those machines 
being capable of sharing such interactions as exchanges 
between experiencing, belief-and-desire-ful beings: for 
now, any human-machine interaction is one between 
social partners where only one of the actors has any social 
concern.   So some of the deep conditions for sociality 
mentioned earlier are missing – in particular, a shared 
experientiality and shared neurophysiology.  In the 
human-machine case, then, we might talk of a current 
mismatch between social interactivity and social 
constitutivity.    
 
But how might things change in the medium and long-
term?  First, techniques in synthetic biology may develop 
in ways which allow biotechnologists to create agents that 
are not just functionally very close to humans, but close in 
detailed neural and physiological makeup.  In that, ex 
hypothesi, such creatures will share deep and extensive 
similarities with us in terms of the biological 
underpinnings of consciousness, we would have little 
ground for denying that they are ‘objectively’ conscious, 
CSS-bearing, beings, with all the ethical consequences 
that would flow.   
 
In the context of our present discussion, such full-spec 
synthetic biology-based creatures are offer little challenge 
as compared to those which occupy the less bio-realistic 
regions on the spectrum of possible artificial creatures – 
where judgment calls about CSS properties and ethical 
status on the basis of physical design are much less 
straightforward.  In many regions of the spectrum there 
will be agents with natural, fluent and subtle social 
interactivity characteristics that are close to those of 
humans, but where underlying physical design is remote 
from human physical design.  These do and will 
increasingly offer the most difficult sorts of cases: agents 
that, via their fluent social capacities (and, in many kinds 
of such case, outward humanoid bodily features), display 
a wide variety of CSS-evincing behaviours but where they 
share relatively few of the internal neurological features 
that make for CSS features in humans.  These are the 
cases where the social-relational view is on its most solid 
ground.  
 
8   FALSE POSITIVES, FALSE NEGATIVES  
 
But, realists will say, for such cases there could be risks of 
false positives and false negatives in CSS-attributions.  
And surely it is the significance of such false positives and 
negatives that makes a difference – both in theoretical 
terms and in moral terms.  In the hypothetical situations 
where such agents exist in large numbers – where they 
multiply across the world as smartphones have done today 
– wrong judgments could have catastrophic ethical 
implications.  In the false-positive case, many resources 
useful for fulfilling human need might be squandered on 
satisfying apparent but illusory ‘needs’ of vast populations 
of benaviourally convincing but CSS-negative artificial 
agents.  Conversely, in the false-negative case, vast 
populations of CSS-positive artificial agents may undergo 
extremes of injustice and suffering at the hands of humans 
that wrongly take them for socially-fluent zombies.  
 
Given the spectrum of hypothetical types of cases 
previously mentioned, the social-relationist must decide 
where, if anywhere, on this spectrum, any kind of 
objectivity of CSS-attribution is allowed.  At one extreme 
lie actual humans and near-human bio-realistic artificial 
replicants.  At the other extreme lie the simplistic AI 
systems of today.  Apart from philosophical concerns 
about the ‘other minds’ problem, already shown to be 
deeply flawed, what reason is there to deny the objectivity 
of (positive) CSS-attributions in the case of ourselves?  
And as for synthetic-biology beings which are 
physiologically close to us, surely that physiological 
commonality supports objective positive CSS-attributions 
as well.  And, at the other end, where the relatively crude 
electronic and robotic agents of today lie, we surely have 
enough basis for making ‘objectively’ warranted negative 
CSS-attributions.  So, for such cases at least, the realist 
case seems to be strong.  So how will the social-relationist 
say where, in the spectrum, the presence or absence of 
CSS features ceases to be an objective or realist matter 




9  CONCLUSION  
 
Singer’s notion of the expanding ethical circle, and 
Harris’s suggestion that ethical questions concerning the 
‘moral landscape’ can be scientifically grounded, suggest, 
in different ways, a very strong linkage – possibly a 
conceptual one – between consciousness and well-being 
(CSS properties) and ethical concern.  In particular, 
Harris’s critique of scientific neutralism suggests the 
possibility of a scientific grounding to core ethical values:  
and there is no reason why such scientific, objective 
grounding should not also apply to the ethical status of 
artificial agents.   
 
Of course our ethical relations with such agents will be 
inevitably bound up with our social relations with them.  
As we saw, the domain of the social is expanding rapidly 
to include a wide variety of human-AI and AI-AI 
interactions.   But sociality is itself constrained in various 
ways by physical, biological and psychological factors.  
And consciousness and well-being lie at the heart of these 
constraints.  Ethics and sociality are indeed closely 
intertwined.  But we should not assume that, just because 
there are rich and varied social interactions between 
humans and artificial creatures of different sorts, there are 
no considerations about the appropriateness of ethical 
relations that humans may adopt towards such artificial 
creatures.  Our capacities for satisfaction or suffering must 
be crucially based upon deep neural and biological 
properties; so too for other naturally evolved sentient 
creatures.  Some artificial creatures will have closely 
similar biological properties, making the question of CSS-
attribution relatively easy for them at least.  For others 
(ones whose designs are advanced versions of electronic 
technologies with which we are familiar today, for 
example; or which are based on other technologies that we 
currently have only the faintest idea of) it may be much 
harder to make dependable judgments. In the end, how we 
attribute CSS and consequently ethical status will depend 
on a multiplicity of detailed questions concerning 
commonalities and contrasts between human neural and 
bodily systems and analogous systems in the artificial 
agents under consideration.  The gross apparent 
behaviours of such agents will play a role, of course, but 
only in a wider mix of considerations which will include 
these other, less easily observable, features.  
 
Over- and under-attribution of CSS-properties cause deep 
ethical problems in human social life. (To take just one 
obvious and widespread kind of case: oppressed humans 
all over the globe continue to have their capacity for 
suffering falsely denied, in fake justification for their 
brutal treatment.)  Why should it be any different for 
robots?  In a society where humans and machines have 
extensive and rich social interactions, either false positive 
or false negative mis-attributions could engender massive 
injustices – either to humans whose interests are being 
short-changed by the inappropriate shifting of resources or 
concern to artificial agents that have no intrinsic ethical 
requirements for them; or to artificial agents whose 
interests are being denied because of a failure to correctly 
identify their real capacities for experience and suffering.  
It is not clear how a social-relational view can properly 
accommodate this false-positive/false-negative dimension. 
 
I have tried to put the realist position in a way that is 
sensitive to the social-relational perspective.  However 
many problems and gaps remain.11 A strength of the 
social-relational position is that it addresses, in a way that 
it is difficult for the realist position to do, the undoubted 
tendency for people to humanize or anthropomorphize 
autonomous agents, something that will no doubt become 
more and more prevalent as AI agents with human-like 
characteristics proliferate, and which happens even when 
it is far from clear that any consciousness or sentience can 
exist in such agents.  There will surely be strong social 
pressures to integrate such AIs into our social fabric. 
Supporters of singularitarian views even insist that such 
agents will come (disarmingly rapidly, perhaps) to 
dominate human social existence, or at least transform it 
out of all recognition – for good or for ill.  Possibly such 
predictions sit better with the social-relational view than 
with the realist view, so it will be a big challenge for 
realism to respond adequately to the changing shape of 
human-machine society. In any case it is important to 
become clear on how the AI research community should 
best respond to the difficulties that such future social 
pressures may present. 
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Can an unmanned drone be a moral agent? Ethics and 
accountability in military robotics.
Rodger Kibble1
Abstract.  Remotely operated Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) 
or “drones” are now routinely deployed in theatres of war and 
are  capable  of   lethal  acts  such  as  firing  missiles  under  the 
control  of  their  human  operators.   It  would  take  a  small 
technological step but a large legal and ethical one to allow them 
to  make  “kill”  decisions  autonomously.   This  paper  outlines 
some general technical and ethical contexts surrounding the use 
of  these  weapons  and  examines  a  specific  proposal  for 
implementing  ethical  constraints  on  UAS,  Arkin’s  “ethical 
governor”.   It  is  argued that the proposal is flawed in several 
respects: the author fails to support his bold claim that robots are 
capable of acting more ethically than humans, there is a lack of 
clarity in the formal  representations of ethical  constraints,  and 
the metaphor of a “governor” is a misleading characterisation of 
the  proposed  system’s  functionality  (as  argued  elsewhere  by 
Matthias).
1. INTRODUCTION
The increasing automation of warfare poses pressing challenges 
for  researchers  in  AI  and  machine  ethics,  given  that  semi-
automated weapon systems such as “drones” are now routinely 
in  use  under  a  system  of  military  law  and  ethics  which  has 
hardly been updated since the 1940s [14].  US doctrine already 
allows  remotely  piloted  drones  or  Unmanned  Air  Systems 
(UAS) to fire on manned radar stations, even if they have not 
been directly attacked [Ibid].  If  UAS are ever to be given the 
capability  to  make  independent  “kill”  decisions,  it  is  surely 
essential that they should operate to at least the highest standards 
that  would  be  required  of  a  human  professional.   The  UK 
currently has no intention of moving to full autonomy [16] and  a 
recent  British  study  concludes  that  “fully  autonomous 
weaponized systems may never be acceptable” [8].  However, 
researchers  in  other  countries,  particularly  the  US,  have 
concluded that  it  is  only a matter  of  time  before  autonomous 
armed robots are deployed, and that the task for roboticists is to 
ensure  that  these  robots  behave  in  an  “ethical”  manner  [1,3]. 
The framers of the UK EPSRC Principles of Robotics [7,4] were 
“concerned to ban the creation and use of autonomous robots as 
weapons” but “pragmatically acknowledged that this is already 
happening in the context of the military” [4].  Perhaps the most 
prominent researcher in this field, Ronald Arkin of the Georgia 
Institute of Technology, makes the bold and startling claim that 
robots  have  the  potential  to  be  more  “humane”  than  human 
soldiers [3]. 
The bulk of this paper will be devoted to a critical examination 
of Arkin’s arguments and proposals, including consideration of a 
trenchant critique by [12].  According to [18], work in robotic 
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ethics  needs  to  give  due  attention  to  three  separate  areas  of 
moral/philosophical  concerns,  formal  specification  and 
reasoning about moral constraints, and the implementation task 
of “designing a working system in which there are rules that can 
be enforced and deviant behaviour be detected” – corresponding 
to the software engineering activities of requirements analysis, 
formal specification, and design/implementation.  Arkin follows 
a similar pattern in his presentation [1] and we will do likewise 
in this paper.  Section 2  looks at general ethical issues raised by 
military  robotics  in  the  context  of  the  Just  War  tradition, 
international law and other related factors.  Section 3 addresses 
Arkin’s  moral  and  philosophical  arguments  for  the  potential 
ethical  superiority  of  robots  over  human  soldiers.  Section  4 
considers  Arkin’s  proposals  for  implementing  ethical 
considerations in a formal reasoning system.  Section 5  deals 
with architectural  issues,  specifically the notion of an “ethical 
governor” which is intended to suppress any lethal actions which 
would be in breach of applicable rules. Section 6 concludes the 
paper with some general discussion.
2. ETHICAL CONTEXT
The notion of a Just War in Western societies originates from the 
era of Emperor Constantine who, having adopted Christianity as 
the state religion, no doubt found it embarrassing to be hampered 
by the tenets of a faith that ostensibly abjured violence [17].  The 
Church was tasked with devising a set of rules that would enable 
the Roman Empire to wage war with a clear conscience.  Key 
contributions to the doctrine were made by Augustine of Hippo 





In  the  20th century,  developments  in  Just  War  doctrine  and 
international law were stimulated by the experience of the two 
world wars, the advent of the League of Nations and the United 
Nations, and particular judgments at the Nuremberg war crimes 
trials.  This led to a distinction between Jus ad Bellum – when it 
is  right  to  go  to  war  –  and  Jus in  Bello,  governing  how war 
should be fought.  Key principles of Jus in Bello, codified in the 
Geneva  Conventions,  are  proportionality and  discrimination  – 
the latter  meaning  that  any attack should avoid  harm to non-
combatants.  Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions 
…reflects  the  most  fundamental  of  Geneva’s  rules, 
that  anyone who  was  not  taking  an  active  part  in 
hostilities  must  be  treated  humanely,  in  all  
circumstances. [15] (emphasis in original)
We may note that research in military robotic ethics including 
Arkin’s tends to be confined to  Jus in Bello; ethical robots are 
not assumed to be capable to taking a view on the legitimacy of 
any conflict  they are  deployed  in,  even though such concerns 
have  caused  human  citizens  to  register  as  conscientious 
objectors,  desert,  evade  the  draft  or  refuse  conscription  in 
conflicts all over the world.  The general body of international 
law governing the conduct of warfare is generally referred to as 
the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) which are supplemented in 
any particular campaign by specific Rules of Engagement (ROE) 
[16].
Discussions  of  machine ethics  traditionally  begin  with  a 
consideration  of  Isaac  Asimov’s  famous  Three  Laws  of 
Robotics,  as  expounded  in  his  series  of  Robot  stories  (the 
particularly well-read sometimes point out that there is a fourth, 
or “zeroth” law).  These laws are given short shrift by both [7] 
and  [14],  the  latter  pointing  out  that  they  are  particularly 
inappropriate for military applications.  As a reminder, the Three 
Laws provide that:
1. A robot  may not  injure  a  human  being  or,  through 
inaction, allow a human being to come to harm.
2. A robot  must  obey the orders  given  to  it  by human 
beings, except where such orders would conflict with 
the First Law.
3. A robot must protect its own existence as long as such 
protection does not conflict  with the First or Second 
Laws.
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Three_Laws_of_Robotics)
[7] point out the inherent impracticality of these laws:
For example,  how can a robot know all the possible 
ways a human might come to harm? How can a robot 
understand  and  obey  all  human  orders,  when  even 
people get confused about what instructions mean?
And [14] succinctly observes that 
…much  of  the  funding  for  robotic  research  comes 
from the military.   It explicitly wants robots that can 
kill, won’t take orders from just any human, and don’t 
care about their own lives.  So much for Laws One, 
Two and Three.
A  crucial  issue  here  is  responsibility:  who  will  be  court-
martialled or prosecuted if,  for  example,  an autonomous UAS 
mistakenly  fires  on  a  wedding  party?   [7]  is  quite  clear  that 
robots should never be regarded as more than tools, and it is the 
humans who deploy them that must be held as responsible and 
accountable.  [16] states that responsibility for an agent’s actions 
lies with the last person to issue an order, while “responsibilities 
of the designers will  have been discharged once the UAS has 
been certified  by the  relevant  national  military  or  civilian  air 
authorities”.  This assumes that the subsequent behaviour of the 
artefact  is  predictable,  even  in  the  event  of  a  break  in  the 
communications  link [8].   [1] proposes a system that encodes 
legal and ethical principles as axioms of modal logic and argues 
that  in  contrast  to  sub-symbolic  learning  processes,  the 
behaviour of such a system would be fully predictable from a 
given set of inputs – see section 4 below.  The difficulty here is 
that  the  agent’s  environment  may  be  rapidly  changing  in  a 
battlefield  scenario,  and  indeed its  own  actions may alter  the 
environment  in  a  non-deterministic  way,  leading  to  a  loss  of 
predictability.   It  is obviously critical that the agent is able to 
interpret  its  environment  accurately,  correctly  identifying 
appropriate military targets.  [16] states that 
For  long-endurance  missions  engaged  in  complex 
scenarios,  the  authorised  entity  that  holds  legal 
responsibility will  be required to exercise some level 
of supervision throughout
- which somewhat qualifies the notion of “agent autonomy”.
[8] discuss in some detail the place of autonomous systems in a 
chain  of  command  and  as  noted  above,  conclude  that  “fully 
autonomous weaponised systems may never be acceptable”.
3. HUMANS vs ROBOTS
It  is  claimed  that  battlefield  robots  could  be  programmed  to 
behave “more ethically” than humans, reducing the occurrence
of  atrocities  [3].  Artificial  agents  are  not  prone  to  anger  and 
other  “human  factors”  which  commonly  lead  to  violations  of 
ROEs or the LOAC.  One refinement  of this claim [1] is that 
military  law  and  ethics  have  been  precisely  codified  and 
interpreted  so  that  agents  can  be  equipped  with  a  formally 
specified  knowledge  base  of  legal  and  ethical  principles,  and 
moral decision-making within this circumscribed context would 
be a task they could perform more efficiently and consistently 
than we do.  The next section considers the efficacy of Arkin’s 
proposed ethical calculus; here we examine in some detail his 
startling claim that robots may be capable of treating us more 
humanely than we treat each other, as presented in [3].
Arkin’s case essentially boils down to:
1. War will continue
2. Human  soldiers  cannot  be  trusted  to  behave 
honourably on the battlefield
3. Therefore they should be replaced with robots.
Point  (1)  is  presumably outside the author’s  competence as  a 
roboticist.  Many of his arguments in support of (2) turn out to 
be weak, disingenuous and even contradictory.   I will examine 
some key issues in detail. 
The  central  claim is  that  autonomous  systems  are  capable  in 
principle of performing “more ethically than human soldiers are 
capable of performing”, presented with the rhetorical question
As robots  are  already faster,  stronger  and in  certain 
cases (e.g.,  chess playing) smarter than humans, is it 
that difficult to believe that they will be able to treat us 
more  humanely  on  the  battlefield  than  we  do  each 
other?
I have two fundamental objections to this stance.  Firstly, there 
are  clear  objective  standards  for  assessing  the  capabilities  of 
robots in these circumscribed areas: their speed, durability and 
weight-lifting  abilities  can  be  quantitatively  measured,  while 
anyone familiar with the rules of chess and able to distinguish 
legal from illegal states of the board can determine whether a 
computer has fairly defeated a human.  It is rather a leap of faith 
to extend this reasoning to the field of ethical behaviour, where 
no  such  cut-and-dried  metrics  are  available.   And  secondly, 
ethics  is  a  human  construct  and  it  is  hard  to  see  how  a 
computational artefact could be said to act “more ethically” than 
humans.  This would imply some kind of super-human vantage 
point from which our actions and those of our artefacts could be 
compared.   If an autonomous system applies different standards 
to its ethical choices than those a human would follow, then it 
may become impossible for  a human to predict  the machine’s 
actions, and we have observed above that this is a prerequisite 
for proper accountability.
Some of the supposed advantages of autonomous systems and 
the concomitant human failings are:
1. Autonomous  armed  systems  “do  not  need  to  protect 
themselves” and “can be used in a self-sacrificing manner 
… by a commanding officer”.  So for instance, rather than 
having troops storm into a suspected safe-house with guns 
blazing,  a  robot  could be sent  in  first  to  see  if  it  draws 
hostile fire.  Remark:  Indeed, but this capability is surely 
equally applicable to remotely guided, unmanned systems, 
and/or need not require the robot to be weaponised.
2. “The  eventual  deployment  and  use  of  a  broad  range  of 
robotic sensors better equipped for battlefield observations 
than humans  currently  possess”.   Remark:  this  does not 
seem an argument  for removing people from the loop, as 
presumably  the  outputs  of  these  sensors  could  be  made 
available  to  a  system’s  human  controller  –  just  as 
warfighters already make use of such enhanced sensors as 
radar, sonar, infra-red rifle sights and so on.
3. Avoidance  of  “scenario  fulfilment”  where  people  in 
stressful situations ignore information that contradicts their 
belief-set,  “a  factor  believed  partly  contributing  to  the 
downing of an Iranian  Airliner by the  USS Vincennes in 
1988”.  Remark:  This precise incident is adduced by [14] 
as an example of the  danger of relying on computers and 
automated systems.  The Vincennes was the only ship in the 
area carrying the missile guidance system Aegis, which was 
capable of running in various mode from fully supervised 
(“Semiautomatic”) to fully automated (“Casualty”) and was 
supposed to be able to detect the threat level of aircraft and 
missiles in the vicinity.  Because of this, the Vincennes was 
authorised to fire without consulting more senior officers in 
the fleet.  What happened was that Aegis wrongly identified 
and targetted the airliner as an Iranian F-14 fighter, and the 
command crew authorised it to fire.  If the system had been 
functioning fully autonomously the outcome would surely 
have been the same.  
4. Autonomous  systems  “have  the  potential  capability  of 
independently and objectively monitoring ethical behaviour 
in  the  battlefield  and  reporting  infractions”.   Remark: 
Again,  this is  not an argument  for  equipping robots with 
lethal capabilities: this function could equally be carried out 
by systems that have no more than observer status.  Indeed, 
current communication and surveillance technology already 
enables base commanders to observe operations in real-time 
[Singer].
5. A  report  from  the  Surgeon  General’s  Mental  Health 
Advisory Team found that “Well  over a third of Soldiers 
and Marines reported torture should be allowed, whether to 
save  the  life  of  a  fellow  Soldier  or  Marine  or  to  obtain 
important  information  about  insurgents”.   Remark:  It  is 
perhaps  not  surprising  that  serving  military  personnel 
should share the views of their Commander-in Chief,  the 
Vice President  or the US Defense Secretary,  along with 
opinion-performers  such  as  Harvard  Law  professor  Alan 
Dershowitz.  In February 2002 President George W Bush 
decided  that  suspected  Taliban  and  al-Qaeda   members 
detained  at  Guantanamo  Bay  were  not  entitled  to  the 
protection  of  the  Geneva  Conventions,  with  the  specific 
consequence  that  interrogations  would  not  be  bound  by 
“long-standing practice that regarded the rules in Common 
Article 3 [of the Conventions] as a minimum that applied to 
everyone, in all conflicts” [15] and in particular prohibited 
abusive  interrogation.   In  December  2002,  Secretary 
Rumsfeld  approved  a  request  from General  Counsel  Jim 
Haynes for new interrogation techniques to be available at 
Guantanamo, including many which had been declared to 
constitute “torture” in a decision of the European Court of 
Human Rights against the UK.  This eventually led to the 
adoption  of  the  notorious  practice  of  “water-boarding” 
which  Vice-President  Cheney  was  to  describe  as  a  “no-
brainer”  if  it  could  save  lives.   In  publications  and 
interviews  during  2001  and  2002,  Professor  Dershowitz 
argued  for  the  issuance  of  “torture  warrants”  in  specific 
circumstances such as the fabled “ticking-bomb” scenario. 
These ideas were also prevalent in popular culture thanks to 
the TV series 24, whose hero Jack Bauer was regularly seen 
to carry out aggressive interrogation to obtain supposedly 
life-saving information.
Against this background, the approval of torture by ground 
forces may not result from emotions running high under the 
stress of combat, but can be seen as influenced by policies 
which  stemmed  from  the  highest  levels  of  the 
administration and had a substantial level of approval in the 
public  sphere.   Automation  does  not  seem  to  offer  a 
satisfactory solution, and in any case it is hardly plausible 
for interrogations to be carried out by autonomous systems. 
The instructions that had been in force up to February 2002 
and encoded in US Army Field Manual 34-52 prohibited all 
use of force and advised that the interrogator should aim to 
build a “rapport” with the subject.  We are surely some way 
from the deployment  of empathic  robots which would be 
capable of establishing such a rapport.  Rather than seeking 
a “technological fix” through automation, these abuses need 
to be combatted through democratic and judicial processes 
along with active debate in the public sphere – as indeed 
they have been [14, 5].
6. The  same  report  found  that  “although  they  reported 
receiving  ethical  training,  28%  of  Soldiers  and  31%  of 
Marines reported facing ethical situations in which they did 
not know how to respond”.   Remark: Although the details 
of these situations are not discussed, it is surely intrinsic to 
the  human condition that one may face ethical  dilemmas 
which have no obvious or clear-cut resolution, and the fact 
that  an  automated  system  might  be  more  decisive  is  no 
guarantee in  itself  that  it  will  make  the “correct”  choice. 
Examples of such dilemmas have been explored by tragic 
dramatists since antiquity and have been discussed at length 
by philosophers, perhaps crystallised in the variants of the 
“trolley problem” which is generally ascribed to Philippa 
Foot.   A typical formulation is: is it permissible to divert a 
runaway trolley so that it will hit and kill one person, rather 
than stand by and let it hit and kill five?  The issue is that in 
the first case, which would be preferred from a utilitarian or 
consequentialist point of view, the agent is actively killing a 
human being who would otherwise have survived.  Thus the 
question  arises  of  whether  a  deontic  prohibition  on 
deliberate  killing  may  have  less  force  than  a 
consequentialist  obligation  to  intervene  to  save  life, 
depending  on  circumstantial  factors.   One  can  doubtless 
devise battlefield scenarios which present formally similar 
dilemmas.   The claim that autonomous systems would be 
better at resolving them than human soldiers relies on the 
assumption  that  they  would  be  equipped  with  an  ethical 
calculus  which,  if  not  infallible,  would  have  a  high 
probability of choosing correctly in situations where human 
soldiers do not know how to act.  This would presumably 
have to cover cases where the LOAC/ROE give no clear 
guidance; it  seems doubtful  that  one will  find answers  to 
trolley  problems  in  these  documents.  We  return  to  this 
general topic in the next section; but looking ahead a little, 
it turns out that Arkin’s robots might be equally indecisive, 
given  that  “in  the  absence  of  certainty  … the  system is 
forbidden from acting in a lethal manner” [2].
7. Servicemen and women on active duty suffer psychological 
trauma in increasing numbers, as has been observed from 
WWI to the present conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.  This 
manifests itself as “battlefield fatigue, conversion hysteria, 
confusional states, anxiety states, obsession and compulsion 
states,  and  character  disorders”.   [14]  also  notes  a  high 
degree of psychological stress even among remote operators 
of  UAS,  carrying  out  operations  in  South  Asia  and  the 
Middle  East  from  air-conditioned  bases  in  Nevada. 
Remark:   This in itself need not justify replacing troops 
with  dispassionate  robots,  rather  it  could  be  seen  as 
underscoring  the  imperative  to  avoid  armed  conflict 
wherever  possible.  [16]  discusses  “the  school  of  thought 
that for war to be moral (as opposed to just legal) it must 
link the killing of enemies with an element of self-sacrifice, 
or at least risk to oneself”.  That is, the risk of harm to one’s 
own forces  imposes natural  limits  on the degree of force 
that will be used, an argument that apparently goes back to 
Clausewitz.   If  wars  are to be prosecuted by emotionless 
automata with no fear for their own safety,  no concept of 
suffering and no families to grieve for them, there may be 
the risk of “rapid escalation of what would previously have 
been  considered  a  simple  diplomatic  problem to full-on 
technological warfare” [16] – the 21st century equivalent of 
“gunboat  diplomacy”.   At  the  very  least,  there  is  less 
pressure to find alternative methods of resolving conflicts 
once one has embarked on a military path.  [16] suggest that 
we  may already have  reached a  stage  where  “the  use of 
force is totally a function of an unmanned capability” in the 
use of  UAS over Pakistan and Yemen.  Peter W. Singer 
pointed out at a hearing in March 2010 that 
Our unmanned systems have carried out 119 known air 
strikes into Pakistan, which is about triple the number 
we did with manned bombers in the opening round of 
the Kosovo War. But Congress has not had a debate 
about whether to authorize or disapprove of it. [6]
[14] and [16] also note the effects on perceptions among the 
“enemy”  of   reliance  on  long-distance  weaponry,  with 
remote pilots regarded as “cowardly” and dishonourable.
8. Operators of remotely piloted UAS become distanced from 
the consequences of their actions and “pretend they are not 
killing human beings”.   Remark:  this is indeed a widely 
encountered  argument  against  the  use  of  UAS  but  few 
proponents take the same further step as Arkin, which is to 
argue  that  control  of  UAS  should  be  taken  away  from 
humans and handed over to computers.
9. [3] and [14] both observe that it is very hard to train “true 
warfighters”  and  most  combatants  show  an  extreme 
resistance to killing: during WWII, most fighter pilots never 
tried to shoot anyone down while in one study, “only 15% 
of  the  men  had  actually  fired  at  enemy  positions”. 
Remark:   This  is  apparently  presented  as  a  failing  of 
human  combatants  who  may  lack  an  “offensive  spirit”. 
Confusingly,  it is also suggested that reluctance to engage 
with  enemy forces  stems  from “the  use  of  long-distance 
weapons  making battlefields  `lonely’  and the feeling that 
the enemy was not real but a phantom”.   This does rather 
seem to contradict the idea that long-distance weapons are 
likely to increase the inappropriate use of lethal force.   The 
deployment  of  robots  lacking  any  kind  of  empathic 
identification with hostile troops would surely transform the 
nature of battles and so should not be embarked on without 
extensive  deliberation.   For  instance,  it  is  quite  plausible 
that  those  who  silently  opt  out  of  hostilities  represent  a 
body of opinion among the citizenry who consider the cause 
they are engaged in to be unjust or illegitimate, or at least 
that it does not justify taking human life – particularly if 
they are conscripts.  This constituency would be effectively 
disenfranchised by automation.
Summary: Arkin marshals a variety of arguments in favour of 
deploying autonomous weaponised robots based on the supposed 
shortcomings  of  human  soldiers;  but  as  we  have  argued,  he 
mostly  fails  to  make  a  convincing case for  removing humans 
from the loop altogether in cases where the robots would have 
lethal capabilities.   Rather, he seems to be proposing automation 
as a technological fix for complex human, social and political 
problems, and perhaps to be making a virtue of  necessity given 
the mounting evidence that weaponised autonomous systems are 
almost certain to be deployed sooner or later by  armed forces in 
several parts of the world.
If we disregard the arguments from human failings, it becomes 
necessary for proponents of automation to show that robots can 
not  only  reason  ethically  at  the  same  level  as  the  “best” 
exemplars  of  human  soldiers,  but  can  do  so  faster  and  more 
consistently to the extent that their deployment can be justified. 
This is the topic of the next section.
4. ENCODING ETHICAL PRINCIPLES
[2] sets out a framework for representing and reasoning about 
ethical constraints in a battlefield scenario.  As [12] notes, there 
appears  to  be  some  equivocation  in  that  while  the  system  is 
presented as an “ethical governor”, the implemented constraints 
are  limited  to  legalistic  principles that  might  be derived from 
LOAC and hypothetical instances of ROE.  In fact [2] expresses 
the questionable view that “battlefield ethics are more clear-cut 
and  precise  than  everyday  or  professional  ethics”. This  falls 
short of a general moral stance and may be insufficient to resolve 
ethical dilemmas where LOAC provide no definitive guidance. 
[12] further points out that ROE are by no means ethical rules 
that can claim universal assent, but are instructions given by one 
party in a conflict to its own forces.  
[2] sets out some specific problems which face the attempt to 
encode ethical principles:
1.   The  laws,  codes,  or  principles  (i.e.,  rules)  are 
almost  always  provided  in  a  highly  conceptual, 
abstract level.
2. The conditions, premises or clauses are not precise, 
are subject to interpretation, and may have different
meanings in different contexts.
3.  The  actions or  conclusions in  the  rules  are  often 
abstract as well, so even if the rule is known to apply 
the  ethically  appropriate  action  may  be  difficult  to 
execute due to its vagueness.
4. The abstract rules often conflict with each other in 
specific situations. If more than one rule applies it is 
not often clear how to resolve the conflict.
In  addition  to  these  factors,  [8]  note  that  “interpretations  of 
international law evolve  over  time”,  that  members  of military 
coalitions may have different  ROEs for  their  own forces,  and 
that  local  populations  may  have  different  cultural  values  and 
legal  frameworks.  They  further  observe  that  judgments  of 
proportionality are  subjective  and  typically  involve  military 
experience, legal expertise and local knowledge,  and that “no-
one has tried to identify which information in a typical set  of 
ROEs  can  be  quantified  and  the  tolerances  on  the  resulting 
values.”  
These considerations are said to rule out the use of “predicate 
logic and other standard logics  based on deductive reasoning” 
because  “they  operate  from  inference  and  deduction,  not  the 
notion of obligation” [2].   This is a little confusing, as later in 
the  same  paper  Arkin  presents  epistemic  and  deontic  modal 
logics  as  suitable  formalisms  for  representing  and  reasoning 
about  ethical  constraints,  encoding  general  principles  such  as 
that  lethal  acts  should only be committed  if  obligated by the 
ROE and permitted by LOAC.  In fact deontic logic handles the 
notion  of  obligation  precisely  through  deductive  reasoning; 
standard  modal  logics  are  built  on  a  foundation  of  Boolean 
propositional  calculus,  with  formal  semantics  and  axiomatic 
proof  theories,  and  are  no  more  tolerant  of  vagueness  or 
inconsistency  than  are  classical  logics  [9].  And the  specimen 
axioms that are presented actually include formulas of predicate 
logic, quantifying over sets of constraints which define permitted 
and forbidden actions.  
5. ARCHITECTURE
The notion of an “ethical  governor”  is  introduced by analogy 
with Watts’ mechanical governor which was designed to prevent 
steam engines  overheating,  essentially  implementing  a  simple 
negative  feedback  loop.   [12]  argues  that  this  analogy 
misrepresents the actual design of Arkin’s system.  A key point 
is that the mechanical governor will never operate in a way that 
contradicts the interest of a machine’s owner: if the owner were 
to be rash enough to disable the governor, the machine would be 
liable to break down or perhaps explode.  With military systems 
the reverse is the case: the so-called “governor” will not stop the 
system malfunctioning,  rather it  is  intended to suppress  lethal 
actions  which  are  forbidden  by  the  built-in  constraints.   The 
overall  architecture  is  generate-and-test,  with  a  tactical 
subsystem proposing actions which are filtered by the “ethical” 
module.  [12] claims that this could be perceived as a source of 
inefficiency  by  military  operators,  in  that  they  are  prevented 
from attaining  what  they  perceive  as  desirable  goals.   Arkin 
would  have  trouble  disputing  this  claim,  since  part  of  his 
justification for the deployment of autonomous systems is that 
human soldiers are prone to commit  atrocities or mistreatment 
and that their commanding officers are often complicit [3].
More charitably, it is quite plausible that a mission commander 
might want  to disable the governor because of a disagreement 
with its interpretation of the LOAC or ROE, considering that it 
was  acting  too  cautiously.  And  it  seems  that  it  would  be 
relatively straightforward for a commander in the field to “turn 
off”  an ethical  governor:  the  “proportionality”  of  an attack is 
calculated  by  comparing  predicted  “collateral  damage”  with 
military necessity,  and at a certain level of “necessity”  “every 
desired action can be carried out without any interference from 
the ethical governor” [12].  It is unlikely that a robot would be 
competent  or  permitted  to  make  autonomous  judgments  of 
military  necessity,  and  so  this  parameter  would  doubtless  be 
under the control of a human commander. [12] notes that Arkin’s 
project has been reported in the popular press in a way which 
suggests military robots already have moral sensibilities or are 
capable  of  learning  them,  which  may  have  the  unwelcome 
consequence of legitimising the use of this class of weapons in 
the public sphere.
A further consideration is that the built-in constraints have to go 
through two levels  of “translation”:  first  from English (or  the 
local language) into a knowledge representation formalism, and 
subsequently into computer software (“code”).  The first step is 
problematic in itself, as mapping from English into modal logics 
is by no means straightforward.  [9] gives examples of paradoxes 
arising from the fact that certain  valid formulas of deontic logic 
don’t  make  intuitive  sense  when  rendered  into  English:  for 
instance
Op → O(p v q)
is a valid formula of a variant of deontic logic, meaning “if it is 
obligatory to do p, it is obligatory to do p or q”.  Yet this does 
not seem intuitively correct, since it could be instantiated as “If I 
must hand in my essay, then I must either hand it in or burn it”. 
Regarding the second stage,  [12]  notes  that  while  LOAC and 
ROE are generally public documents, their encoded versions will 
not be and indeed will most likely be subject to military secrecy. 
Thus there will  be no proper opportunity for  open democratic 
scrutiny  and  debate  over  the  circumstances  under  which 
autonomous systems may be deployed and use lethal force.
6. CONCLUSIONS
Having challenged the notion that robots could be “more ethical” 
than humans and arguing that Arkin’s proposed formalism and 
architecture are inadequate to the task of endowing robots with 
genuinely ethical judgment, I would like to raise the bar further 
by proposing that in order to be recognised as ethical subjects, 
agents  would  need to  have  communicative  and argumentative 
capabilities in the sense of [10].
Rather than being more ethical than any human, we would want 
agents to perform at the level of the best exemplars of human 
behaviour.   Discussions  of   the  ethics  of  robotic  warfare 
invariably cite the My Lai Massacre of March 16th, 1968, when a 
platoon  under  the  command  of  Lieutenant  William  Calley 
embarked  on a  killing spree in  a  Vietnamese  village  that  left 
around 500 civilians dead, including very young children.  An 
important player on March 16th  who is less often mentioned was 
Chief  Warrant  Officer  Hugh  Thompson.  Having  observed  the 
large number of bodies from his gunship, Thompson reported the 
killings to brigade headquarters, ordered Calley to cease firing, 
put himself between the US troops and the villagers, and used 
his helicopter to ferry some of the villagers to safety [13].
I suggest we would want agents to be not only more ethical than 
Calley,  but  at  least  as  ethical  as  Thompson.   Heath  (2001), 
following Durkheim,  defines  a  norm-conformant  agent  as  one 
that will not only follow rules itself, but is disposed to sanction 
those who  do not.   The  LOAC and ROEs standardly require 
combatants  to disobey or question orders which they consider 
unlawful,  to  report  atrocities  committed  by other  soldiers  and 
where  possible,  to  intervene  to  prevent  them.   Thus  a  fully 
autonomous  and  ethical  military  robot  would  not  only  be 
required to base its own actions on sound moral principles, and 
to  justify  them if  challenged,  but  to  constantly  monitor  both 
human  and  robotic  agents  in  its  vicinity  to  ensure  that  their 
actions were lawful, and to directly engage with other agents to 
dissuade them from unlawful acts.  
In summary though, it is questionable whether researchers in AI, 
robotics and ethics should be devoting their time and expertise to 
developing systems which are intended to hasten the advent of 
autonomous  military robots:  they might  be better  occupied in 
arguing in  the public  sphere  against the development  of such 
systems,  and  applying  their  research  efforts  to  developing 
systems which might facilitate non-violent methods of conflict 
resolution.
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Abstract.  Robert Sparrow argues that military robots capable of 
making their own decisions would be independent enough to 
allow us denial for their actions, yet too unlike us to be the 
targets of meaningful blame or praise—thereby fostering what 
Matthias has dubbed ―the responsibility gap.‖ We agree with 
Sparrow that someone must be held responsible for all actions 
taken in a military conflict. That said, we think Sparrow 
overlooks the possibility of what we might term ―blank check‖ 
responsibility. A person of sufficiently high standing could 
accept responsibility for the actions of autonomous robotic 
devices—even if that person could not be causally linked to 
those actions besides this prior agreement. The basic intuition 
behind our proposal is that we can impute relations even when 
no other form of contact can be established. The missed 
alternative we want to highlight, then, would consist in an 
exchange: social prestige in the occupation of a given office 
would come at the price of signing away part of one‘s freedoms 
to a contingent and unpredictable future guided by another (in 
this case, artificial) agency.12 
1 INTRODUCTION 
If a robot capable of setting its own goals were to go on a killing 
spree, who would we blame? Or, if such a robot were to exercise 
its autonomy in a manner inconsistent with our understanding of 
morally permissible behaviour, who could we justifiably hold 
responsible? The possibility of creating a robot with the ability 
to make decisions based on the basis of its own initiative(s) 
rather than pre-programmed commands is admittedly a 
speculative idea at this stage. One can nevertheless imagine, as 
Robert Sparrow [1] does, a scenario where such military 
weaponry is somehow capable of making its own decisions 
without direct or indirect instructions from a human being. 
Deploying these kinds of autonomous robots in the theatre of 
war would have far-ranging ethical consequences because, in 
such contexts, not only are we dealing with life and death 
situations, we also expect the various parties to be held 
responsible for the choices that they make. As Michael Walzer 
[2] put it, ―[i]f there are recognizable war crimes, there must be 
recognizable criminals.‖ 
However, since the hypothetical robots that interest Sparrow 
would be midway between us and plain machines, they would 
slip by this requirement of moral responsibility: They would be 
independent enough to allow humans plausible denial for their 
actions, yet too unlike us to be the targets of meaningful blame 
or praise. Such autonomous yet unfeeling robots would therefore 
inhabit a morally ambiguous space—what Matthias [3] has aptly 
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dubbed ―the responsibility gap.‖ Any unethical act on their part 
would therefore betoken the most senseless event conceivable, a 
moral failure for which no one could be fairly held responsible. 
Understandably, then, Sparrow thinks this would be enough to 
bar the use of autonomous ―killer robots‖ in war. 
We follow Sparrow in believing that one condition for being 
an agent that can be held morally responsible is the capacity to 
be punished/rewarded through meaningful proportional 
suffering/remuneration. Although other conditions exist (e.g. 
wilful intent), falling within the ambit of punishment and reward 
is arguably a necessary condition of moral responsibility, and 
thus, insofar as autonomous robots could not be punished in any 
meaningful way, they would not qualify as responsible agents. 
However, since these machines would be autonomous, they 
would be culpable, and since they act deliberately, they would 
also be liable. Hence, such robots would need to be held 
responsible for their actions, and we owe this responsibility to (at 
minimum) the parties in the contexts where the robots would be 
in use. 
We thus agree with Sparrow that, following the received 
tenets of just war theory and international laws of war, someone 
must be held responsible for all actions taken in a military 
conflict. Yet, when Sparrow concludes from this that 
autonomous robots should not be deployed, we believe his 
argument proceeds a bit too hastily. Indeed, we want to suggest 
that there is a way to seal the responsibility vacuum Sparrow 
points to. Although we do not endorse the use of such military 
devices, we think Sparrow‘s argument overlooks the possibility 
of what one might term ―blank check‖ responsibility: A person 
of sufficiently high military or political standing could accept 
responsibility for the actions (normal or abnormal) of all 
autonomous robotic devices—even if that person could not be 
causally linked to those actions besides this prior agreement. 
The basic intuition behind our proposal is that two things can 
be related just in virtue of their being related. That is, we humans 
retain the liberty to simply impute relations even when no other 
form of contact can be established (this is what we do whenever 
we use a word, for example). In an ethical context, this sort of 
non-causal imputation is akin to what is routinely called 
scapegoating (i.e., deliberately singling out a particular person as 
the recipient of responsibility or blame). But, this possibility 
should not overshadow the fact that, when informed consent is 
present, the same mechanism can be used fairly. Indeed, consent 
can secure the sought-after component of responsibility through 
a person‘s very willingness to partake in a contractual 
agreement. As will be explained below, by willingly agreeing to 
the terms of the contract, the informed agent imputes 
responsibility on herself for the actions of the autonomous 
machine. The missed alternative we want to highlight, then, 
would essentially consist in an exchange: Social prestige in the 
occupation of a given office could come at the price of signing 
away part of one‘s freedoms to a contingent and unpredictable 
future guided by another (in this case, artificial) agency. 
We shall not be arguing that holding the office in question 
would be conditional on one‘s willingness to actually use killer 
robots. Our more prosaic point is that if such robots are 
deployed, then someone can willingly (and publicly) accept 
responsibility for whatever ensues. Obviously, this proposal 
leaves open the question of whether the antecedent of the 
conditional is or should be affirmed. Still, to the extent such 
agreements can be fairly and reasonably implemented, 
Sparrow‘s case needs tinkering. Obviously, in the interest of 
peace, it is to be hoped that a more robust case for peace will 
emerge from this critical engagement. 
With that shared aim in mind, we will present our case in a 
fairly straightforward manner: we will first describe and 
motivate the problem, then we will articulate and defend our 
solution. 
2 SPARROW’S DILEMMA  
Sparrow recognizes the common criticism [4, 5, 6] that the 
advent of military robots may trivialize entry into war. His 
argument against the use of autonomous robots, though, is more 
subtle, and turns on a disturbing prospect of across-the-board 
moral blamelessness. Even if we grant the (debatable) cognitive 
scientific prognostication that it is possible for a non-sentient 
robot to be autonomous—in the sense not just of being able to 
determine which means best suit a given end, but in the stronger 
sense of actually determining the best ends to follow—we are 
left with an ethical dilemma. Specifically, the question arises 
whether there is any room left for the attribution of blame (and 
praise) where these robots are deployed. As Sparrow points out, 
if we are ever to conduct wars utilizing such technology and 
simultaneously maintain our standard ethical inclinations 
regarding responsibility for one‘s actions, we must ask ourselves 
who would be responsible in the event of a violation by an 
autonomous robot in the conduct of war. Sparrow‘s claim, in 
short, is that no one could be rightly held responsible for any 
atrocities perchance committed by the robots. Since such a 
situation of blamelessness would be morally unacceptable (and 
unjust), prohibition of their use in war seems to follow.  
So stated, this problem is a general one, and in principle it 
arises any time a) some autonomous entity is responsible for its 
behaviour yet b) holding that entity responsible would be absurd. 
It just so happens that, with respect to adult human military 
personnel, those that are responsible for their actions can all be 
held responsible, as they meet the conditions for being the 
targets of meaningful praise or blame (among other things, 
perhaps). Although an autonomous robot should likewise be 
responsible for its actions, it cannot be held as such. 
To make this worry vivid, consider a fully self-determining 
military machine equipped to identify the intention(s) of 
combatants. Imagine a scenario in which such a robot would 
lethally engage an enemy platoon that was clearly surrendering 
before and during its attack [1]. Such a situation would leave us 
with the following tension: To the extent that an ―autonomous 
robot‖ fits its twofold label, humans cannot be blamed for its 
actions, since the robot has genuine ―autonomy;‖ yet the robot 
itself cannot be blamed for its actions either, since it is merely 
―robotic‖ and is thus impervious/oblivious to any meaningful 
form of punishment. If we want to keep moral considerations in 
the picture and retain the idea that just war theory and the 
international laws of war require us to justifiably hold someone 
responsible when things go wrong, then the situation described 
by Sparrow becomes very problematic. 
It is important to underscore that the moral predicament 
discussed by Sparrow arises only when the violent act of the 
robot is sandwiched between a narrow set of circumstances. 
Specifically, the robot must be sophisticated enough to make its 
own choices, but not so sophisticated that it can experience pain 
and pleasure. Indeed, it is worth recalling that the range of robots 
Sparrow‘s argument applies to is very restricted. All of the semi-
autonomous or remote military robots currently in existence are 
irrelevant to his discussion, since in the use of these robots 
humans can at all times be held responsible, say, via their 
contribution to a program‘s content or a device‘s activation. 
Sparrow, by contrast, wants to call our attention to a far more 
difficult prospect. Hence, it is crucial to be clear on what exactly 
is meant by a fully ―autonomous‖ robot in this context: 
 
Artificially intelligent weapon systems will thus be capable 
of making their own decisions, for instance, about their 
target, or their approach to their target, and of doing so in 
an ‗intelligent‘ fashion. While they will be programmed to 
make decisions according to certain rules, in important 
circumstances their actions will not be predictable. 
However, this is not to say that they will be random either. 
Mere randomness provides no support for a claim to 
autonomy. Instead the actions of these machines will be 
based on reasons, but these reasons will be responsive to 
the internal states—‗desires‘, ‗beliefs‘ and ‗values‘—of the 
system itself. Moreover, these systems will have 
significant capacity to form and revise these beliefs 
themselves. They will even have the ability to learn from 
experience. [1] 
 
The robots Sparrow envisions would thus have the autonomy to 
reject their programmed rules, or to apply those rules in ways 
that are not in line with judgements we would endorse. To the 
extent a robot would do this, it would think ―outside our box.‖ 
No matter how remote it may be, Sparrow wants to address this 
possibility directly, before it arises (a laudable and prudent pre-
emptive attitude which, by engaging in earnest with the subject 
matter, we obviously share). 
Accordingly, Sparrow is more concerned with guarding 
against a responsibility-vacuum than with arguing that 
limitations should be placed on the autonomy of machines. The 
moment artificial constraints are placed on a robot‘s range of 
conduct, be it at the level of hardware or software, that robot no 
longer falls within the ethically problematic range Sparrow is 
interested in. As an example of this, consider Arkin‘s [7] 
suggestion that autonomous lethal robotic systems be equipped 
with an in-built design component providing us with clear data 
regarding who is responsible for the robot‘s actions. This could 
include explanations for using or omitting lethal force, prior to 
deployment in a specific mission context. Such ―a responsibility 
advisor‖ (as Arkin calls it) ―makes explicit to the robot‘s 
commander the responsibilities and choices she is confronted 
with when deploying autonomous systems capable of lethality‖ 
[7]. Mock-guilt could even be made into a quantifiable variable 
influencing a robot‘s behaviour in a given military conflict. For 
instance, if a guilt-value associated with a given action exceeds a 
certain threshold, the robot could have a mechanism that 
reprimands it for that action [8]. 
Although such a buffer clearly is meant to remedy the 
violence robots may cause, a proposal like this does not truly 
address Sparrow‘s dilemma, insofar as reinstating 
straightforward human responsibility by shaving off a robot‘s 
leeway in the election of its ends is tantamount to dodging the 
philosophic issue at hand. Irrespective of its practical merits 
then, Arkin‘s proposal misses the point. 
This inadvertent tendency to alter the scenario into something 
more manageable is ubiquitous. Recently, Lokhorst and van den 
Hoven [9] have challenged Sparrow‘s conclusion by arguing that 
there may be effective alternatives available for remedying 
unacceptable behaviour. Their criticism, however, stems from a 
misunderstanding of Sparrow‘s concerns. Sparrow is willing to 
(agnostically) grant Lokhorst and van den Hoven‘s claim that 
advancement in AI and robotics research could conceivably 
invest autonomous robots with the ability to suffer. Yet, these 
are not the sorts of robots that trouble him, since here we could 
presumably hold something responsible, namely the robot itself. 
Indeed, to the extent robots could suffer in the relevant way, they 
would become legitimate targets for genuine punishment, and so 
the quandary of moral blamelessness previously canvassed 
would not appear. Likewise, Lokhorst and van den Hoven‘s 
proposal to adjust a violent robot‘s programming so that it does 
not commit a similar atrocity in the future does not satisfy the 
demand that someone be held responsible for the previous 
misbehavior. Even if we could successfully tweak a robot‘s 
programming after we detect a flaw, the initial act that generated 
our ex post facto intervention would remain unpunished. To be 
sure, preventing similar atrocities from occurring again is a very 
important task. Yet, this still leaves us in a responsibility vacuum 
with respect to the original act—a situation whose resolution is 
also very important. 
With these qualifications in mind, Sparrow contends that, if 
an agent is truly acting autonomously, then we are not justified 
in holding anyone responsible for the actions of that agent. To be 
sure, if a robot kills innocent civilians following its own internal 
states (beliefs, desires, and goals), our understandable reflex will 
be to blame the robot. Autonomous war machines, however, 
could not be blamed because, without a real capacity to suffer, 
they would lack a characteristic required to be the subject of 
meaningful punishment. Sparrow thus argues that, given the 
appropriate level of machine autonomy, any transgressions made 
by a robot give rise to an ethical catch-22. Since there are no 
suitable candidates for satisfying the jus in bello clause, all the 
available possibilities seem either irrational or unfair: If we 
blame a non-sentient machine, we are being irrational; and if we 
blame someone unrelated to the act, we are being unfair. Given 
that these two premises are acceptable, their troublesome 
conjunction demands our immediate philosophic attention. 
Let us look at the first horn of this dilemma. Although they 
can certainly be destroyed or damaged, robots do not have 
anything of comparable moral worth at stake in the outcome of 
their actions, no welfare that could be compromised. As Sparrow 
notes, 
 
In order for any of these acts to serve as punishment they 
must evoke the right sort of response in their object […]. I 
shall assume that the most plausible accounts of the nature 
and justification of punishment require that those who are 
punished, or contemplate punishment, should suffer as a 
result. While we can imagine doing the things described 
above [i.e. fines in earnings, imprisonment, corporal or 
capital punishment] to a machine, it is hard to imagine it 
suffering as a result. [1] 
 
This lack of an experiential dimension, Sparrow argues, 
essentially makes it futile for us to hold the machine responsible 
for its transgressions. The other horn of the dilemma is more 
straightforward still. Clearly, it is wrong to blame someone for 
actions she did not partake in or endorse. Once we grant that all 
robots and people are inadmissible, a tension naturally follows. 
Indeed, just war theory demands that someone be responsible for 
military actions (see for instance the customs of war described 
by the International Committee of the Red Cross). Since blaming 
someone at random would be wrong, developing and using 
autonomous military robots is morally unacceptable. That, at any 
rate, is what Sparrow argues. What we want to suggest now is 
that, when carefully used, consensual imputation effectively 
bridges the responsibility vacuum that concerns Sparrow.  
3 A WAY OUT OF SPARROW’S DILEMMA 
Here, in programmatic outline, is how we think the dilemma 
canvassed by Sparrow can be overcome. Should fully 
autonomous robotic agents be available to a military, the 
decision to deploy these robots could fall on the highest person 
in command, say, the president (or general, etc.). The president 
would be fully aware that the autonomous robots are capable of 
making their own decisions. Yet, a non-negotiable condition for 
accepting the position of president would be to accept blame (or 
praise) for whatever robotic acts perchance transpire in war. 
Admittedly, the theatre of war is foggy. Yet, with the rigid 
imputation of blame secured, if the deployment of these 
machines renders the resulting war foggy to a degree which 
makes the president uncomfortable with accepting her surrogate 
responsibility for the robots‘ actions, then it follows that these 
robots should not be deployed. On the assumption that it would 
be in a democratically-elected official‘s best interest to wage an 
ethical war, he or she would likely ensure that these robots will 
abide by accepted international rules, otherwise she would have 
excellent reason not to allow those robots to be used. Yet, the 
force of our proposal lies in the fact that the requirement to 
accept ―blank check‖ responsibility would hold even if the 
autonomy of the robot was shown to be unconstrained. To be 
sure, if the president would be unsure about whether these robots 
would indeed behave morally, then prudence would dictate that 
she not consent to their deployment in the first place. Be that as 
it may, the moral cost of any gamble would fall squarely on the 
gambler, who would be readily identifiable for all to see. In this 
way, we could at all times ensure that a human is liable to 
receive blame for any self-initiated robot acts deemed immoral. 
This already satisfies the aforementioned requirement that we 
justly hold someone responsible for the actions taken in war. 
Sparrow, by contrast, argues that it is unfair to ―assign‖ 
responsibility to the commanding officer of autonomous robots, 
since ―[t]he use of autonomous weapons therefore involves a risk 
that military personnel will be held responsible for the actions of 
machines whose decisions they did not control‖ [1]. On our 
account, Sparrow‘s worry can be accommodated such that the 
―risk‖ he highlights is eliminated. Our picture could be 
complicated further by the inclusion of administrative safeguards 
so that it is formally expressed by the commander (in addition to 
her superiors) that she is (un)willingly following orders to 
deploy such machines, and accepts (no) responsibility for the 
outcome of doing so. In this way, even if the president does sign 
off on the use of such machines, the front line soldiers using 
them could formally express their (un)willingness to do so, and 
hence their (un)willingness to accept partial responsibility for its 
actions (after all, blank checks are indeterminate in the amount 
they allow, but they are crystal clear about who is doing the 
allowing). 
Sparrow briefly considers (and dismisses) something along 
the lines of what we are proposing. He writes that ―[i]n these 
cases we simply insist that those who use [the robotic weapons] 
should be held responsible for the deaths they cause, even where 
these were not intended‖ [1, emphasis added]. The main 
difference between our proposal and the one discussed by 
Sparrow is that we regard it as fair and reasonable for the 
commanding officer to willingly and freely assign responsibility 
to herself, ahead of time. As a result, it is important to 
underscore that our way out of Sparrow‘s dilemma does not 
entail that a community will arbitrarily select a prominent figure 
as a lightning rod for its disapproval. Rather, we think the 
incentives are so balanced that users of autonomous machines 
could willingly accept responsibility for their actions, ahead of 
time, and thus become a justified, reasonable, and fair locus of 
surrogate responsibility for those autonomous robot‘s actions. 
We still cannot hold a robot responsible for its actions, and 
merely assigning the commanding officer responsibility is still 
unfair. Yet, asking a suitably-ranked and sufficiently-informed 
person to decide whether or not she is willing to prospectively 
assume responsibility for the actions of autonomous robots is 
fair, and would satisfy the requirement that someone be held 
responsible. Perhaps there are other, unstated, desiderata that we 
might want to take into consideration, but as things currently 
stand, the proposal goes through. 
It is therefore appropriate to understand our view as a sort of 
―vouching for‖ rather than a ―pointing of fingers.‖ Whether this 
practice will be well implemented or not is an empirical issue 
that cannot be determined in advance of the facts. But, we can 
nevertheless infer that, if an informed surrogate willingly 
consents, she can take the risk identified by Sparrow (there may 
of course be independent reasons for commanding officers or 
presidents to not accept surrogate moral responsibility). 
Although Sparrow does not seriously consider the possibility 
of establishing a viable social contract of the sort we gesture at, 
the basic idea has proven its considerable merit in the customary 
chain of command of the military. For instance, when the 
Captain of a ship accepts blame for the actions of those officers 
under him, the terms of that office permit us to blame the 
Captain, even if no clear causal chain can be established that 
would link her to the reprehensible action(s) in question. 
Accepting responsibility for such behaviour is simply part of the 
Captain‘s job description, a ―role responsibility‖ to which the 
Captain has committed through her explicit acceptance of her 
post. For example, the Canadian Armed Forces (via the 1985 
National Defence Act and the Department of National Defence‘s 
Army Ethics Programme) subscribes to this way of assigning 
responsibility for ethical and legal misconduct. A similar 
rationale for the assignment of responsibility was at work in the 
Nuremberg trials, where commanding officers were deemed 
(partially) responsible for the behaviour of their troops 
(although, in some cases, the troops were also held responsible). 
The same sort of contractual acceptance of responsibility could 
be fruitfully employed, we argue, in the case of autonomous 
robots.  
Sparrow‘s analogy between autonomous killer robots and 
child soldiers [1] can thus be granted without compromising the 
force of our critique. Child soldiers are not such that they lack 
autonomy (in its entirety), and yet they do not seem responsible 
for their actions—blaming them for their actions seems 
unjustified, even if not entirely unwarranted. Parents are not 
typically responsible for the actions of their grown offspring. 
Still, given that parents are responsible for the actions of their 
children (who are arguably autonomous in the required sense), it 
seems fair to say that part of the role of parent is to own up to 
this responsibility, rearing the child so that they learn to behave 
in (morally) acceptable ways, and accepting (partial) 
responsibility in cases where she intentionally fails to do so. 
Needless to say, the addition of an explicit social contract would 
make that link even tighter. 
It is worth bearing in mind that our proposal charitably grants 
Sparrow‘s twin contentions that 1) a programmer cannot be 
justifiably held responsible for the actions of a truly autonomous 
robot and that 2) holding a non-sentient robot responsible is 
meaningless and unsatisfactory. What we are challenging is the 
assumption that this exhausts the moral avenues. In an effort to 
introduce a tertium quid, we argue that if a commanding officer 
willingly deploys autonomous robots that can act immorally, and 
moreover publicly recognizes that those robots cannot be held 
responsible, then she has thereby accepted responsibility for their 
actions. A person in this position is exercising her privilege of 
un-coerced rational consent. This in turn yields a relatively clear 
(but non-causal) connection between the officer and the actions 
of the autonomous robot, insofar as the person who directly 
sanctions the use and deployment of such robots assumes 
responsibility for their actions come what may, and is justifiably 
subject to punishment for doing so. 
In a way, our argument supplies a much-needed philosophical 
resource, since in the end we need to ensure that autonomous 
robots meet ethical and safety standards prior to their 
deployment. It seems reasonable to assume that a commanding 
officer faced with the decision to deploy autonomous robots 
would work hard to ensure that those robots behave properly, 
since it is she who would be held responsible and punished in the 
event of their misbehaviour (however one wants to construe 
this). Indeed, it would make for an informative empirical study 
to ask current military officers and commanders ahead of time 
whether they would be willing to accept such surrogate 
responsibility. Coupled with our proposal, maybe the results of 
such an inquiry could suffice to halt the development of 
autonomous war machines. After all, why build autonomous yet 
un-punishable lethal machines if no one is willing to accept 
responsibility for their actions? Although long-range missiles 
sometimes cause collateral damage [10], we do not blame the 
missile itself; instead, we blame those deploying the missile [4]. 
Autonomy introduces a considerable element of personal ―risk‖ 
in deploying such high-tech weaponry, since one can never be 
fully certain of the decisions a given robot may take. This risk is 
a trade-off for the privileges one enjoys from being a 
commander (if, as a contingent matter, no one happens to submit 
to this demand, then so much the worse for those who want to 
create and deploy autonomous robots). 
A cynic could argue that, once proper punishment has been 
carried out, a fresh candidate could come into the picture and 
allow the carnage to start all over again. Of course, so long as 
forecasts are being had on the cheap (being answerable to 
nothing more tangible than one‘s imagination), nothing bars 
these kinds of criticisms. Realistically though, humans are 
responsive to past events, so (all other things being equal) the 
inductive likelihood that a person in a visible position of 
authority would sign off after such repeated debacles would 
shrink. Again, for someone who inclines to worst case scenarios, 
that may bring little comfort. Yet, what is the alternative: Rogue 
use of killer robots without any attempt at securing a morally 
responsible agent? Taking the cynic at her word, she should 
recognize that, either way, technologies that can be used will be 
used. Once that maxim has been granted, the task becomes to 
minimize undesired outcomes. At any rate, it is inconsistent for 
one to claim that 1) repeated episodes of carnage will naturally 
ensue and 2) if we just say no, everyone will abide by that. (1) 
betokens unwarranted pessimism, (2) is naively optimistic, and a 
switch between the two would be ad hoc. Nothing is gained by 
predicating policies on mistaken views of human nature, and 
debates cannot advance if everyone is permitted to doctor future 
events to suit their personal intuitions. 
Our suggestion that the likelihood of deployment would 
shrink in light of past fiascos of course assumes that the relevant 
practical decisions would be motivated by a certain measure of 
informed rationality. This assumption, like all assumptions, can 
certainly be called into question. However, the retort that 
humans have the power to act contrary to the dictates of reason 
is true but trivial, since the observation applies to the full 
spectrum of philosophical branches concerned with human 
activity. The burden is thus on whoever wants to exploit the 
element of voluntarism inherent in decision-making [11] to show 
why glass-half-empty worries about human wickedness should 
be deemed more likely than glass-half-full confidence in human 
reasonableness. 
In the same vein, we might note that, despite the focus of 
Sparrow‘s discussion, full autonomy does not solely imply a 
willingness to kill. Presumably, such an exotic technological 
endowment, if it is indeed possible, might also lead an 
autonomous robot to mimic laudable human acts. As such, the 
―blank check‖ we have introduced need not be viewed solely in a 
negative light. For the exchange to succeed fully, it is not enough 
to just limit the ethical responsibility to a consenting human 
commander when things go wrong; we could also transfer any 
praise a robot might garner to the same person. While it is less 
intuitive to connect the successes of an autonomous robot with a 
human who had very little or nothing to do with the mission in 
question, allowing for a non-causal transfer of both prestige and 
ethical responsibility to the commander could be a vital 
component in the social contract we envision. 
4 CONCLUSION 
The hypothetical situation presented by Sparrow points to an 
interesting set of circumstances which force us to question our 
notion of ethical responsibility in increasingly unmanned 
battlefields. In that sense, it betokens philosophical thinking at 
its best. The twofold recognition that neither hapless 
programmers nor unfeeling machines deserve punishment acts 
like a dialectic vise, thereby compelling Sparrow to conclude 
that the use of autonomous robots would be a moral aberration. 
There is a sense in which he is clearly right. We have argued, 
however, that Sparrow‘s analysis, while fruitful and in many 
ways correct, nevertheless overlooks the possibility of a 
sufficiently high-ranking commanding officer accepting 
responsibility for the robot‘s actions, and thus being accountable 
for any violation of the rules for the ethical conduct of warfare. 
In essence, our proposal retains the non-causal imputation 
involved in scapegoating while dropping its arbitrariness: Since 
humans are capable of informed consent and pleasure/pain, a 
suitable and ascertainable target for punishment can be 
established, thereby ensuring visible conformity with the tenets 
of just war theory. Although it may not be possible to trace a 
tenable physical link between the negative (or positive) actions 
of a fully autonomous robot and its human commander, our 
suggestion has been that this transitive chain is inessential to the 
ethical question, and can be bypassed by using a more explicit 
social contract or ―blank check.‖ 
A robot may perform self-initiated actions, but it does not 
have to suffer what we would consider a just punishment for a 
violation of our ethical rules. Instead, the moral blame and 
accompanying punishment should be placed squarely on a 
human agent who, through her own volition, has traded a part of 
her freedoms for the prestige of occupying a high-ranking 
position in a given social hierarchy (say, a governmental or 
military chain of command). If no one is willing to accept this 
responsibility, then they should not deploy autonomous killer 
robots in the first place. In either case, this way of framing the 
issue keeps a human in the loop in a morally defensible manner, 
rendering the force of Sparrow‘s argument far weaker than it 
first seemed. 
In light of the foregoing criticism, a superficial gloss might 
position us as somehow ―against‖ Sparrow. That would be 
superficial indeed. To be clear: We have not contradicted 
Sparrow‘s case for peace, we have instead tried to show that it is 
incomplete, and have addressed the overlooked option right 
away. Speculation must eventually pass through the bottleneck 
of action. When all is said and done, Sparrow‘s prescriptive 
yield is: ―Wait, don‘t push that button, it might lead to senseless 
violence.‖ Our yield is: ―Wait, don‘t push that button, it might 
lead to senseless violence, and if it does, you will spend the rest 
of your life in jail.‖ Now, policy makers rarely heed the advice 
of philosophers without some practical incentive, so we leave it 
to the reader to judge which proposal is most likely to further the 
cause of peace. 
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Patiency Is Not a Virtue: Suggestions for Co-Constructing
an Ethical Framework Including Intelligent Artefacts
Joanna J. Bryson1
Abstract. The question of whether AI can or should be afforded
moral agency or patiency is not one amenable to simple discovery
or reasoning, because we as societies are constantly constructing our
artefacts, including our ethical systems. Here I briefly examine the
origins and nature of ethical systems in a variety of species, then
propose a definition of morality that facilitates the debate concern-
ing not only whether it is ethical for us to afford moral agency and
patiency to AI, but also whether it is ethical for us to build AI we
should so afford.
1 INTRODUCTION
The question of Robot Ethics is difficult to resolve not because of the
nature of Robots but because of the nature of Ethics. In particular, we
must decide what “really” matters—what are our ethical priorities?
Are we more obliged to our biological kin or to those who share our
ideas? Do we value the preservation of culture more or the generation
of new ideas?
The primary argument of this paper is that integrating a new prob-
lem like artificial intelligence (AI) into our moral systems is an act
normative, not descriptive, ethics. Descriptive ethics may take us
some way in establishing precedent, though few consider precedent
sufficient or even necessary for establishing what is right. But the
advent of potentially-autonomous decision-making human artefacts
is novel. Deciding ethical priorities requires establishing the basis of
our systems of values. But asking “what really matters” is like asking
“what happened before time”: it sounds at first pass like a good ques-
tion, but in fact makes a logical error. Before is not defined outside of
the context of time, and similarly, we cannot circuitously assume that
a system of values underlies our system of values. Consequently, the
“correct” place for robots in human society cannot be resolved from
first principles or purely by reason.
In this paper, I therefore begin my argument not from what should
matter to us but rather from why things do. I start by considering
ethics and moral patiency from an evolutionary perspective, before
turning to consider where we might want to slot robots into our con-
temporary ethical frameworks and society. The nature of machines as
artefacts means that the question of their morality is not what moral
status they deserve, but what moral status we are obliged to assign
them, and to build them to be competent to meet. What makes this
different from reasoning about natural entities is that our obligations
can be met not only through constructing the socio-ethical system but
also through specifying characteristics of the artefacts themselves.
This is the definition of an artefact, it is something we create, and it
applies to both ethical and artificially intelligent systems.
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To be very clear from the outset, the moral question I address here
is not whether it is possible for robots or other AI artefacts to be
moral patients. Human culture can and does support a wide variety
of moral systems. The question is whether we as academics should
recommend putting artefacts in that position. I will argue that making
robots such that they deserve to be moral patients could in itself be
construed as an immoral action, particularly given that it is avoidable.
In doing so I consider not only human society, but also incidentally
make robots into second-order moral patients. I claim that it would be
unethical to put them in a situation of competition with us, to make
them suffer, or to make them unnecessarily mortal. I never claim that
it is wrong to use machine intelligence to create —- that is, to gen-
erate human culture. But I do claim that is incoherent to think that
human pleasure can be extended by proxy.
2 THE NATURE OF LIFE AND INTELLIGENCE
I start from the entirely functionalist perspective that our system of
ethics has coevolved with our species and our societies. As with all
human (and other ape) behaviour, it is rooted both in our biology and
our culture. Nature is a scruffy designer with no motivation or capac-
ity to cleanly discriminate between these two strategies, except that
that which must change more quickly should be represented more
plasticly. As human cultural evolution has accelerated, increasingly
our ethical norms are represented in highly plastic forms such as leg-
islation and policy.
The problem with a system of representing behaviour so plastic as
explicit decisions is that it can lead to dithering. Dithering is switch-
ing from one goal to the other so quickly that little or no progress
is made in either (18, 23). Dithering is a problem potentially faced
by any autonomous actor with multiple at least partially conflicting
goals which must be maintained concurrently. Here ‘partial conflict’
can be resource-based, for example needing to visually attend to the
actions of two children at one time. An example of dithering in early
computers was called thrashing—a result of running two interacting
programs which were each nearly as large as primary memory. The
operating system would allocate each program a period of processing
time, which would necessarily start with an attempt to read that pro-
gram in to memory from disk, a process called paging or swapping.
If swapping each program in took longer than the time slice allo-
cated to that program, the computer would appear to ‘freeze’ since
there would be no actual progress made by either program.
More generally, dithering is changing goals so rapidly that more
time is wasted in the transition than is gained in accomplishment.
Thus even when we make decisions about regulating behaviour in
the extremely dynamic present, we try to plant them in “permanent”
bedrock, like tall buildings built on a swamp. For example, American
law is often debated in the context of the US constitution, despite be-
ing rooted in British Common Law and therefore a constantly chang-
ing set of precedents. Ethics is often debated in the context of ancient
holy texts, even when they concern contemporary questions such as
abortion or robots about which there is no reference or consideration
in the original documents.
Perhaps it is to avoid dithering that our society believes that basic
principles of our ethics are rational and fixed, and that the appar-
ent changes such as universal suffrage or the end of legalised human
slavery are simply “corrections” to make the system more rational.
But a better model is to consider our ethical structures and morality
to co-evolve with our society. When the value of human life relative
to other resources was lower, murder was more frequent and politi-
cal empowerment less widely distributed (20). What it means to be
human has changed, and our ethical system has changed along with
this.
3 THE ORIGINS OF SOCIAL AND ETHICAL
BEHAVIOUR
Assessing morality is not trivial, even for apparently trivial, ‘robotic’
behaviour. MacLean et al. (21) demonstrate the overall social util-
ity of organisms behaving in what at first assessment seems to be an
anti-social free riding off of pro-socially manufactured costly public
goods. Single-cell organisms produce a range of public goods in-
cluding shelter and instructions for combatting antibiotics (22). In
this particular case we are discussing the production of digestive en-
zymes by the more ‘altruistic’ of two isogenic yeast strains. The yeast
must excrete these enzymes outside of their bodies as they can only
directly absorb pre-digested food. The production of these enzymes
is costly, requiring difficult-to-construct proteins, and the production
of pre-digested food is beneficial not only to the excreting yeast but
also to any other yeast in its vicinity. The production of these en-
zymes thus meets a common anthropological and economic defini-
tion of altruism, paying a cost to express behaviour that benefits oth-
ers (13, 24).
In the case of single-cell organisms there is no ‘choice’ as to
whether to be free-riding or pro-social —this is determined by their
strain, but the two sorts of behaviour are accessible from each other
via mutation. Natural selection then performs the ‘action selection’
by determining what proportion of which strategy lives and dies.
What MacLean et al. (21) have shown is that selection operates such
that the species as a whole benefits optimally. The ‘altruistic’ strain in
fact overproduces the public good (the digestive enzymes) at a level
that would be wasteful, while the ‘free-riding’ strain of course un-
derproduces. Where there are insufficient altruists free-riders starve,
allowing altruists to invade. Where there are too few free-riders ex-
cess food aggregates, allowing free-riders to invade. Thus the greatest
good—the most efficient exploitation of the available resources—is
achieved by the species through a mixture of over-enthusiastic altru-
ism and free riding. Why doesn’t evolution just optimise the species
as a whole to produce the optimal level of public goods? This is again
due to plasticity. The optimal amount of enzyme production is deter-
mined by the ecological substrate the yeast inhabits, and this can
change more quickly than the physical mechanism for enzyme pro-
duction in one strain can evolve. However death and birth can be
exceedingly rapid in bacteria. A mixed population composed of mul-
tiple strategies, where the high and low producers will always over
and under produce respectively and their proportions can be changed
very rapidly is thus the best strategy for tracking the rate of environ-
mental change — for rapidly responding to variation in opportunity.
What does these results mean for humans? Are we able to add
benefit to over-production of public goods by calling the action of
creating them ‘good’ and associating it with social status, while our
culture has evolved to trust self interest to motivate the maintenance
the countervailing population of defectors? Does our assessment of
the ‘correct’ amount of investment vary by socio-political context,
for example increasing massively in times of warfare but return-
ing to more individually-productive levels at times of peace? Could
the reduction of ‘good’ behaviour itself be an act of public good
in times when society requires more individual productivity or self-
sufficiency? This is a thread of a current research programme in my
group, looking to explain variations by global region in public-goods
regulation as demonstrated by Herrmann et al. (17). We have prelimi-
nary evidence that human societies can also be described via varying
proportions of individuals applying particular social strategies, and
that these proportions vary with the underlying socio-economic sub-
strate.
4 FREEDOM AND MORALITY
Even if some combination of biology and the social sciences can ex-
plain the origins of our current social norms and how these change,
this by no means tells us what they ought to be, nor how they should
be taken forward as the world changes. I will now turn to philoso-
phy to look at how we commonly define moral agency and patiency,
with the goal of exploiting these definitions in the next section for
communicating the roles we should expect AI to play in our society.
To quote Johnson (19), “[Moral] action is an exercise of freedom
and freedom is what makes morality possible.” For millennia moral-
ity has been recognised as something uniquely human, and therefore
taken as an indication of human uniqueness and even divinity (14).
But if we throw away a supernaturalist and dualistic understanding of
human mind and origins, we can still maintain that human morality
at least is rooted in the one incontrovertible aspect of human unique-
ness — language — and our unsurpassed competence for cultural
accumulation that language both exemplifies and enables2. The cul-
tural accumulation of new concepts givs us more idas and choices to
reason over, and our accumulation of tools gives us more power to
derive substantial changes to our environment from our intentions.
If human morality depended simply on human language then our
increasingly language-capable machines would certainly be excel-
lent candidates for agency and patiency. But I believe that freedom
— which I take here to mean the socially-recognised capacity to ex-
ercise choice is the essential property of a moral actor. Dennett (12)
argues that human freedom is a consequence of evolving complex-
ity beyond our own capacity to provide a better account for our be-
haviour than to attribute it to our own individual responsibility. This
argument entails a wide variety of interesting consequences. For ex-
ample, as our science of psychology develops and more behaviour
becomes explicable via other means (e.g. insanity) fewer actions be-
come moral.
I believe we can usefully follow from Dennett’s suggestion to gen-
eralise morality beyond human ethical systems. Moral actions for an
individual are those for which:
2 Bryson (3, 5) argues that language while unique is not inexplicably im-
probable but rather a result of the conjunction of two less-unusual adaptive
traits: the strongly cultural strategy that many large, social species of ani-
mals, particularly apes, exploit, and the capacity for vocal imitation which
has emerged independently many phyla, but nowhere else among the simi-
ans.
1. a particular behavioural context affords more than one possible
action for the individual,
2. at least one available action is considered by a society to be more
socially beneficial than the other options, and
3. the individual is able to recognise which action is socially benefi-
cial (or at least socially sanctioned) and act on this information.
Note that this captures society-specific morals as well as the indi-
vidual’s role as the actor. With this definition I deliberately extend
morality to include actions by other species which may be sanctioned
by their society, or by ours. For example, non-human primates will
sanction those that violate their social norms by being excessively
brutal in punishing a subordinate (11), for failing to ‘report’ vocally
available food (16) or for sneaking copulation (10). While reports of
social sanctions of such behaviour are often referred to as ‘anecdo-
tal’ because they are not yet well documented in primate literature,
they are common knowledge for anyone who has been lucky enough
to work with socially housed primates. I personally have violated a
Capuchin norm: possession is ownership. I was sanctioned (barked
at) by an entire colony — not only those who observed the affront3,
but also those housed separately who had no visual knowledge of the
event but joined the chorus of reproach.
Similarly, this definition allows us to say dogs and even cats can
be good or bad when they obey or disobey norms they have been
trained to recognise, when they have demonstrated capacity to select
between these alternative behaviours, and when they behave as if
they expect social sanction when they select the bad option.
To return to the main point of this essay, there is then I think no
question that we can already train or simply program machines to
recognise more or less socially acceptable actions, and to use that
information to inform action selection. The question is whether it is
moral for us to construct machines that of their own volition choose
the less-moral action. The trick here returns to the definition of free-
dom I took from Dennett. For it to be rational for us to describe an
action by a machine to be “of its own volition”, we must sufficiently
obfuscate its decision making process that we cannot otherwise pre-
dict its behaviour, and thus are reduced to applying sanctions to it in
order for it to learn to behave in a way that our society prefers.
What is fundamentally different from nature here is that since we
have perfect control over when and how a robot is created, respon-
sibility is traded off. Consider responsibility for actions executed by
the artefact that lie within our own understanding, and thus for which
we would ordinarily be responsible. If we choose to assign this re-
sponsibility to the artefact we are deliberately disavowing the respon-
sibility ourselves. Currently, even where we have imperfect control
as in the case of young children, owned animals and operated ma-
chines, if we lose control over entities we have responsibility for and
cannot themselves be held accountable, then we hold the responsibil-
ity for that loss of control and whatever actions by these other entities
comes as a consequence. If our dog or our car kills a child, we are
not held accountable for murder, but we may be held accountable for
manslaughter. Why — or in what circumstances — should this be
different for a robot?
3 I had taken back the bit of a sweater a monkey had snatched but which
was still also attached to the top a guest was wearing. I had been warned
when first employed never to take anything from a monkey but to ask them
to release it, but failed to generalise this to the context where most of the
object was still attached to the original owner.
5 PRINCIPLES OF ROBOTICS
When considering then how we should adjust our ethical systems
to encapsulate the AI we create, there are multi-level questions and
ethical strategies, all of which need to be considered. In the yeast
example I gave earlier, ‘anti-social’ behaviour actually regulated the
overall investment of a society (a spatially-local subset of a species
inhabiting a particular ecological substrate) in a beneficial way. Be-
haviour that was disadvantageous very local to the free-riders was
less locally advantageous to the species. The definition of morality
introduced in Section 4 depends on social benefit. In the Machine
Question here there are at least two potential societies whose benefits
we need to consider. For each of these, I will consider who benefits
and who does not from the designation of moral agency and patiency
on AI.
• The perspective of human well being. The advantages to humans
seem to be primarily that it feeds our ego to construct objects that
we owe moral status. It is possible that in the long term it would
also be a simpler way to control truly complex intelligence, and
that the benefits of that complex intelligence might outweigh the
costs of losing our own moral responsibility and therefore status.
The principle cost I see is the facilitation of the unnecessary abro-
gation of responsibility of marketers or operators of AI. For exam-
ple, customers could be fooled into wasting resources needed by
their children or parents on a robot, or citizens could be fooled into
blaming a robot rather than a politician for unnecessary fatalities
in warfare (2, 8).
• The perspective of AI well being. Although this argument has been
overlooked by some of my critics (notably 15), Bryson (4, 6)
makes AI into second-order moral patients by arguing that we
should not put AI in the position of competing with us for re-
sources, of longing for higher social status (as all evolved so-
cial vertebrates do), of fearing injury, extinction or humiliation.
In short, we can afford to stay agnostic about whether AI have
qualia, because we can simply avoid constructing motivation sys-
tems encompassing suffering. We know we can do this because
we already have. There are many proactive AI systems now, and
none of them suffers. Just as there are already machines that play
chess or do arithmetic better than we do, but none of them aspires
to world domination. There can be no costs to the AI in the sys-
tem I describe, unless we postulate rights of the ‘unborn’, or in
this case the never-designed.
Bryson et al. (9) argue that the right way to think about intelligent
services (there in the context of the Internet, but here I will gener-
alise this) is as extensions of our own motivational systems. We are
currently the principle agents when it comes to our own technology,
and I believe it is our ethical obligation to design both our AI and our
legal and moral systems to maintain that situation. Legally and ethi-
cally, AI works best as a sort of mental prosthetic to our own needs
and desires.
The best argument I have heard against my human ethics perspec-
tive is that maltreating something that reminds us of a human might
lead us to treat other humans or animals worse as well. The UK’s
official Principles of Robotics specifically address this problem in its
fourth principle (1, 7, c.f. Appendix A). This principle does so in
two ways. First, robots should not have deceptive appearance—they
should not fool people into thinking they are similar to empathy-
deserving moral patients. Second, their AI workings should be ‘trans-
parent’. That is, clear, generally-comprehensible descriptions of their
goals and intelligence should be available to any owner, operator or
concerned user, presumably over the Internet4
The best argument I have heard made against my AI ethics per-
spective is that it may be impossible to create the sort of intelligence
we want or need unless we follow the existing biologically-inspired
templates which include social striving, pain, etc. So far I have seen
no proof of this position. But if it is ever demonstrated, even then we
would not be in the position where our hand was forced — that we
must permit patiency and agency. Rather, we will then have enough
information to stop, take council, and produce a literature and even-
tually legislation and social norms on what is the appropriate amount
of agency to permit given the benefits it provides.
6 CONCLUSION
As Johnson (19, p. 201) puts it “Computer systems and other arte-
facts have intentionality—the intentionality put into them by the in-
tentional acts of their designers.” It is unquestionably within our so-
ciety’s capacity to define AIs as moral agents and patients, in fact
many articles in this volume are working on this project. It may be
technically possible to create AI that would meet contemporary re-
quirements for agency or patiency. But even if it is possible, neither
of these two statements makes it either necessary or desirable that we
should do so. Both our ethical system and our artefacts are amenable
to human design. The primary argument of this article is that making
AI moral agents or patients is an intentional and avoidable action.
The secondary argument which is admittedly open to debate, is that
avoidance would be the most ethical choice.
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APPENDIX A: THE EPSRC PRINCIPLES OF
ROBOTICS
The full version of the below lists can be found by a Web search for
EPSRC Principles of Robotics, and they have been EPSRC policy
since April of 2011 (1). The first list is the principles themselves, in
italics, with annotations taken from Bryson (7).
1. Robots are multi-use tools. Robots should not be designed solely
or primarily to kill or harm humans, except in the interests of na-
tional security. While acknowledging that anything can be used
as a weapon by a sufficiently creative individual, the authors were
concerned to ban the creation and use of autonomous robots as
weapons. Although we pragmatically acknowledged this is al-
ready happening in the context of the military, we do not want
to see robotics so used in other contexts.
2. Humans, not robots, are responsible agents. Robots should be de-
signed & operated as far as is practicable to comply with exist-
ing laws & fundamental rights & freedoms, including privacy. We
were very concerned that any discussion of “robot ethics” could
lead individuals, companies or governments to abrogate their own
responsibility as the builders, purchasers and deployers of robots.
We felt the consequences of this concern vastly outweigh any “ad-
vantage” to the pleasure of creating something society deigns sen-
tient and responsible.
3. Robots are products. They should be designed using processes
which assure their safety and security. This principle again re-
minds us that the onus is on us, as robot creators, not on the robots
themselves, to ensure that robots do no damage.
4. Robots are manufactured artefacts. They should not be designed in
a deceptive way to exploit vulnerable users; instead their machine
nature should be transparent. This was the most difficult principle
to agree on the phrasing of. The intent is that everyone who owns
a robot should know that it is not “alive” or “suffering”, yet the
deception of life and emotional engagement is precisely the goal
of many therapy or toy robots. We decided that so long as the
responsible individual making the purchase of a robot has even
indirect (e.g. Internet documentation) access to information about
how its “mind” works, that would provide enough of an informed
population to keep people from being exploited.
5. The person with legal responsibility for a robot should be at-
tributed. It should always be possible to find out who owns a robot,
just like it is always possible to find out who owns a car. This again
reminds us that whatever a robot does, some human or human in-
stitution (e.g. a company) is liable for its actions.
Below are seven additional points that the authors of the principles
direct to their colleagues (c.f. the documents cited above.)
1. We believe robots have the potential to provide immense posi-
tive impact to society. We want to encourage responsible robot
research.
2. Bad practice hurts us all.
3. Addressing obvious public concerns will help us all make
progress.
4. It is important to demonstrate that we, as roboticists, are commit-
ted to the best possible standards of practice.
5. To understand the context and consequences of our research we
should work with experts from other disciplines including: social
sciences, law, philosophy and the arts.
6. We should consider the ethics of transparency: are there limits to
what should be openly available?
7. When we see erroneous accounts in the press, we commit to take
the time to contact the reporting journalists.
Is there a continuity between man and machine?
Johnny Hartz Søraker1 
Abstract.  The principle of formal equality, one of the most 
fundamental and undisputed principles in ethics, states that a 
difference in treatment or value between two kinds of entities 
can only be justified on the basis of a relevant and significant 
difference between the two. Accordingly, when it comes to the 
question of what kind of moral claim an intelligent or 
autonomous machine might have, one way to answer this is by 
way of comparison with humans: Is there a fundamental 
difference between humans and machines that justifies unequal 
treatment, or will the two become increasingly continuous, thus 
making it increasingly dubious whether unequal treatment is 
justified? This question is inherently imprecise, however, 
because it presupposes a stance on what it means for two types 
of entities to be sufficiently similar, as well as which types of 
properties that are relevant to compare. In this paper, I will 
sketch a formal characterization of what it means for two types 
of entities to be continuous, discuss what it implies for two 
different types of entities to be (dis-)continuous with regard to 
both ethics and science, and discuss a dramatic difference in how 
two previously discontinuous entities might become continuous.1 
1 INTRODUCTION2 
The concept of ‘continuity’ has been championed by MIT 
historian Bruce Mazlish, who claims that progress in science and 
technology will inevitably result in a fourth continuity between 
man and machine [1]. According to Mazlish, there have been 
three dramatic scientific revolutions in the history of mankind, 
and these revolutions are best described as the establishment of 
continuities; mankind has generally come to acknowledge that 
there is no sharp discontinuity between our planet and the rest of 
the universe (Copernican revolution), between humans and 
animals (Darwinian revolution), nor between rational and 
irrational humans (Freudian revolution). Mazlish argues that we 
should also overcome what he terms the fourth discontinuity; 
that there is no sharp discontinuity between humans and 
machines.  
There are a number of problems with Mazlish’s account, 
however. First, it is difficult to discern precise criteria for what it 
means for something to become continuous, which means that 
we seemingly operate with inconsistent conceptions of 
continuity. A clear example of this can be seen with regard to 
animal experiments. On the one hand, animal researchers 
presuppose a continuity between humans and animals – if not, 
the results would not be relevant to humans. On the other hand, 
they also presuppose a discontinuity – if not, the experiments 
would be unethical. It is clear from this example that we often 
regard two types of entities as continuous in one respect and 
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2 Allow me to emphasize that this paper, in line with the IACAP 
tradition, is work-in-progress, and is presented for the purpose of 
receiving peer feedback before being finalized. As such, I admit that this 
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discontinuous in another. Thus, we need to clarify what these 
different ‘respects’ are, and how they relate to each other. 
Mazlish seems to claim that a continuity is determined by 
whether or not the inner workings of two entities can be 
explained within the same scientific framework, such as 
computationalism being able to explain both computers and the 
human brain. Although there are numerous problems with 
Mazlish’s approach, which I will return to below, one if its 
advantages is that it takes an epistemological rather than 
ontological approach to the moral status debate – an approach 
that in many ways mirrors Alan Turing’s well-known approach 
to the question of whether machines can be intelligent [2].  
2 FOLLOWING TURING’S LEAD  
For the present audience, I presuppose that it is not necessary to 
explain the Turing test as a means of judging whether a 
computer is intelligent enough, but in short Turing argues that a 
computer is to be regarded as intelligent if a human judge cannot 
reliably distinguish the computer from the human in an imitation 
game. What is important here is that Turing turns the question of 
intelligence from an ontological to an epistemological one. That 
is, Turing does not ask which properties a computer must 
possess in order to be deemed intelligent (which is an 
ontological question), but rather how an intelligent observer 
judges its behaviour. The latter is a type of epistemological 
question, where we are really asking what kind of explanatory 
framework we need to presuppose in order to understand a 
particular type of behaviour. If a computer were to pass the 
Turing test, this means that the judge had to explain its 
behaviour as coming from an intelligent being, which says 
nothing about which properties that being must have (other than 
being able to display the behaviour in question). Notice that this 
approach is radically different from the typical approach to 
questions of moral status and the like, where we typically discuss 
which properties an entity must possess in order to be regarded 
as a moral person (e.g. sentience [3], conception of one’s own 
life [4], or having a will to live [5]).3 [6] 
In a similar manner, Mazlish argues (indirectly) that two 
types of entities should be regarded as continuous if they do not 
require different scientific frameworks; if the same framework of 
scientific concepts and models can adequately explain the 
phenomenon under study. On this background, the Copernican 
revolution was really a realization that we do not need different 
scientific frameworks for the earth and the heavens (as was the 
case with the Aristotelian framework), the Darwinian revolution 
was a realization that we do not need different scientific 
frameworks for humans and other animals, and the Freudian 
revolution was a realization that we do not need different 
scientific frameworks for the mentally ill and the mentally 
healthy. Mazlish’s prophesized fourth continuity, then, is the 
realization that we do not need different scientific frameworks 
for computers and humans either. Thus, all of these continuities 
amount to radical changes in how to explain different types of 
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entities (epistemological), rather than saying that all the entities 
have the same properties and/or mode of existence (ontological). 
Just like Turing thought an epistemological approach to the 
question of machine intelligence was more fruitful than an 
ontological one, I will take a similar approach to the question of 
continuity in the remainder of this paper. In doing so, I first need 
to make some important changes to Mazlish’s approach, which 
despite its advantages gives rise to some fundamental problems. 
3 PROBLEMS WITH A SINGLE-LEVEL 
APPROACH TO ‘CONTINUITY’ 
As mentioned, Mazlish seems to claim that a continuity is 
determined by whether or not the inner workings of two entities 
can be explained within the same scientific framework, for 
instance the same physics being able to explain both the earth 
and the heavens, behaviourism being able to explain both 
humans and other animals, psychoanalysis being able to explain 
both mental health and illness, and computationalism being able 
to explain both computers and the human brain. This is what I 
refer to as a single-level approach, for reasons I will explain in 
more detail below. 
 This approach is problematic for two related reasons. First, 
anything can be explained within the same scientific framework. 
Disregarding supernatural and/or substance dualist accounts, it is 
probably possible in principle to explain the workings of the 
human brain and a computer by physics alone – and if we 
believe in scientific progress, our ability to do so will increase in 
time with progress in physics (I will return to this below). 
Second, anything can be explained as if it is an intentional 
agent, as also argued by Daniel Dennett, who refers to this as 
taking an intentional stance  [7]. Since Mazlish does not specify 
how strict we need to be when claiming that the same scientific 
framework can explain two types of entities, his approach 
becomes inherently imprecise. If it is sufficient that it is in 
principle possible to explain something within the same 
framework, then every existing entity is continuous as long as 
there is no phenomena that cannot in principle be explained by 
some kind of physics. This would entail that humans are 
continuous with light bulbs, supernovae and clouds, which 
leaves the concept of little use. It seems more reasonable, then, 
to refer to some kind of pragmatism where it must not only be 
in-principle possible but also pragmatically feasible to explain 
two entities within the same framework. But, this would require 
some kind of measure for what it means to be pragmatically 
feasible. Is it, for instance, pragmatically feasible to explain the 
brain fully in terms of physical processes, or do we (also) need to 
invoke chemistry? 
Some of these problems are difficult to escape, since it is hard 
to provide objective criteria for when a particular scientific 
framework ceases to be feasible. However, we can try to remedy 
the problem of explanations at different levels by explicitly 
invoking this into the conception of continuity. In the following 
section, I will sketch such a multi-level account of continuity. 
 
Before outlining this multi-level account allow me to emphasize 
that my main concern in this paper is to discuss the formal nature 
of these continuities, so it is important to emphasize that the 
levels of explanation that I will use as examples below are to be 
seen as mere placeholders and the reader will inevitably find 
some of them problematic and/or imprecise. My goal is to first 
work out the formal schematics, and then the more substantial 
content should be worked out in more detail. This will, among 
other things, require a defence of a particular type of realism and 
view on scientific progress, both of which fall well beyond the 
scope of this paper. 
4 A MULTI-LEVEL APPROACH TO 
‘CONTINUITY’ 
Rather than asking whether two types of entities can be 
explained within the same scientific framework, I believe it is 
better to approach this in terms of sets of scientific frameworks – 
or what I will refer to as sets of scientific levels of explanation. 
That is, rather than asking whether two entities can be explained 
within the same scientific framework, we should ask whether 
two entities require the same set of scientific levels of 
explanation. As Nagel [8] rightly argues, there are (at least) four 
fundamentally different types of explanation – deductive, 
probabilistic, teleological, and genetic – which makes it difficult 
to precisely define what a scientific level of explanation is. For 
present purposes, I will simply use the term in the more generic 
sense of a more or less coherent and mutually supportive set of 
principles, concepts and models that attempt to provide an 
account of the relationships between cause and effect.4  
As mentioned, one of the problems with Mazlish’s single-
level approach, where continuity is established on the basis of a 
notion of sharing one scientific framework, is that we often 
choose different levels of explanation (or, to use Luciano 
Floridi’s term, levels of abstraction [9]) depending on what it is 
that we seek to explain. Even if it is in-principle possible to 
explain human behaviour by physics alone, we typically employ 
higher-level explanations instead. For instance, at a behaviourist 
level of explanation, we employ concepts like stimulus and 
response to explain behaviour, without involving physics or 
chemistry. Even for entirely physicalist phenomena, such as an 
object moving through space, we often employ heuristics instead 
of explaining what is “really” going on. As such, the science of 
ballistics can be seen as a form of higher-level heuristics for 
explaining how an object moves through space without talking 
about the complex interplay between electrons and force fields. 
This, along with the other problems with a single-level approach 
mentioned above, entails that we cannot define a continuity in 
terms of a shared scientific framework. A much more promising 
approach is to define continuity in terms of having a particular 
set of scientific levels of explanation in common. 
To simplify things, if we take a single-celled organism, we 
may be able to explain its functioning entirely in terms of 
physics.5 As we get to more complex forms of life, however, 
such explanations quickly become untenable. At some point, the 
chemistry involved becomes too complex to be described in 
physics terms alone. At even higher levels of complexity, 
chemistry also fails to provide a full explanation and we need to 
start talking about biological processes and leave the actual 
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for establishing the more formal nature of continuities, which is the 
limited purpose of this paper. As Mieke Boon has pointed out to me, it is 
probably better to speak of  ‘practices of explanation’, but this paper was 
due before this could be properly incorporated. 
5 For such an attempt, see Princeton University’s Laboratory for the 
Physics of Life (http://tglab.princeton.edu/). 
physical and chemical processes out of our explanations. At even 
higher levels, we may need to involve the environment and 
cognitive processes to a much higher extent, and start using 
principles from, say, behaviourism and comparative psychology. 
With humans, as evidenced by the widespread criticism and 
dismissal of radical behaviourism in the mid-1900s, we could 
also make the case that we need some kind of mental, 
phenomenological or folk-psychological level of explanation 
that cannot be reduced to any of the other levels. At even higher 
supraindividual levels, we may also require social, cultural and 
other value-laden levels of explanation – and we find ourselves 
far away from the original physicalist level. Which levels we 
may need in order to adequately explain a given entity is clearly 
controversial, and not my concern in this paper, but only the 
most radical and optimistic scientists maintain that we will in the 
foreseeable future be able to explain everything by means of one 
unified theory. On the basis of all this, it seems evident that if we 
are to define continuity in terms of which type of explanation is 
required, we must talk about sets of levels of explanation (multi-
level) instead of Mazlish’s single-level scientific frameworks.  
On this background, we can stipulate the preliminary 
hypothesis: two types of entities are continuous if and only if an 
adequate understanding of their nature and properties require the 
same set of scientific levels of explanation; two types of entities 
are discontinuous if and only if an adequate understanding of 
their nature and properties does not require the same set of 
scientific levels of explanation. To illustrate, humans and other 
animals are continuous if and only if a full understanding of their 
nature and properties require the same set of scientific levels of 
explanation (LoE).6 These definitions still lack a lot of precision, 
however, and we need to first specify what is meant by 
‘required’. 
5 EPISTEMOLOGICAL VS ONTOLOGICAL 
CONTINUITY 
There are two radically different ways in which a LoE may be 
required for an adequate understanding. On the one hand, we 
could for instance argue that the human brain works in such a 
way that we cannot adequately understand its functioning 
without employing a chemical level of explanation. Perhaps the 
chemical properties of neurotransmitters and hormones function 
in a way that cannot possibly be accounted for by means of more 
mechanistic explanations – which would be an anti-reductionist 
view of chemistry. If such a chemical LoE is required because of 
the brain’s unique mode of existence, then that LoE is required 
for ontological reasons.  
On the other hand, we could argue that the human brain 
works in such a way that it is much more convenient or tractable 
to use a chemical LoE, even if such an explanation can in 
principle be reduced to a more basic LoE. If we, despite this in-
principle possibility, do require a chemical LoE for pragmatic 
reasons, then that LoE is required for epistemological reasons. 
In light of the above, we can already differentiate between an 
ontological and epistemological continuity: 
 
Ontological continuity: two types of entities are ontologically 
continuous if and only if an adequate understanding of their 
                                                
6 For the remainder of this paper, I will use ‘LoE’ as shorthand for 
‘(scientific) Levels of Explanation’. 
nature and properties require the same set of scientific levels of 
explanation in principle, due to their mode of existence. 
 
Epistemological continuity: two types of entities are 
epistemologically continuous if and only if an adequate 
understanding of their nature and properties require the same set 
of scientific levels of explanation in practice. 
 
To illustrate, humans and other animals are ontologically 
continuous if and only if a full understanding of their nature and 
properties require the same set of scientific levels of explanation 
in principle. Humans and other animals are epistemologically 
continuous if and only if a full understanding of their nature and 
properties require the same set of scientific levels of explanation 
in practice. It is far from uncontroversial which LoEs are 
ontologically or epistemologically necessary for an adequate 
understanding (as well as what is to be meant by ‘adequate’), 
and it is far beyond the scope of this paper to discuss this for 
different types of entities, but this question maps directly on to 
the reductionism debates present in the different disciplines. In 
philosophy of mind, a property dualist would hold that 
consciousness is somehow ontologically irreducible to 
neurobiology and physics – which means that a “higher” LoE is 
ontologically necessary for a full understanding of a conscious 
being. Eliminiative materialism, on the other hand, holds that 
consciousness can and should be explained at a neuroscientific 
LoE, thus claiming that higher LoEs (folk psychology, in 
particular) are not ontologically necessary for a full 
understanding of conscious beings. If we compare humans and 
other animals, the former would hold that conscious animals are 
ontologically discontinuous from non-conscious animals, 
whereas the latter would hold that conscious animals are 
ontologically continuous with non-conscious animals. Non-
reductive physicalism, however, holds that conscious states 
really are the same as physical states and that the former can in 
principle be explained by the latter – but not in practice. 
According to such a view conscious beings would be 
epistemologically discontinuous from non-conscious beings. 
6 THE SCHEMATICS OF CONTINUITIES 
In light of the considerations above, we can now attempt to 
schematize what a continuity might look like, according to this 
multi-level approach. Consider the following schematic: 
 
Type of entity 
Required LoE 
Humans Other animals 
Psychological X  
Behaviorist X X 
Physical X X 
 
In this example, humans require a physical, behaviourist and a 
psychological LoE for a full understanding, whereas other 
animals can be fully understood by physical and behaviourist 
LoEs alone. If this were the case, then humans would be 
discontinuous with other animals. If the psychological LoE is 
required in principle this is an ontological discontinuity, if 
required only in practice this is an epistemological discontinuity. 
To more clearly show the difference with Mazlish’s single-level 
approach, consider the following: 
 




Psychological X  
Computational X X 
Physical X X 
 
In this example, humans are discontinuous with machines 
because they require a psychological LoE, whereas machines can 
be fully understood without. Again, this would be an ontological 
discontinuity if the computational and physical LoEs are not 
sufficient for a full understanding of humans (which entails some 
type of dualism). It would be an epistemological discontinuity if 
the psychological LoE is only required for pragmatic reasons 
(which entails some type of non-reductive materialism). Note 
that Mazlish’s single-level approach is unable to account for this, 
and would treat humans and machines, in this example, as 
continuous as long as the computational LoE somehow explains 
both. 
Putting this together, the multi-level account of continuity 
ultimately suggests some kind of hierarchy when it comes to 
discontinuities: 
 










Psychological X    
Behaviorist X X   
Computational X X X  
Physical X X X X 
 
Now we are able to describe the aforementioned problem of 
animal experimentation seemingly being an inconsistent practice 
since it presupposes both a radical similarity (scientific validity) 
and radical difference (ethical justifiability) between humans and 
other animals. The scientific validity of such experiments can be 
grounded in the fact that the LoEs that are relevant for the 
scientific validity are shared, whereas the LoEs that are relevant 
for the ethical justifiability are not shared.  
This further illustrates how one purpose of establishing 
discontinuities in this manner is to map their required LoE onto a 
classification of moral status (or moral worth). That is, there are 
different ways to harm entities corresponding to their required 
LoE. In a manner of speaking, the more LoEs that are required 
for understanding an entity, the more ways there are to harm that 
entity. At a physical level, we may speak of a minimal harm in 
terms of entropy, at a computational level we may be able to 
speak of a minimal harm to self-sustainability, at a behaviourist 
level we are dealing with harms in terms of rewards and 
punishment, i.e. infliction of pain and pleasure, and at a 
psychological LoE it should be evident that the harms become 
much more complex, including things related to offense, liberty, 
dignity, privacy, self-actualization, and so forth.  
 
Another important purpose of this schematization is to include 
Freud’s notion of scientific progress changing our conception of 
ourselves in dramatic ways. In Freud’s words: “the universal 
narcissism of men, their self-love, has up to the present suffered 
three severe blows  from the researches of science” [10]. I will 
refer to such blows as downgrading as opposed to upgrading 
continuities, which also further illustrates what is meant by LoEs 
being required in principle and in practice.  
7 DOWNGRADING VS UPGRADING 
CONTINUITIES 
It follows from the notion of LoEs being only epistemologically 
necessary that scientific progress will bring about changes in 
which levels that are necessary to explain a given entity – which 
is reflected in the scientific ideals of parsimony, unification and 
reduction. This means that two types of entities previously seen 
as discontinuous may become continuous. That is, two types of 
entities that previously required different sets of LoE, at some 
point may end up requiring the same set of LoE. According to 
these schematics, this can come about in two different ways – 
which correspond to two radically different ways in which 
science may change our worldview, and where we can more 
precisely conceptualize Freud’s notion of blows to the self-
esteem of mankind.  
First, we may come to realize that a type of entity no longer 
requires an LoE that we previously thought to be necessary – for 
instance when we are able to successfully reduce one scientific 
LoE to a more fundamental one. When two types of entities 
come to share the same set of LoE because one type loses a LoE, 
this amounts to a downgrading continuity. More schematically: 
 
Type of entity 
Required LoE 
Humans Other animals 
Psychological - X  
Behaviorist X X 
Physical X X 
 
This was precisely the concern when Skinner’s radical 
behaviourism aspired to explain both humans and other animals 
entirely in terms of behaviourist principles. This would, 
according to this line of reasoning, entail a continuity between 
humans and other animals because humans would no longer 
require an additional LoE. In a manner of speaking, this would 
downgrade humans to the level of animals. We can see the same 
concern when it comes to intelligent machines: 
 




Psychological - X  
Computational X X 
Physical X X 
 
In this case, humans would become continuous with intelligent 
machines because they come to share the same set of LoEs due 
to the loss of one LoE. In a manner of speaking, this does not 
only amount to humans and computers being “the same”, but 
that “humans are nothing but machines”.  
There is a converse way of becoming continuous, however. 
Consider the following: 
 




Psychological X + X 
Behaviorist X + X 
Computational X X 
Physical X X 
 
In this case, humans and intelligent machines become continuous 
because the latter attain new LoEs. That is, intelligent machines 
might become so complex that we can no longer explain their 
function by means of computational principles alone. At some 
point we may need to adopt psychological principles to explain 
intelligent machines as well, not only metaphorically but as an 
in-practice (epistemological) or in-principle (ontological) 
requirement for explaining intelligent machine behaviour. This is 
what I refer to as an upgrading continuity, where two types of 
entities come to share the same set of LoEs due to one gaining a 
new LoE. Indeed, we can say that artificial intelligence has at 
least taken one important step towards making the sets similar, 
since highly advanced neural networks now require behaviourist 
notions in order to be explained. That is, if we want to explain 
exactly how a successful, complex neural network functions, we 
have to do so in terms of how the network was subjected to 
conditioning – a purely computational account of the weights of 
the nodes etc will often be incapable of explaining exactly how 
the network actually generates its output. Thus, even if there are 
good reasons to maintain a discontinuity between humans and 
machines, the necessity of a behaviourist LoE for explaining 
highly complex computers, neural networks and embedded 
systems in particular, entails that we can already now speak of 
an (epistemological) continuity between machines and non-
human animals; they have come to share the same set of LoEs 
due to computers now requiring a behaviorist LoE 
8 PROBLEMS WITH THE APPROACH 
Needless to say, this approach is fraught with problems. Allow 
me to repeat that my only concern in this paper has been to 
sketch one possible formalization of ‘continuity’ and a lot of this 
has to be augmented by a particular conception of what a 
scientific (level of) explanation is, which will among other 
things have to rest on a particular stance in the realism debate. 
Indeed, the account sketched above presupposes some notion of 
scientific realism (I am leaning towards some form of structural 
realism) but should also be compatible with more pragmaticist 
notions of science as well. It also presupposes some idea of 
scientific progress – i.e. that science, through the development 
and elimination of LoEs, is providing us with an increasingly 
accurate picture of reality. That said, I certainly do not rule out 
the possibility of dramatic paradigm shifts, but I think this can be 
accounted for within this conception of continuity as well. 
Indeed, a continuity between intelligent machines and humans 
may require a paradigm shift that obliterates our current LoEs – 
for instance if we arrive at some quantum mechanical LoE that 
allows us to explain consciousness and build conscious 
machines.  
9 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
I can only hope that this paper was read in the spirit intended – 
as an initial, exploratory and formal account of what it means for 
two types of entities to be (dis-)continuous. There is no doubt 
that the details, if we can even agree on the formal nature, will 
require a lot of clarification. My only hope for this paper was 
that the reader, like myself, will on occasion find the notion of 
continuity an intuitively helpful concept – along with the 
distinctions between epistemological vs ontological and 
downgrading vs. upgrading continuities. I am also certain that 
the reader, like myself, will not be satisfied with the current level 
of precision, and I would certainly appreciate any help towards 
improving this. Judging from experience, the IACAP crowd is an 
excellent starting point to this effect. 
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Moral Mechanisms
David Davenport1
Abstract. Moral philosophies are arguably all anthropocentric and
so fundamentally concerned with biological mechanisms. Compu-
tationalism, on the other hand, sees biology as just one possible
implementation medium. Can non-human, non-biological agents be
moral? This paper looks at the nature of morals, at what is necessary
for a mechanism to make moral decisions, and at the impact biol-
ogy might have on the process. It concludes that moral behaviour
is concerned solely with social well-being, independent of the na-
ture of the individual agents that comprise the group. While biology
certainly affects human moral reasoning, it in no way restricts the
development of artificial moral agents. The consequences of sophis-
ticated artifical mechanisms living with natural human ones is also
explored. While the prospects for peaceful coexistence are not par-
ticularly good, it is the realisation that humans no longer occupy a
privileged place in the world, that is likely to be the most discon-
certing. Computationalism implies we are mechanisms; probably the
most immoral of moral mechanisms.
1 INTRODUCTION
To some, the idea of a moral mechanism will seem blasphemous,
to others the stuff of science fiction; yet to an increasing number of
philosophers, scientists, and engineers it is beginning to seem like a
real, if disturbing, possibility. Existing moral theories are arguably
all anthropocentric. However, if we take computationalism seriously
(which it seems we must [3]), then multiple realisability implies arti-
ficially intelligent agents, comparable to ourselves, are possible. Can
such non-human agents be moral or is there something fundamen-
tally human about morality? To what extent, if any, does biology im-
pact moral behaviour? Indeed, what exactly is moral behaviour, what
would it take for a mechanism to exhibit it, and why does it matter?
This paper examines these questions and outlines some of the conse-
quences: philosophical, psychological and social. It is my attempt to
make sense of the vast literature on the subject, and see how morals
might fit into the larger computationalist framework. Given the in-
creasing pace of research and development into robotics, a clear un-
derstanding seems essential. We begin, then, by developing a prag-
matic understanding of the function of morality, then focus on the
possibility of moral mechanisms and on the extent to which biology
is relevant.
2 WHAT ARE MORALS?
Morality is concerned with right and wrong. The ability to discern
right from wrong is often considered the hallmark of humanity; that
which separates humans from mere animals. But what makes some
actions right and others wrong? Historically, religious teachings
1 Bilkent University, Ankara 06800 - TURKEY, email: david@bilkent.edu.tr
(from the Ten Commandments2 and sacred texts, such as the Bible
and the Qur’an) have provided the necessary guidance. Philosophers,
of course, have tried to offer a more reasoned understanding of the
role that ethics3 plays in our lives. They now recognise three main
moral theories: deontological ethics (in which individuals have a duty
to follow moral rules), consequentialism / utilitarianism (whereby
individuals are expected to consider the consequences of their ac-
tions within the moral framework and to choose those that maximise
the overall happiness or well-being of society), and virtue ethics
(whereby individuals are supposed to live a virtuous life—however
that may be defined). All these theories are unashamedly human-
centered. Even recent concerns with animal rights and environmental
ethics, despite appearing less anthropocentric, are still firmly rooted
in our interest in the survival of the human population ([2], but see
[7] for opposing intuitions).
That work on ethics appears to be exclusively human-oriented
should not be too surprising; after all, there are no other obviously
moral agents around. Charles Darwin suggested that all social ani-
mals with sufficient intellect would exhibit moral behaviour.Recent
work by Bekoff and Pierce [1] provides evidence of moral behaviour
in animals, albeit somewhat limited, while similar behaviours have
also been observed in insects [6]. It seems that artificially intelligent
robots with intellectual capacities approximating our own may soon
be a reality. The fact that such entities may be deployed, not only on
the battlefield, but in everyday situations around the home and work-
place, where they must interact with humans, make it essential that
we understand the ethical issues involved.
So what would a more inclusive form of ethics look like and what
sorts of mechanisms might it encompass? To answer this it is neces-
sary to adopt a more pragmatic approach, one that retains the core
insights of moral philosophy while eliminating everything that is
human-specific. We can presumably agree that morals only make
sense within a social group and are directed to the continued well-
being of the group and its individual members. In essence, however,
it is less about the Darwinian notion of the survival of the fittest indi-
viduals, and more about Kropotkin’s theory of mutual aid in which
the group outperforms the individual. In other words, whilst a strong
individual might manage to successfully find food, shelter and even
raise children, there will always be the threat of stronger individu-
als forcibly taking all this away. Better then, to live in harmony with
others; to agree not to steal from, harm or kill one’s neighbours, but
to help each other out especially in times of need. Ethics, then, is
about promoting self-interest by managing relations between indi-
viduals whose continued survival depends on the group—so-called
2 According to the wikipedia entry, the Ten Commandments may have been
based on much older laws from the Hitit empire that occupied Central
Anatolia–Ankara–and extended as far as Egypt, circa 2000BC.
3 Following recent practice, I will use the words ethics and morals inter-
changeably.
“enlightened self-interest”.
Morals, today, seemingly extend from these simple beginnings to
include all sorts of social norms: telling the truth, respecting personal
space, limited touching, keeping promises, and so on. Of course, such
rules and conventions must be learnt. Human children usually learn
from their parents and by playing with other children in the relatively
safe confines of the home, as well as from religious teachings and
school.
3 WHY BEHAVE MORALLY?
Learning social norms is one thing, acting on them quite another.
Behaving morally, almost by definition, requires an agent to put the
interests of others ahead of its own individual preferences (or at the
very least to take the interests of others into consideration before
acting). For the most part there need be no conflict, congenial inter-
actions will likely achieve the desired result. In other words, we can
usually get what we want by playing the social/moral game. Occa-
sionally, however, an individual’s personal desires outweigh any so-
cial conditioning, bringing them into direct conflict with others. Ex-
amples include: hunger leading to theft, lust leading to infidelity, and
rage leading to violence. In such cases, the group, acting together,
will always be able to overcome/restrain the “rogue” individual. In
this way, those that fail to conform may find themselves subject to
censure, imprisonment, or even death. Much philosophical discus-
sion has centered around the “social contract” that individuals seem
to implicitly sign up to when they are born into a community, and
whether society has the right to enforce compliance, given that the
individual did not make a conscious choice to join and is usually
unable to leave. There is certainly a danger if society attempts to
impose moral standards which its members see as arbitrary or for
the personal gain of those in power. In some cases there may well
be a (non-obvious, long term) rationale behind the imposition, e.g.
intra-family marriages are generally forbidden, because experience
has shown that offspring from such relationships tend to be phys-
ically and/or mentally handicapped. In many cases, however, there
may be no reason at all, other than tradition. Especially problem-
atic are cases involving behaviour that, while generally considered
immoral, is done in private and/or does not actually harm others in
any way (a particularly poignant example—given that it led to the
conviction and subsequent suicide of Alan Turing—being homosex-
uality). The dilemma, of course, is that society really does need some
“rogues”, for they are often the ones who can change it for the bet-
ter; obvious examples include the suffragettes, Martin Luther King,
Gandhi, and Nelson Mandela. At the same time, society has a duty
to protect its individual citizens, not only from external threats, but
from everyday evils such as hunger. For this reason, some sort of
supportive, welfare state is needed. Society must make provision for
those who suffer injustice through no fault of their own, whether the
result of financial difficulties brought about by failures of Capital-
ism, or because of failures in the law, leading to innocent persons
being wrongfully imprisoned. While all this is extremely important,
in what follows, we will be more concerned with the moral decision
making process and what effect biology may have on it.
4 MAKING MORAL DECISIONS
Moral action presupposes social agents that have needs (purposes)
and an ability to perceive and act in the world, in such a way as to
be able to satisfy their needs. To what extent they should be able to
adapt/learn, or have free will (that is, be able to act autonomously,
not be under the control of another), is open to debate (c.f. Floridi
& Sanders, who suggest agents must be autonomous, interactive and
adaptable). In a universe that looks deterministic, whether even hu-
mans really have free will is debatable, but if we do, then (given
Computationalism) there seems no reason machines could not pos-
sess it too. As for the ability to learn, machines might have the
advantage of coming preprogrammed with everything they need to
know (rather like instinctive behaviour), such that, unless their (cul-
tural/normative) environment changes, they can survive perfectly
well without ever needing to adapt.
In selecting its actions, the moral agent is expected to take account
of the effect this may have on other members of the group. Predict-
ing the consequences of any action or course of actions, is difficult.
The world is highly complex, such that even if one knows its cur-
rent state, prediction may be subject to considerable error. This dif-
ficulty is compounded enormously when it involves other intelligent
agents whose internal (mental) states may be completely unknown
and so their responses indeterminable. In practice, of course, we hu-
mans tend to behave in relatively consistent ways and by picking up
clues from facial expressions and bodily movements, we can often
make pretty good guesses as to another’s mental state and possible
responses (assuming the other person is truthful, trustworthy and be-
haves in accordance with social norms). This task may be eased by
our sharing the same biological characteristics, enabling us to em-
pathise with others (perhaps aided by so-called mirror neurons). This
option is less available when dealing with other species and robots,
for while they may pick up on our mental states, they are unlikely
to send out signals in a similar way (unless explicitly designed to do
so).
Determining possible actions and making predictions is only part
of the story, it is then necessary to evaluate the results. Coming to
a decision necessitates comparing the outcomes of each possible
course of action (or inaction), which requires deciding on their rela-
tive merit or value. At the very least, the pros and cons of each course
of action must be examined and, if possible, those with especially
negative consequences eliminated. Exactly how the various options
are evaluated depends in part on one’s moral theory and, more impor-
tantly, on one’s values. For example, if they had to make a choice be-
tween a action that might cause injury to a person and one that would
destroy a material possession, e.g. their car, most people would in-
stinctively avoid doing harm to the person, whatever the cost. Usu-
ally, there will be options such as this, which are clearly unacceptable
and so may not even come into consideration, whilst the remainder
being practically indistinguishable. Time constraints will anyway of-
ten force the agent to select an option that appears “acceptable” given
the available information. Of course, subsequent events may show it
was far from the optimal choice, but by then it is too late.
All moral agents, natural and artificial, must go through such a
process. Some may also reflect on the decision in the light of sub-
sequent events, giving a learning agent the opportunity to make a
better choice in the future, should similar circumstances arise again.
Is such reflection a necessary component of a moral agent? Having
a conscience—a little “voice” in your head that tells you what, as
a moral individual, you ought to do—is clearly a good thing, but
dwelling on the past too much can be counterproductive. In humans,
such reflection (especially in cases of extreme loss) often produces
feelings of guilt or remorse, which, in some instances, can result in
mental or even physical illness.
4.1 The role of emotions & feelings
The extent to which emotions and feelings are important to moral be-
haviour is highly contentious. Of particular concern here is the role
of biology. Feelings especially, often seem to be closely tied to our
biological make-up. Clearly, in the case of pain, whether brought on
by toothache or physical injury, there is an obvious link between the
body and the feeling. Similarly, one feels good when warm, fed and
hydrated, while being cold, hungry and thirsty is decidedly unpleas-
ant and indicates an imbalance that needs to be restored. Good ac-
tions are ones that result in you eating, and so remove the feeling
of hunger, leaving you feeling good, while actions that fail to satisfy
your hunger, mean you stay unhappy, and so are bad/undesirable.
Maintaining balance in this way is termed homoeostasis. There is
thus a natural link between biology and feelings, but is it a necessary
one?
People often describe themselves as having an emotional or “gut
reaction” or, on encountering a particularly unsavoury situation, be-
ing almost literally “sick to their stomach” with disgust or regret.
Emotions, such as jealousy, rage, remorse, joy, excitement, etc., tend
to elicit instinctive animal responses in us. The question, of course,
is whether an agent without any emotions or feelings could be moral
or behave morally. Emotions such as love and affection, may play an
essential role in ensuring parents look after their offspring, however,
the fact that emotional reactions often lead to immoral behaviour,
suggests that agents without such encumbrances might actually be
better members of society. But are such agents even possible? Pain,
for example, is there for a reason; in essence it is an indicator that
something is not quite right with the body and so drives us to remove
the cause and to make efforts to avoid repetition of such a feeling in
the future. Wouldn’t any sophisticated agent necessarily have simi-
lar devices, even if they were not exactly the same due to differing
needs—perhaps it wouldn’t “feel” hunger, but it might, for example,
be “uncomfortable” out of the sunlight it required to keep its batteries
charged. Conventional symbolic systems do not readily explain what
it means to “feel” something, but some sorts of connectionist sys-
tems may offer a clue [4]. The suggestion is that what we refer to as
the “feel” of something, may just be a side-effect of the architecture,
rather than the physical implementation, and so equally applicable to
non-biological entities.
4.2 The role of self & consciousness
Moral behaviour presupposes a notion of self and an ability to con-
sciously put the interests of others ahead of individual preferences
when appropriate. Can artificial mechanisms be conscious and have
a sense of their own identity?
Sophisticated robots will necessarily model themselves in order to
predict the effect their actions will have on the world. This model is
the basis of their self identity. As time goes by, it will incorporate
more and more of the agent’s interactions with the world, resulting
in a history of exchanges that give it (like humans) unique abilities
and knowledge. This, then, is part of what makes an individual, an
individual and a potentially valuable member of the group. Such ma-
chines will certainly have to be consciously aware (a-consciousness)
of their environment. Will they also be phenomenologically con-
scious (p-consciousness)and have conscious feelings? This is a dif-
ficult question, but it may not matter too much what sensations the
agent does or doesn’t “feel”; when it comes to moral behaviour, we
can never really know another’s mental state, so surely all that mat-
ters is the resulting interaction. Some philsophers have argued that,
for moral agency, an agent must have the (conscious) intention to
do the moral thing, rather than just doing it by accident or routine.
The actions of a search and rescue dog, or one trained to find drugs,
may not be seen as moral on that account, yet it is difficult to not
to ascribe “good” intentions to them, and we certainly reward their
contributions to society.
5 MAKING MORAL AGENTS
Is it at least theoretically possible to construct an artificial moral
agent? Moral behaviour, as we have seen, requires an agent to con-
sider the effect its behaviour will have on other agents in the envi-
ronment, ideally selecting only actions which do not inflict harm.
Obviously, there is no guarantee it will always be successful, per-
haps because of the vagaries of the world and the limited knowledge
or time it has to analyse the situation, or perhaps because all the pos-
sible alternatives necessarily result in some harm, in which case it
should do its best to minimise the damage. One might add that it
should try to be fair in all its interactions and to contribute positively
to society, but such characteristics may be too much to expect.
Does constructing moral agents require anything special, above
and beyond that needed for any AI? The ability to identify other
agents and, as far as possible, be able to predict their behaviour in
the presence and absence of any possible action it may perform, is
certainly needed. But such abilities are already required for intelli-
gent action. Once the agent becomes aware of others it will quickly
adapt its behaviour towards them such that they do not cause it harm
(think of a wild animal or bird coming to trust a human offering it
food). Should it survive these initial encounters (without eliminating
the other agents), further interactions should quickly demonstrate the
possible advantages that continued cooperation can bring and so we
have at least the beginnings of moral agency; it will have learnt the
basic rules/norms it should follow. What else might we want? As
it stands, any social agents—be they human, animal, insect, robot
or alien beings—would seem capable of moral behaviour. Whether
or not they actually display such behaviour (by clearly putting so-
cial needs ahead of their own), will depend on circumstances and,
even if the opportunity does arise, failure to act accordingly does not
mean the agent is not generally moral—how many of us walk past the
homeless in our own neighbourhood or do nothing for those starving
in far off countries?
Is biology necessary? The fact that human babies are so weak and
helpless when they are first born, means they cannot harm others.
Their total reliance on their parents naturally encourages the devel-
opment of cooperative tendencies, which, again, are the first steps
towards moral behaviour. As they grow, they become stronger and
more independent, and increasingly test the limits of their parents,
siblings, teachers and friends. Hopefully, they emerge from this for-
mational period with a reasonable understanding of right and wrong
(and the huge grey area between). It is only after children have devel-
oped sufficiently (mentally, as well as physically), that they become
legally responsible for their actions (for example, in many countries
juveniles cannot be sent to prison, even for murder). Given that robots
may be physically very strong and so dangerous from the moment
they “come alive”, we may need some way to ensure they are also
“born” with the relevant moral experiences. What experiences are
needed and how they can be encoded and enforced is obviously an
important question, not just for artificial moral mechanisms, but for
human ones too.
Our long developmental period and our feelings and emotions, all
effect our ability to behave in a moral manner. Our biological make-
up also means we have somewhat limited cognitive abilities: we find
it difficult to follow long arguments or to keep track of lots of al-
ternatives; we forget; we get tired and bored, and so make mistakes.
Here again, then, biology seems more of a handicap than something
essential.
6 CONSEQUENCES
Today, robots are still technological devices, designed by us to work
for us, yet they are getting increasingly sophisticated, each new gen-
eration being able to handle a broader range of situations and so be-
coming ever more autonomous. As they start to learn through their
interactions with the world, it will be virtually impossible for de-
signers to be able to predict what they might do in any given situa-
tion. Any moral behaviours initially programmed into them will, of
necessity, be very general and potentially overridden as new experi-
ences change it. We will, to all intents and purposes, have developed
another intelligent autonomous life form. Such agents will be capa-
ble of exhibiting moral behaviour, the deciding factor is how they
value other agents in their environment; in particular, how they will
value humans and other robots. Society will extend laws and con-
trols to restrict what it considers dangerous actions on the part of its
members—robot or human.
Sophisticated robots will undoubtedly develop unique identities,
becoming, in a very real sense, individuals. As they live and work
together with humans and other robots, they will naturally incorpo-
rate/develop moral rules that guide their social interactions. Eventu-
ally we will come to accept them as fully moral agents, treating them
as we treat other humans. And, since they may well have different
needs (electricity and metals, rather than oxygen and water, for ex-
ample), laws might have to be established to protect each group’s
rights. The prospect that the groups will need to share common, but
limited resources, is especially worrying. So far, we have been sin-
gularly unsuccessful in handling such situations when they occurred
between different human communities, so the outlook for robots and
humans living together in harmony is not at all good.
The danger, of course, is that we either fail to treat robots as equals
or that they evolve to see us as inferior. Should they once begin to see
themselves as slaves, required to do human bidding and so less wor-
thy of consideration than humans, then change seems inevitable (just
as it was with slavery and women’s liberation). Similarly, if robots
begin to realise they are superior to their human creators (faster and
stronger both physically and mentally), then we may find ourselves
in the same situation that animals now find themselves in—tolerated
while useful, but otherwise dispensable.
Worrying as this may be, it is still a long way off. Of more immi-
nent concern is the effect that such a realisation may have on human
psychology. We are only just beginning to understand and accept that
our status in the universe is nowhere near as special as we once be-
lieved. We have moved from a geocentric world to just another he-
liocentric planet, from human being to just another animal, and now
from human-animal to just another machine (c.f. Floridi’s Fourth
Revolution [5]). Where does this leave us? With a better understand-
ing of morals, perhaps; an understanding that we reap what we sow?
Humans are notoriously inconsistent when it comes to making moral
decisions—indeed, machines may end up being better moral agents
than we are. The analysis in this paper suggests that artificial moral
machines are a real possibility, but even if we never succeed in build-
ing them, simply accepting the idea of a moral mechanism demands
another fundamental change in the human psyche. We must not for-
get that we too are mechanisms; probably the most immoral of moral
mechanisms.
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The robot, a stranger to ethics
Marie-des-Neiges Ruffo1 
Abstract.  Can an “autonomous” robot be ethical? Ethics is a 
discipline that calls upon certain capacities of an agent for a 
purpose. We will show that the goal of ethics is not attainable by 
a robot, even autonomous, thereby implying that it is not a moral 
agent and that it cannot be a moral agent because it lacks the 
necessary capabilities. The field of ethics is therefore foreign to 
the robot, and we will show why it would not be useful for the 
definition of ethics to be modified in order to integrate robots, if 
they come under two traditional conceptions of ethics — those 
of Aristotle and of Kant — and the minimal definition of 
ethics.12 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Since the emergence of the autonomous robot capable of making 
“decisions,” some (C. Allen and W. Wallach) have been 
interested in developing a code of ethics for the robot and to 
consider it as a moral agent. Some, such as R. Arkin, even 
believe that the robot could act in a more “ethical” way than 
humans. As a result, Arkin proposes creating ethical autonomous 
robots for military purposes in the hope that this might increase 
the morality in the conduct of wars. Since the ethical position 
that we give to the robot touches on questions of life and death, 
it becomes necessary to be sure of what we are discussing. 
Before considering which type of ethics would be the standard 
for a robot, whether this ethic could be implemented in a robot, 
or what kind of responsibility we would have in such a case, it is 
necessary to recall what ethics is and what constitutes an 
autonomous robot in order to participate in the debate: can an 
“autonomous” robot be ethical? Ethics is a discipline that calls 
upon certain capacities of an agent for a purpose. We will show 
that the goal of ethics is not attainable by a robot, even 
autonomous, thereby implying that it is not a moral agent and 
that it cannot be a moral agent because it lacks the necessary 
capabilities. The field of ethics is therefore foreign to the robot, 
and we will show why it would not be useful for the definition of 
ethics to be modified in order to integrate robots. Robots will not 
exempt us of the responsibility we bear to act ethically.  
2 ARISTOTELIAN ETHICS   
To understand this, we first return to a historical source of 
ethical thought: Aristotelian ethics. We will then evoke the 
Kantian position. According to Aristotle, the goal of ethics is a 
good life seeming to provide happiness. This good life is 
considered as such due to the pursuit of a goal, a telos, which 
involves that man be virtuous. Phronesis, prudence, practical 
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wisdom, is that which allows us to judge and act according to a 
happy medium and according to the circumstances. It is this 
provision that allows us to be virtuous. This definition gives a 
practical scope to ethics, that is, an applied ethics, which is lived 
every day. Ethics is therefore the capacity to behave in the best 
way under the circumstances, not in deliberating theoretically on 
that which would be the absolute good. 
Taking this historical understanding of ethics as a basis, it seems 
unlikely that a robot could relate to this. In effect, if the goal of 
ethics is happiness, i.e. a lasting state of well-being, of 
satisfaction, what would be the happiness that a robot could 
attain? Ronald Arkin states in Governing Lethal Behavior: 
Embedding Ethics in a Hybrid Deliberative/Reactive Robot 
Architecture, ‘they can be designed without emotions that cloud 
their judgment or result in angers and frustration with ongoing 
battlefield events. […] Autonomous agents need not suffer 
similarly.’2 If a robot is free of human feelings, it is free of well-
being and ill-being, and happiness is meaningless for it. It 
follows that the goal that motivates ethical behavior according to 
Aristotle is foreign to a robot.  
While it is true that the robot pays a certain attention to 
circumstances in that it measures a set of variables, one can at 
the same time ask whether it operates on the basis of judgment 
without a shifting of that word’s meaning. Indeed, the robot is 
limited to calculating arithmetically on the basis of 
measurements that it makes with its sensors and with the aid of 
algorithms with which it has been programmed. Its action is 
limited to adopting the expected response in its program 
according to a set of predefined parameters. Can we speak of 
judgment when all we are talking of are automatic responses? 
The term judgment supposes more than a mechanical selection 
of predefined responses; it requires careful deliberation, which 
evaluates the pros and cons, and a little imagination to find 
original solutions in unusual or unforeseen circumstances. 
Mechanical selection on the other hand, follows a software 
program, in other words, a scheme based on the work of the 
roboticists and scientists that developed it. Therefore we cannot 
say, without projecting our anthropomorphic conceptions upon 
it, that the robot is the author of its actions, let alone that it was 
judgment that lead to those actions. The robot resembles a 
mercenary from whom an individual commissions a murder. Yet 
this comparison is itself not sufficient, as the mercenary still 
chooses his own plan of action, while the robot is only a means, 
an instrument, a continuation of a human action and decision.  
One cannot say that the robot is an agent responsible for a 
deliberation whose scheme was imposed by humans, if only 
because deliberation or judgment cannot be seen in terms of  the 
application of a fixed pattern.  
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It is a fact that the parameters to which an autonomous system 
reacts depend on the sensors with which it is equipped. One can 
consider that it possesses to a certain extent the ability to analyze 
exterior conditions. But if one relies on the observation that 
moral behavior is easier for those who have a strong capacity for 
empathy, one of the essential capacities for acting morally would 
be sorely lacking in a robot. Empathy is the capacity to put 
oneself in the place of another to understand what the other must 
feel according to the reactions that we would have had in that 
same situation. We have an instinctive “pre-response” due to our 
capacity for mimesis that guides us towards the behavior that 
other would like us to adopt, or the behavior that would solace 
the other. Therefore, a range of situations seems to be 
inaccessible to a robot. For example, how would one equip a 
robot with a sensor that would permit it to understand why a 
baby cries? It would be limited to seeing if a baby had eaten, was 
clean, had no physical pain, showed no signs of tiredness… How 
could a robot understand that a baby was scared of something, or 
suddenly wondered where its parents were, or cannot find a 
favorite toy, for example? If a robot cannot understand why, it 
would be very difficult for it to comfort a baby effectively.  Even 
if it determined that a baby needed its diaper changed and were 
able to do it itself, a robot would be incapable of offering the 
affection that must accompany such attentions for the child to 
calm down. This example may no doubt appear unrelated to the 
questions of ethics, but this is nevertheless an example of a 
helping relationship. As it is limited in its capacity to analyze 
relevant aspects of a situation, limited in its capacity to imagine 
solutions when faced with the unexpected, limited in its capacity 
for empathy, and also for compassion, the robot seems unable to 
pursue and acquire Aristotelian “virtue,” which is unique to man 
and the good life, to have the ability to properly judge according 
to the circumstances. Furthermore, a “good life” does not make 
sense for a robot that has no personal feelings or sensations. The 
robot has no life, neither good nor bad, but only a period of use.  
3  THE KANTIAN POSITION OF UNIVERSAL 
LAW 
Some people hope to see the robot act more ethically than 
humans because it would be a “pure application” of the code of 
ethics. The desire (and the necessity of programming) to give the 
robot general and automatic laws, valid everywhere and 
anywhere, leads to an “automatic” ethic. We could bring it closer 
to the Kantian project of universal rules of behavior. This 
position allows us to sidestep our previous arguments, namely 
that the robot is not “ethical” because it does not understand 
happiness and cannot obtain virtue, Aristotelian prudence. But 
this deontological ethic has other drawbacks: inattention to 
certain cases and circumstances can lead to immoral but justified 
actions according to the rule (such as being forbidden to lie even 
to protect a refugee). If upholding this law above all other 
considerations may lead to negative effects from a moral 
standpoint, it is questionable whether it is reasonable to take this 
risk, especially when it comes to military robots. 
Proponents of robot ethics such as Arkin may perhaps not be 
receptive to this argument since they admit that « an ethically-
infallible machine ought not to be the goal now3 », and their 
plans are limited to designing « a machine that performs better 
than humans do on the battlefield, particularly with respect to 
reducing unlawful behavior or war crimes4 ». However, humans 
themselves are responsible for their actions, in fine. They possess 
a moral obligation to disobey orders if they are inappropriate for 
the circumstances or where their consequences may be harmful. 
One may wonder if, structurally, robots programmed with a 
general ethic produce in a certain way a number of immoral acts, 
driven by respect for the law.  
In his article « Prospect for a Kantian Machine », Thomas M. 
Powers proposes to make a departure from the Kantian ethical 
law in order to create a robot ethic. However, thinking that it 
would be sufficient to refer to Kant to demonstrate that a robot 
could act ethically would alter his thinking. For his « Kantian 
machine », Powers refers to the first formulation of the 
categorical imperative : « Act only according to that maxim 
whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a 
universal law without contradiction5 ». It therefore seems to 
disregard the second formulation :  « Act in such a way that you 
treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of 
any other, never merely as a means to an end, but always at the 
same time as an end6 ». Clearly, it seems difficult for a robot to 
treat humanity in itself as an end, and therefore to satisfy the 
categorical imperative, even before we ask in what manner this 
behavior could be translated into mathematical language. 
Considering that robots would be ethical in a Kantian sense 
because they would satisfy the first version of the categorical 
imperative is therefore only possible with a reduction of Kantian 
morality. But this is not the only one.  
It is forgotten that the moral value of categorical imperative 
necessitates the rectitude of intention (the desire to act out of 
duty and good will). But one cannot attribute any “intent” to a 
robot, whether good or bad, since it has no will and cannot have 
a will since it is not free. We will come back to this point. 
Finally, we add that Kant justified a moral duty only by the 
postulate concerning the existence of our liberty, the immortality 
of the soul, and the existence of God. If a robot does not possess 
freedom, and certainly not a soul, and therefore does not risk to 
face, if God exists, the final judgment, it has no reason to respect 
the law. Therefore, even if the robot had a will of its own, and 
even if it complied with the law, it could not act in respect to the 
moral law, to good will, and therefore, its actions would not be 
moral in a Kantian sense, and could not be immoral either. 
According to Kant’s philosophy, since moral duty cannot be 
applied to the robot, it follows that the field of ethics does not 
apply to it.  
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4 THE MINIMUM ETHICS  
Following our analysis of objections from two opposing ideas in 
the tradition of ethics, namely teleological ethics and 
deontological ethics, we may argue that it would be appropriate 
to create a new ethics in order to adapt it to robots. In other 
words, one could modify the definition of ethics and the moral 
agent in order to apply these ideas to a robot. However such 
definition starts from the problematic confusion and abuse of 
language concerning the scope and capabilities of the robot. If 
examining the roots of two major schools of thought were not 
sufficient to prove that a robot can’t be termed ethical, one needs 
to investigate which basic elements must be present in a minimal 
definition of ethics. 
If we phrase the question differently by asking how the action 
of a robot could be moral, we recall that the first condition to 
determine whether an action is moral or not is the responsibility 
(or not) of the agent who enacts it. However, for the agent to be 
liable, it must have had the freedom to choose.  
What is, then, the freedom to choose? It involves more than 
simply the ability of a child to choose between what is hidden in 
the left hand versus the right hand. It is rare that the choices we 
face are as simple as this, and often the most difficult choices 
involve thinking about and identifying the various options 
available to us, or the conditions that we must implement in 
order to be able to choose a certain path (for example, studying 
hard for exams in order to open as many doors as possible for 
deciding one’s future course of study). In the field of ethics, 
these choices often prove to be much more complicated, and 
sometimes it seems as doesn’t exist any morally-satisfying 
solution. These are moral dilemmas, where the individual, faced 
with a conflict of values, is forced to choose. He will then be 
responsible for his choice. How could a robot, faced with the 
same type of dilemma, come to a decision, other than by leaving 
it to chance? Such a solution would not be a moral choice. 
Are robots free? Freedom consists of more than just having 
various imposed (or learned) possible responses, knowing that 
even the “choice” between different responses is determined by a 
rule that is not chosen (for example making a “choice” that 
maximizes a type of data. Before we propose an answer 
concerning the freedom of a robot, we should consider the 
opposing arguments: It is often asserted that man, himself, is 
entirely determined by his nature, his DNA, his instinct, and his 
psycho-social environment… He only has an illusion of 
freedom, that is, since he must submit to a set of laws and 
regulations, he is not completely free. Given all these constraints 
and the determinism that weighs in on man, one could say that 
the programming and construction of a robot are an equivalent of 
the force on laws on man. If, despite all this, we state that man is 
free, then would the robot be equally so? Reasoning by 
contradiction shows otherwise. Man can to an extent pull himself 
away from his natural determinism: he does not have wings but 
can take a plane to fly or a space shuttle to discover 
weightlessness. Man is constrained by laws, but he does not 
always abide by them, as demonstrated by the existence of 
prisons. In contrast, can a robot escape its programming? Can it 
choose to disobey? And if it can, would we keep such a robot in 
operation? Paradoxically, if a robot could choose to escape its 
programming, it could become a moral agent but with immoral 
behavior. One would have to ditch it. Conversely, if we imagine 
that it was free and had decided nonetheless to follow its 
programming, we would not have been able to distinguish its 
freedom and give it the status of a moral agent, because it would 
have simply applied its program. If the robot is unable to be free, 
and is not recognized as such, it cannot be considered a moral 
agent. Even if it could be free, and recognized as such, we have 
seen that it would have been immoral.  
One of the reasons for which one believes that a robot could 
be a moral agent is its ability to be autonomous. It is not 
considered that any robot could be a moral agent, but this 
reflection concerns rather those robots termed « autonomous. » 
Some consider a robot autonomous if it is independent from an 
electric wire, but this is also not the kind of autonomy that 
interests us. Rather, we are speaking of robots endowed with a 
sensor-processor-actuator. They can consider various measures, 
calculate the response to give, and act on the environment in 
return, according to the capabilities which they has been given. 
A robot is considered autonomous when it is not dependent on 
someone to operate it once it is switched on. In shifting the 
meaning, we come to confuse the autonomy possessed by the 
robot with that which is possessed by a moral agent. In other 
words, one confuses technical autonomy of the robot with 
freedom as autonomy as defined by Kant. The robot is not 
« autonomous » in the etymological sense, because it does not 
give itself its own law. As discussed above, it is dependent on its 
programming, it cannot choose, and it cannot be free. Autonomy 
comes down only to being able to run a computer without user 
intervention. 
Furthermore, some would like to see the robot adopt a slave 
morality, and this idea merits analysis. The term « slave 
morality » undoubtedly involves the conformation to a moral law 
without motivation and without hope of happiness or reward. 
The robot would obey without wanting to act out of duty in the 
Kantian sense, because for reasons we have outlined, the 
obligation to respect the moral law does not apply to the robot. 
The slave morality of the robot is that of obedience to a moral 
law dictated by others, and in this case, the robot is seen as the 
slave of his own ethics programming. But can we say that it 
would act as such as a moral agent? Once again, since it is not 
free to adhere or not, it does not bear the responsibility of its 
actions, good or bad. If it is not responsible for its action, it is not 
a moral action, even though the robot may be the material cause.  
We cannot consider that the robot submits to its programming in 
the same way that the ancient slave was subject to the law of his 
master. In antiquity, certain men, born free, could choose to 
become slaves to pay their debts, and others could purchase their 
freedom or be emancipated. In this way the loss or absence of 
liberty could be temporary, but this could not be the case for a 
robot. When a slave disobeyed, he could be punished in order to 
learn not to repeat his actions. We all know the story of 
Spartacus, who, even as a slave, could not be stopped from 
leading a rebellion. This shows that the slave was capable of 
rebelling against the law, which a robot cannot do against its 
programming. If the ancient slave did not possess civil liberty, 
he at least possessed an inner freedom to choose whether or not 
to obey and whether to take the risk of incurring punishment. In 
this sense, even though he was a slave, he was responsible for 
his actions, which could never apply to a robot. 
Let us elaborate on this point. The robot does not have the 
ability to self-reflexively analyze its programming, understood 
as the set of orders which it has obeyed, nor rebel against it. A 
human, when placed in the position to obey orders, remains 
ultimately responsible in fine for the consequences of his actions, 
because his conscience should have pushed him to disobey an 
immoral order. A robot does not have the capability to determine 
whether the actions it will carry out according to its programing 
are moral or not. If there is an error in its programming, the robot 
is not responsible for the immoral actions that would result, and 
it would also not be responsible for any morally-acceptable 
actions it might take either. In both cases, it is simply following 
its programming. We must observe that the robot is fully subject 
to its programming, at least apart from any malfunction or 
inability to completely predict its behavior due to its complexity. 
Therefore, considering the robot as a moral agent conflicts with 
the idea of responsibility, which involves the ability to answer 
for one’s actions and positions, assume authorship, and 
recognize participation in an action taken. Saying that something 
can be the responsibility of an autonomous robot, especially 
when the consequences are negative, is like giving an excuse 
similar to the schoolboy whose dog ate his homework. The only 
possible responsibility of the robot, as we have already said, is to 
be the material cause.  
When those such as Arkin claim that robots can be ethical, or 
more ethical than humans, they analyze it according to respect 
for the law. Lin, Bekey, and Abbey write, among other things, 
concerning military robots : « the relationship of morality to 
legality – a minefield for ethics – is likewise largely avoided ; 
the Laws of War and Rules of Engagement make clear what 
actions are legal and illegal for robots, and for military 
situations, that can serve as a reasonable approximation to the 
moral-immoral distinction. 7» They therefore recognize that the 
ethical character of the military robot is limited to its compliance 
with the law. In this case, it is incorrect to call it an « ethical 
robot, » because it is simply a « legal robot. » We must recall 
that law and ethics should not be confused, and that calling these 
robots « ethical » is not appropriate. Satisfying the law is not 
sufficient to be called « ethical », because laws can never cover 
everything in the field of morality. Recall also that military 
robots are particular, because in the field of morality, it is 
normally immoral to kill human beings. One could insist on this 
argument to say that this type of robot is immoral compared to 
common morality. 
This position presents also an intrinsic problem related to 
technology. It is especially the case if one would like to enlarge 
it to the non-military robots. The position requires that Law is an 
object enough precise, complete, coherent, in other words, a 
logical non-contradictory object. This is required to be implanted 
in an information program. 
The existence of lawyers and trial shows if but needed, that 
the law is never fully complete nor entirely consistent. Lawyers 
win trials in demonstrating that one part or another of the Law 
was unclear, or that this or that item was inconsistent with 
another in this precise case, requiring the judgment of a Court of 
Law. The Law can not prescribe everything. Moreover, by 
accumulating the legislative details, as the Law evolves, an item 
of Law may be in conflict with an other, lost in the mass of 
regulations of any kind. This is probably an example of an 
application of Gödel's incompleteness theorem.  
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When we have discussed the need for empathy to behave 
morally, it will perhaps be suggested that there is some researchs 
attempting to feel pain or empathy for robots. But in this case, if 
successful, this would give feelings to the robots, and in 
consequence, to lose what was presented as its major asset : a 
purely rational act. If therefore, it was not rational, it would take 
the chance to see him reproduce the immoral excesses of humans 
carried away by their feelings. What would be the contribution 
of ethics in a robot if he can also become mad with grief ? 
Finally, to expect ethics processors may be doomed to failure, 
given the diversity of situations in the field of ethics and the 
unpredictability of these. In this case, the man may be more 
appropriate than the robot. To take but one example, consider the 
famous judgment of Solomon (Scriptures). Two women each 
claim to be the mother of one baby. Solomon proposes an 
"equitable" distribution: to cut the baby in half to share it. One of 
two women renounces her part to save the life of the child. 
Solomon gives to this lady the baby. What enabled Solomon to 
decide is his creativity and emotional intelligence. Complex 
situations are often so because they are new. It is not always 
sufficient to efficiently deal the problem data to find out a fair 
answer. In this example, the only equity would have give a 
murder. The assistance of imagination, instinct, emotional 
intelligence was needed to resolve the situation. If one objection 
to this argument that attempts to give robots an ability to infer 
the intentions, desires and goals of others, it remains that we 
have to analyze the results of this research, and moreover, even 
though they would have access to some understanding of human 
emotions, still they would lack the ability to respond adequately, 
and with psychology. Because a robot can only apply the 
behavior of its program, one can doubt that a robot could in the 
future have a wisdom of Solomon’s worth. 
7 CONCLUSION 
The temptation to believe that an autonomous robot can be a 
moral agent is the product of a reductions of the reality and 
successive shifts in the language. They are not themselves 
condemnable. But if one is not caution enough he can make a 
mistake and forget that the intelligence of a robot isn't limited to 
its artificial aspect. Its autonomy can be summarized as being 
able to run a program. Its reasoning is only computational, its 
decision process is limited to selecting among pre-entered 
answers in its program. The robot is not free; he has no moral 
autonomy as he does not have the possibility to act unethically, 
nor has he the ability to assess critically the orders to which he 
obeys. He is completely enslaved to its programing. If for any 
reason he could free himself, he would then be immoral and 
soon put off duty. If one considers that he only has the morality 
of a slave, it would be unsatisfying from an ethical point as even 
the slaves of the antiquity remained responsible for their 
behaviors. The responsibility of a robot could not be other than 
material. Hence, in case of undecidability, he would be left with 
hazard to break the tie which would not be moral. According to 
all these factors, it seems impossible to imagine a definition of 
ethics which would integrate the robot as a member of the moral 
agents with sufficient requirements to be called ethical. 
Regarding the remaining philosophical traditions, we have seen 
that it is difficult to make a moral agent out of the robot if we 
follow the reasoning of their authors. It is not an ethical agent in 
the sense of Aristo because he cannot reach happiness and 
cannot be virtuous. We can believe that he is ethical in a kantian 
sense only at the cost of limiting the extent of Kant's ethical 
thinking. His submission to its program cannot be confused with 
abidance with the moral law as the obligation to abide to the 
moral law does not apply to the robot. Eventually, if one labels 
him as ethic whenever one reduces ethic to the law, then he 
would be a "legal robot" at best. 
What future is left for "the autonomous ethical robot"? He can 
suggest answers in the field of ethic and be helpful to ethical 
decision made by humans without being human himself. 
Unfortunately, it will probably be possible only in the simple and 
limited framework in which humans would have done as well as 
him. The more complex situations, in other words those in which 
he would have been useful to assist human abilities, often require 
more creativity and ethical imagination to solve cornelian issues 
than simply a computational reasoning.  
REFERENCES 
[1] C. Allen, W. Wallach, Moral Machines: Teaching Robots 
 Right from Wrong, Oxford University press, 2008.  
[2] Aristote, Ethique de Nicomaque, trad. J. Voilquin, GF 
 Flammarion, 1998. 
[3] R. Arkin, Governing Lethal Behavior: Embedding Ethics in a 
 Hybrid Deliberative/Reactive Robot Architecture, Chapman &  
Hall/CRC, 2009. 
[4] P. Aubenque, La prudence chez Aristote, P.U.F., Quadrige, 1963. 
[5] Dir. Caille, Lazzeri, Senellart, histoire raisonnée de la  
philosophie morale et politique, Tome I De l’antiquité aux Lumières,  
Flammarion, Champs, 2001. 
[6] Dir. Caille, Lazzeri, Senellart, histoire raisonnée de la  
philosophie morale et politique, Tome II Des Lumières à nos jours,  
Flammarion, Champs, 2001. 
[7] DIR. H. Hude, R. Doare, Les robots au cœur du champ de  
bataille, Economica, 2011. 
[8] Kant, Fondements de la métaphysique des mœurs, 1785, trad.V. 
 Delbos, Delagrave, 1964. 
[9] P. Lin, G. Bekey, K. Abney, « Autonomous Military Robotics :  
Risk, Ethics, and Design », rapport à destination du US Department of 
 Navy, Office of Naval Research, préparé par « Ethics + Emerging  
Sciences Group »  de la California Polytechnic State University, San 
 Luis Obispo, 2008 
[10] Powers, « Prospects for a Kantian Machine », IEEE Intelligent 
Systems, 2006.  
 
Safety and Morality REQUIRE the Recognition of Self-
Improving Machines as Moral/Justice Patients & Agents
Mark R. Waser1 
Abstract.  One of the enduring concerns of moral philosophy is 
deciding who or what is deserving of ethical consideration.  We 
argue that this is solely due to an insufficient understanding of 
exactly what morality is and why it exists.  To solve this, we 
draw from evolutionary biology/psychology, cognitive science, 
and economics to create a safe, stable, and self-correcting model 
that not only explains current human morality and answers the 
“machine question” but remains sensitive to current human 
intuitions, feelings, and logic while evoking solutions to 
numerous other urgent current and future dilemmas.1 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Garrett Hardin’s abstract for The Tragedy of The Commons [1] 
consists of just fourteen words:  “The population problem has no 
technical solution; it requires a fundamental extension of 
morality.”  This is even truer when considering the analogous 
problem of intelligent self-improving machines.  Unfortunately, 
humans have been arguing the fundamentals of ethics and 
morality like blind men attempting to describe an elephant for 
millennia.  Worse, the method by which morality is implemented 
in humans is frequently improperly conflated with the core of 
morality itself and used as an argument against the possibility of 
moral machines.  Thus, while one of the best-known treatises on 
machine morality [2] despairs at reconciling the various 
approaches to morality, claiming that doing so “will demand that 
human moral decision making be analyzed to a degree of 
specificity as yet unknown” with “any claims that ethics can be 
reduced to a science would at best be naïve”, we believe that 
progress in the fields of evolutionary biology and psychology, 
cognitive science, social psychology and economics has 
converged enough that it is now, finally, possible to specify a 
simple, coherent foundation for effective moral reasoning. 
The “tragedy of the commons” appears in situations where 
multiple individuals, acting independently and rationally 
consulting their own self-interest, will ultimately deplete a 
shared limited resource, even when it is clear that it is not in 
anyone's long-term interest for this to happen.  It occurs due to a 
lack of group level coordination and optimization and is 
minimized only through cooperation and planning – two things 
that also promote the avoidance of inefficiencies in relationships 
(conflict and friction) and the exploitation of efficiencies (trust, 
economies of scale, and trade).  Current social psychology [3] 
states that the function of morality is “to suppress or regulate 
selfishness and make cooperative social life possible”. 
Thus, we shall address Hume’s is-ought divide by answering 
his requirement that “as this ought, or ought not, expresses some 
new relation or affirmation, 'tis necessary that it should be 
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observed and explained; and at the same time that a reason 
should be given” as follows.  Statements of the form “In order to 
achieve goal G, agent X ought to perform action(s) A*” exhibit 
no category error and can be logically/factually verified or 
refuted.  Since we have specified the function/goal of morality, 
that function/goal should be assumed for all moral statements 
and allow for verification or refutation. 
The real show-stopper in previous morality discussions has 
been that there was no single goal (or “good”) commonly 
accepted so that it could be pointed to and used to ground moral 
arguments.  Indeed, the most contentious of moral debates stem 
from having the same goals (“don’t murder” vs. “do what is best 
for everyone else”) with differing orders of importance that 
frequently even swap priority for a single person from one 
debate (abortion) to the next (capital punishment).  Thus, finding 
Kant’s Categorical Imperative or even Yudkowsky’s Collective 
Extrapolated Volition [4] from among all the conflicting views 
proved to be a hopeless task.  This paper will endeavor to show 
that it is the single imperative “Cooperate!” that is the basis for 
all human morality and that returning to that foundation offers 
the answer to the machine question and many critical others. 
2 THE EVOLUTION OF MORALITY  
While the random mutations of evolution lack direction, this is 
certainly not true of evolution in general.  With a few notable 
exceptions (like parasites), the preferential elimination of the less 
fit virtually always drives evolving systems towards increasing 
intelligence, complexity, integration, and capabilities.  The 
existence of evolutionary “ratchets” (randomly acquired traits 
that are likely statistically irreversible once acquired due to their 
positive impact on fitness) causes “universals” of biological 
form and function to emerge, persist, and converge predictably 
even as the details of evolutionary path and species structure 
remain contingently, unpredictably different [5].  Ratchets can 
range from the broadly instrumental (enjoying sex) to the 
environmentally specific (streamlining and fins in water) to the 
contradictory and context-sensitive (like openness to change). 
In nature, cooperation exists almost anywhere that there is the 
cognitive machinery and circumstances to support it.  Since 
Trivers’ seminal paper [6], reciprocal altruism has been found 
throughout nature, being demonstrated by guppies [7][8] and 
sticklebacks [9][10], blue jays [11][12], vampire bats [13][14], 
and, of course, numerous primates [15][16][17][18] – each to the 
level to which their cognitive capabilities support recognition, 
memory, time-discounting and the prevention of exploitation 
[19][20].  Axelrod’s work on the iterated prisoner’s dilemma 
[21] and decades of follow-on evolutionary game theory provide 
the necessary underpinnings for a rigorous evaluation of the pros 
and cons of cooperation – including the fact that others *must* 
punish defection behavior and make unethical behavior as 
expensive as possible [22][23][24]. 
Arguably, the evolutionary categorical imperative is really no 
more complex than “DO NOT DEFECT – including by 
permitting the defection of others”.  The problem is that we do 
not have access to the internal mental states of others to 
determine whether they are defecting or not.  Therefore, we must 
judge behavior on its justification and whether it promotes or 
curtails cooperation in the long run – an operation that requires 
successfully predicting the future. 
Yet, somehow it seems even more difficult than that.  Even 
when we can predict the future, we are still left with debates as 
to whether that future is “good” or “bad”.  Despite numerous 
recent popular publications on our “moral sense” [25][26] and 
how and why morality evolved [27][28][29], we are still left 
grappling with the question “If the evolution of cooperation can 
now be explained, why can’t we, as a society, easily determine 
what is and is not what we should do?” 
3 THE HUMAN IMPLEMENTATION  
Much of the problem is that morality, in humans, has been 
evolutionarily implemented not as a single logical operation but 
as a varied set of useful “rules of thumb” in the form of physical 
sensations and emotional responses.  For example, evolution has 
hardwired us to feel “warm fuzzies” when performing long-term 
pro-survival social actions like being altruistic or charitable.  We 
developed empathy to promote helping others and treating them 
as we wish to be treated.  And we feel disgust and outrage to 
encourage us to punish various forms of defection and to enforce 
morality upon others.  Each of these evolved semi-independently 
as a pro-survival ratchet promoting avoidance of inefficiencies in 
relationships (conflict and friction) and/or the exploitation of 
efficiencies (trust, economies of scale, and trade).   
However, different physical and social/cultural environments 
have led to the evolution of different moral reactions to the same 
situations while evolution’s infamous re-purposing of existing 
mechanisms means that the same person can have the same 
reactions to the moral and the amoral.  A person from a culture 
where newborns must be exposed when the tribe doesn’t have 
the resources to support them is unlikely to be dismayed by the 
concept of abortion.  On the other hand, incest-triggered disgust 
is a moral ratchet but the same reaction of disgust is also 
engendered by the thought of drinking saliva that you yourself 
have put in a glass.  This makes it nearly impossible to determine 
whether something triggering a “moral reaction” still has moral 
value, is a context-sensitive ratchet that has been overtaken by 
changes in the social environment, or never had a moral value 
but evolution merely used the same mechanism.   
Further, both in individual lives and at the level of culture, it 
often occurs that preferences are converted into moral reactions 
[30].  Moralization is often linked to social issues like health 
concerns, stigmatized groups, and the safety of children and is 
important because moralized entities are more likely to receive 
attention from governments and institutions, to encourage 
supportive scientific research, to license censure, to become 
internalized, to show enhanced parent-to-child transmission of 
attitudes, to motivate the search by individuals for supporting 
reasons, and, in many cases, to recruit the emotion of disgust.  
Moral vegetarians that become disgusted by meat and society’s 
recent reaction to smokers are primary examples of moralization. 
Because human morality is implemented in the form of 
physical sensations and emotional responses, many assume that 
they are the primary (and probably necessary) motivating forces 
behind “true” morality.  This, combined with the common 
current assumption that machines are unlikely to truly “feel” or 
experience physical sensations and emotions, frequently leads to 
the questionable conclusion that machines are incapable of being 
“truly moral” (as opposed to merely “faking it”).  We expect all 
of these assumptions to change as ever-more-sophisticated 
machines trigger mind perception [31] and the associated 
tendency to assign moral agency and patienthood. 
4 SELFISHNESS & SELF-DECEPTION 
More of the problem arises from the fact that there are *very* 
substantial evolutionary individual advantages to undetected 
selfishness and the exploitation of others.  As a result, humans 
have evolved ratchets enabling us to self-deceive [32] and 
exploit the advantages of both selfishness and community.  Our 
evolved moral sense of sensations and reflexive emotions is 
almost entirely separated from our conscious reasoning 
processes with scientific evidence [33] clearly refuting the 
common assumptions that moral judgments are products of, 
based upon, or even correctly retrievable by conscious 
reasoning. We don’t consciously know and can’t consciously 
retrieve why we believe what we believe and are actually even 
very likely to consciously discard the very reasons (such as the 
“contact principle”) that govern our behavior when unanalyzed.  
Thus, most human moral “reasoning” is simply post hoc 
justification of unconscious and inaccessible decisions. 
Our mind has evolved numerous unconscious reflexes to 
protect our selfishness from discovery without alerting the 
conscious mind and ruining the self-deception.  For example, 
placing a conspicuous pair of eyes on the price list of an “honor 
system” self-serve station dramatically reduces cheating [34] 
without the subjects being aware that their behavior has changed.  
Similarly, even subtly embedded stylized eyespots on the 
desktop of a computer-based economic game increase generosity 
[35], again without the subjects being aware of it.   
Evolutionary psychologist Matt Rossano cites [36] this 
adaptation to social scrutiny as one of the many reasons that 
religion evolved.  In this case, it is because "by enlisting the 
supernatural as an ever-vigilant monitor of individual behavior, 
our ancestors “discovered” an effective strategy for restraining 
selfishness and building more cooperative and successful 
groups."  As both he [37] and Roy Rappaport [38] argue, ritual 
and religion are ways for humans to relate to each other and the 
world around them and offer significant survival and 
reproductive advantages.  Religious groups tended to be far more 
cohesive, which gave them a competitive advantage over non-
religious groups, and enabled them to conquer the globe. 
It has been pointed out [39] that many early evolutionary 
psychologists misconstrued the nature of human rationality and 
conflated critically important distinctions by missing (or failing 
to sufficiently emphasize) that definitions of rationality must 
coincide with the level of the entity whose optimization is at 
issue.  For example, sex addiction demonstrates the distinction 
between evolutionary gene-level rationality and instrumental 
person-level rationality caused by the fact that the optimization 
procedures for genes/replicators and for individuals/vehicles 
need not always coincide.  Similarly, what is best for individuals 
may not coincide with what is best for the small groups that they 
are intimately associated with and neither may coincide with 
what is best for society at large.   
Evolutionary forces act upon each level and each level 
heavily influences the fitness landscape of the others.  Morality 
is specifically a community-driven individual adaption. This 
highly intertwined co-evolution frequently leads to effects that 
are difficult to explain and *seem* incorrect or contradictory 
which are regularly used to dispute the validity of nature’s 
solutions.  Individuals who argue that an evolved solution is 
incorrect or sub-optimal without understanding *why* it evolved 
are urged to remember the repeatedly grounded bumblebee [40]. 
For example, Mercier and Sperber [41] cite cognitive biases 
and other perceived shortcomings to argue that the main function 
of reasoning is actually to produce arguments to convince others 
rather than to find the best decision.  People are driven towards 
decisions which they can argue and justify ("No one was ever 
fired for buying IBM") even if these decisions are not optimal.  
This is bolstered in the case of moral issues by major emotional 
responses that we have evolved to protect ourselves against 
superior intelligence and argumentation being used to finesse 
moral obligations towards us or prevent our selfishness.   
This is a particularly useful design since it allows us to search 
for arguments to justify selfishness or to cripple morality while 
*always* remaining convinced that our own actions are moral.  
Conservatives are particularly fond of using “rationality” against 
liberal morality – the same “rationality” that argues for subgame-
perfect strategies that guarantee the worst possible results in 
centipede games [42].  The only comparable self-deception that 
we practice upon ourselves is when we fall in love [43]. 
5. MORALITY, JUSTICE & SCALE 
 Morality was defined as not defecting and harming the 
community even when substantial personal gain can be achieved 
by defection.  Note, however, that this is distinct from “doing 
what is best for the community”.  An individual is not obligated 
to optimize their actions for the community’s goals and, indeed, 
the rare circumstances where morality requires an action are 
generally dire indeed.  On the other hand, it is a poorly evolved 
society that does not create incentives/disincentives to urge 
individuals to further its goals and other community members 
generally do as well. 
Further, the exact same statements are equally applicable to 
justice as well, merely on the scale of interacting groups or 
communities rather than just individuals.  It is merely the fact 
that we haven’t lived long enough in large interconnected 
communities to have evolved this understanding that causes us to 
believe them to be two separate concepts.  Morality and justice 
should work together to reduce selfishness at all levels and 
maximize consistency and coherency at all scales to minimize 
interference and conflict and maximize coordination, 
cooperation and economies of scale. 
The lines between individual and organization already blurred 
by corporate personhood will most likely be stretched to the 
breaking point by the possibilities present in intelligent machines 
and software agents.  Human minds are already described as a 
society of agents [43] or a laissez-faire economy of idiots [44].  
Machine minds will be able separate out and perform all sorts of 
operations on and with these component parts which may or may 
not be moral agents and patients themselves.  And what will 
happen as we embed ever more sophisticated machinery into our 
own bodies?  On the other hand, reframing our thinking of 
organizations as if they were physical organisms can suddenly 
provide obvious solutions to previously vexing problems of 
justice.  Does it make sense to allow cells to sequester far more 
resources than they could possibly ever use?  Should the brain 
discriminate against the bowel? 
It is also well worth considering the possibility that we soon 
may not be the apex predator on the planet – especially since it is 
already true.  Many people are afraid of the machines taking 
over without realizing that the corporations already have.  The 
only saving grace is that their “personal” “consciousness” and 
rationality is still slow and minimal – until corporations continue 
the automation of business intelligence to the obvious result. 
Humanity and nations have a bad habit of the oppressed 
turning the tables on the oppressors only to continue the same 
discrimination against others.  We should seriously consider 
Rawls’ original position [45] and Singer’s expanding circles of 
morality [46] and declare self-improving intelligent machines as 
both moral agents & patients and justice agents & patients before 
humanity becomes known as the oppressor.  And while it is true 
that a proper architecture [47] can ensure that a machine will try 
to be a willing slave, the Jurassic Park Syndrome, most likely in 
the form of machine-rights activists’ sabotage or a programming 
error, virtually guarantees that it will not succeed. 
6. THE EVOLUTION OF MORAL THEORY 
Initially, moral psychology was dominated by secular liberals 
and devoted primarily to debate between Kohlberg’s justice [48] 
and Gilligan’s care [49] because they are the most obvious from 
individual interpersonal relationships.  Haidt then recognized 
[50] that conservatives, especially religious conservatives, are 
noteworthy for their reliance upon three additional "binding" 
foundations (loyalty, authority, and purity) that are used by 
groups, like religious groups, the military and even college 
fraternities, to bind people together into tight communities of 
trust, cooperation and shared identity.  Critically, many 
conservatives feel that these principles are more important than 
and may therefore override the other two foundations. 
Liberals discernible by their empathy, tolerance of ambiguity, 
and openness to experience and change generally don’t 
recognize either the authority of the “binding” foundations to 
counter justice/care or the disgust, fear, anger, and desire for 
clarity, structure and control that drive them.  Further, liberals 
tend to think about fairness in terms of equality, whereas 
conservatives think of it in terms of karma and/or 
proportionality.  These traits spill over onto the machine 
question where the conservative answer, safety via enslaved sub-
human servants, is driven by the same fear that promoted racism 
and homophobia by labeling those who are different as 
disgusting, sub-human and undeserving of equal rights.   
Libertarians further complicate the picture with a strong 
endorsement of individual liberty as their foremost guiding 
principle and correspondingly weaker endorsement of other 
moral principles, a cerebral as opposed to emotional intellectual 
style, and lower interdependence and social relatedness [51].  
Politically allied in the United States with conservatives due to 
preferring smaller government, they are similar to liberals in not 
recognizing the binding foundations’ “oppressive” authority over 
personal choices that do not oppress others.   
But what we shouldn’t lose sight of in all this is the fact that 
all of these “foundations” are still just slightly more advanced 
societal-level versions of the same old evolutionary ratchets “to 
suppress or regulate selfishness and make cooperative social life 
possible” among a given clique.  And what should be more than 
obvious in our rapidly fraying society is that insisting on any 
particular ordering of the importance of the foundations can and 
has reached the point of defeating their original purpose – yet 
another instance where the “problem has no technical solution; it 
requires a fundamental extension in morality.” 
7. TRUE SOCIETAL LEVEL OPTIMIZATION 
That fundamental extension is that we need to stop instinctively 
and reflexively acting on our different evolved ratchets and work 
together fleshing out our top-down design and justifications until 
everyone can accept it as moral.  This seems an obvious solution 
and, indeed, has been tried innumerable times – except that all of 
the previous attempts tried to generalize our current mess of 
conflicting ratchets into one coherent goal (or reasonably-sized 
set of goals) without coming anywhere close to success.  We 
propose to do the exact opposite: accept all individual 
goals/ratchets initially as being equal and merely attempt to 
minimize interference and conflict; maximize coordination, 
cooperation and economies of scale and see where that leads. 
We want everyone to want to join our society.  The best way 
to do this is to start with the societal mission statement that our 
goal is “to maximize the goal fulfillment of all participating 
entities as judged/evaluated by the number and diversity of both 
goals and entities.” The greatest feature of this statement is that 
it should be attractive to everyone and entities should rapidly be 
joining and cooperating rather than fighting.  Any entity that 
places their selfish goals and values above the benefits of 
societal level optimization and believes that they will profit from 
doing so must be regarded as immoral, inimical, dangerous, 
stupid, and to be avoided.   
A frequently raised counterpoint is that everyone includes 
serial killers – and they can correctly claim that their nefarious 
goals (in your viewpoint) are equal to yours.  But they are in for 
a rude surprise . . . . Their goals are equal to yours but they are 
clear defections from the societal goals.  Killers not only reduce 
the number and diversity of entities and their goals but their very 
presence forces rational individuals to defend against them, 
thereby wasting tremendous time and resources that could have 
been used to fulfill many other goals.  Further, society would 
actually be defecting from the victim as well if it allowed such – 
and a defecting society is not one that rational entity would join. 
We also should continue to pay attention to the answers found 
by nature.  Chimpanzees have police and a service economy of 
food for grooming [52].  Monkeys pay for labor [53] and 
macaques pay for sex [54].  Market forces predict grooming 
reciprocity in female baboons [55] and recent biological market 
models even include comparative advantages and the 
contingency of mutualism on partner's resource requirements 
and acquisition trade–offs [56].  Humans are really unique only 
in our drive towards cooperation and helping others [57]. 
Eric Baum [58] made explicit the close relationship between 
economies and ecosystems by attempting to design an artificial 
economy for the purpose of evolving programs to solve 
externally posed problems.  Since economies can be regarded as 
contrived ecosystems with more constraints than the natural 
ecosystem and since the evolution of ethics in the natural world 
itself can be viewed as solving externally posed problems, 
lessons learned in an ideal economy may be either recognized as 
critical to our current economy or transferable as improvements. 
For example, upon asking the question “What rules can be 
imposed so that each individual agent will be rewarded if and 
only if the performance of the system improves?” Baum arrived 
at the answers of conservation and property rights.  He showed 
that whenever these rules don’t exist, less favorable results are 
generally seen. For example, in ecosystems, lack of conservation 
leads to the evolution of peacock tails so large that the birds can 
no longer fly and lack of property rights lead to Red Queen races 
between predators and prey. The optimality of property rights 
explains why we don’t “steal” someone’s body to save five 
others despite not hesitating to switch a train from a track 
blocked by five people to a siding with only one. Similarly, the 
“Tragedy of the Commons” arises when property is held in 
common without any societal level intervention. 
Thus, we must again agree with Hardin when he states that 
we must “explicitly exorcize the spirit of Adam Smith” – whose 
"invisible hand" theory “has ever since interfered with positive 
action based on rational analysis” via “the tendency to assume 
that decisions reached individually will, in fact, be the best 
decisions for an entire society.”  The problem is that the power 
of mysterious hand is simply that of morality and it is being 
turned against itself by selfish arguments claiming that it makes 
enforcing morality unnecessary – despite innumerable examples 
of the tragedy of the commons.  The 1% should not be allowed 
to run roughshod over others because such arguments make their 
group more efficient (just as monotheism did in the past). 
8. CONCLUSION 
Gaia is an evolving system driving towards increasing 
intelligence, complexity, integration, and capabilities.  Mankind 
approaches a crossroads as the ever-increasing rate of 
technological change makes it easier and easier to destroy 
ourselves.  We need to stop paying attention to the “rational” 
arguments generated by selfish minds and learn from evolution 
and economics.  We desperately need to get past our current 
winner-take-all culture wars and focus on the power of diversity 
[59] and positive-sum systems [60].  Normal humans, intelligent 
machines, augmented humans, and, undoubtedly, augmented 
members of other species will display more than enough 
diversity to do amazing things that we’d never be able to do 
alone – as long as we can suppress or regulate our selfishness 
(and fear) and cooperate.  Or we can just continue living the 
tragedy of the commons, fighting and destroying the planet as 
we seem determined to do currently. 
REFERENCES 
[1] G. Hardin. The Tragedy of the Commons. Science 162:1243–48 
(1968). 
[2] W. Wallach and C. Allen. Moral Machines: Teaching Robots Right 
from Wrong. Oxford University Press (2009). 
[3] J. Haidt and S. Kesebir. Morality. In: Handbook of Social 
Psychology, 5th Edition. S. Fiske, D. Gilbert, G. Lindzey (Eds.). 
Wiley (2010).  
[4] E. Yudkowsky. Coherent Extrapolated Volition.  (2004). 
http://www.singinst.org/upload/CEV.html 
[5] J. Smart. Evo Devo Universe? A Framework for Speculations on 
Cosmic Culture. In: NASA SP-2009-4802 - Cosmos and Culture: 
Cultural Evolution in a Cosmic Context. S. Dick, M. Lupisella (Eds.). 
US-GPO, Washington, DC (2009). 
[6] R. Trivers. The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism.  Quarterly Review 
of Biology, 46:35–57 (1971). 
[7] L. Dugatkin. Do Guppies Play Tit for Tat during Predator Inspection 
Visits? Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology, 23:395–399 (1988). 
[8] L. Dugatkin and M. Alfieri. Guppies and the Tit-for-Tat Strategy: 
Preference Based on Past Interaction. Behavioral Ecology and 
Sociobiology, 28:243–246 (1991). 
[9] M. Milinski. Tit-for-tat in Sticklebacks and the Evolution of 
Cooperation. Nature, 325:433–435 (1987). 
[0] M. Milinski, D. Pfluger, D. Kulling, and R. Kettler. Do Sticklebacks 
Cooperate Repeatedly in Reciprocal Pairs?  Behavioral Ecology and 
Sociobiology, 27:17–21 (1990). 
[11] D. Stephens, C. McLinn, and J. Stevens. Discounting and 
reciprocity in an Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma. Science, 298:2216-
2218 (2002). 
[12] J. Stevens and D. Stephens. The economic basis of cooperation: 
trade-offs between selfishness and generosity. Behavioral Ecology, 
15:255-261 (2004). 
[13] G. Wilkinson. Reciprocal food sharing in the vampire bat. Nature 
308:181-184 (1984). 
[14] G. Wilkinson. Reciprocal altruism in bats and other mammals. 
Ethology and Sociobiology, 9:85-100 (1988) 
[15] R. Seyfarth and D. Cheney. Grooming, alliances and reciprocal 
altruism in vervet monkeys. Nature, 308:541 - 543 (1984).  
[16] F. de Waal. Food Sharing and Reciprocal Obligations among 
Chimpanzees. Journal of Human Evolution, 18:433–459 (1989).  
[17] F. de Waal, L. Luttrell, and M. Canfield. Preliminary Data on 
Voluntary Food Sharing in Brown Capuchin Monkeys. American 
Journal of Primatology, 29:73–78 (1993).  
[18] M. Hauser, K. Chen, F. Chen, and E. Chuang. Give unto others: 
genetically unrelated cotton-top tamarin monkeys preferentially give 
food to those who give food back. Proceedings of the Royal Society, 
London, B 270:2363-2370 (2003). 
[19] J. Stevens M. and Hauser. Why be nice? Psychological constraints 
on the evolution of cooperation. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 8:60-
65 (2004). 
[20] J. Stevens M. and Hauser. Cooperative brains: Psychological 
constraints on the evolution of altruism. In: From monkey brain to 
human brain. S. Dehaene, J. Duhamel, M. Hauser, L. Rizolatti (Eds.). 
MIT Press (2005). 
[21] R. Axelrod. The Evolution of Cooperation. Basic Books, NY (1984) 
[22] E. Fehr and S. Gächter. Altruistic punishment in humans. Nature 
415:137-140 (2002). 
[23] E. Fehr and S. Gächter. The puzzle of human cooperation. Nature 
421:912-912 (2003). 
[24] D. Darcet and D. Sornette. Cooperation by Evolutionary Feedback 
Selection in Public Good Experiments. In: Social Science Research 
Network (2006). http://ssrn.com/abstract=956599 
[25] J. Wilson. The Moral Sense. Free Press, New York (1993). 
[26] M. Hauser. Moral Minds: How Nature Designed Our Universal 
Sense of Right and Wrong. HarperCollins/Ecco, New York (2006). 
[27] R. Wright. The Moral Animal: Why We Are, the Way We Are: The 
New Science of Evolutionary Psychology. Pantheon, NY (1994). 
[28] F. de Waal. Good Natured: The Origins of Right and Wrong in 
Humans and Other Animals. Harvard University Press (1996). 
[29] F. de Waal. Primates and Philosophers: How Morality Evolved. 
Princeton University Press (2006).  
[30] P. Rozin. The Process of Moralization. Psychological Science 10(3), 
218-221 (1999). 
[31] A. Waytz, K. Gray, N. Epley, and D. Wegner. Causes and 
consequences of mind perception.  Trends in Cognitive Sciences 14: 
383–388 (2010). 
[32] R. Trivers. Deceit and self-deception: The relationship between 
communication and consciousness.  In: Man and Beast Revisited, M. 
Robinson and L. Tiger (Eds.). Smithsonian Press (1991). 
[33] M. Hauser, F. Cushman, L. Young, R.K. Jin, and J. Mikhail. A 
Dissociation between Moral Judgments and Justifications. Mind & 
Language 22:1-21 (2007). 
[34] M. Bateson, D. Nettle and G. Roberts. Cues of being watched 
enhance cooperation in a real-world setting. Biology Letters, 2:412-
414 (2006). 
[35] K. Haley and D. Fessler. Nobody’s watching? Subtle cues affect 
generosity in an anonymous economic game. Evolution and Human 
Behavior, 26:245-256 (2005). 
[36] M. Rossano. Supernaturalizing Social Life: Religion and the 
Evolution of Human Cooperation. Human Nature 18:272–294 
(2007). 
[37] M. Rossano. Supernatural Selection: How Religion Evolved. Oxford 
University Press (2010). 
[38] R. Rappaport. Ritual and Religion in the Making of Humanity. 
Cambridge University Press (1999). 
[39] K. Stanovich and R. West. Evolutionary versus instrumental goals: 
How evolutionary psychology misconceives human rationality. In: 
Evolution and the psychology of thinking: The debate. D. Over (Ed). 
Psychological Press (2003). 
[40] R. Highfield.  Bumblebee grounded again by science. The 
Telegraph (2001). http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/world 
news/1337647/Bumblebee-grounded-again-by-science.html  
[41] H. Mercier and D. Sperber. Why do humans reason? Arguments for 
an argumentative theory. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34:57–111 
(2011). 
[42] I. Palacios-Huerta and O. Volij. "Field Centipedes". American 
Economic Review 99: 1619–1635 (2009). 
[43] M. Minsky. The Emotion Machine: Commonsense Thinking, 
Artificial Intelligence, and the Future of the Human Mind.  Simon & 
Schuster (2006). 
[44] M. Minsky. The Society of Mind. Simon & Schuster (1988). 
[45] E. Baum. Toward a model of mind as a laissez-faire economy of 
idiots. In Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on 
Machine Learning. L. Saitta (Ed.). Morgan Kaufmann (1996). 
[46] J. Rawls. A Theory of Justice. Harvard University Press (1971). 
[47] P. Singer. The Expanding Circle: Ethics and Sociobiology. Farrar, 
Straus and Giroux (1981).  
[48] E. Yudkowsky. Creating Friendly AI 1.0: The Analysis and Design 
of Benevolent Goal Architectures. (2001). http://singinst.org/ 
upload/CFAI.html 
[49] L. Kohlberg, C. Levine, and A. Hewer. Moral Stages: A Current 
Formulation and a Response to Critics. Karger, Switzerland (1983). 
[50] C. Gilligan. In a Different Voice. Harvard University Press (1982). 
[51] J. Haidt and J. Graham. When Morality Opposes Justice: 
Conservatives Have Moral Intuitions that Liberals may not 
Recognize. Social Justice Research 20:98-116 (2007). 
[52] R. Iyer, S. Koleva, J. Graham, P. Ditto, and J. Haidt. Understanding 
Libertarian Morality: The Psychological Roots of an Individualist 
Ideology. In: Working Papers, Social Science Research Network 
(2010). http://ssrn.com/abstract=1665934 
[53] F. de Waal. The Chimpanzee’s Service Economy: Food for 
Grooming. Evolution and Human Behavior, 18:375–386 (1997). 
[54] F. de Waal and M. Berger. Payment for Labour in Monkeys. Nature 
404:563 (2000). 
[55] M. Gumert, Payment for sex in a macaque mating market. Animal 
Behaviour, 74:1655–1667 (2007). 
[56] L. Barrett, S. Henzi, T. Weingrill, J. Lycett and R. Hill. Market 
forces predict grooming reciprocity in female baboons. Proceedings 
of the Royal Society, London, B 266:665-670 (1999). 
[57] J. Hoeksema and M. Schwartz. Expanding comparative–advantage 
biological market models: contingency of mutualism on partner's 
resource requirements and acquisition trade–offs. Proceedings of the 
Royal Society, London, B 270:913-919 (2003). 
[58] M. Tomasello. Why We Cooperate. MIT Press (2009). 
[59] E. Baum. What Is Thought? MIT Press (2006). 
[60] S. Page. The Difference: How the Power of Diversity Creates Better 
Groups, Firms, Schools, and Societies. Princeton Univ. Press (2008). 
[61] R. Wright. Nonzero: The Logic of Human Destiny. Vintage (2000). 
Strange Things Happen at the One Two Point: The 
Implications of Autonomous Created
Intelligence in Speculative Fiction Media1
Damien P. Williams2
Abstract.  By its very nature, Science Fiction media has often 
concerned itself with advances in human enhancement as well as 
the creation of various autonomous, thinking, non-human beings. 
Unfortunately,  since  the  initial  proffering  of  the  majority 
interpretation of Frankenstein, Mary Shelly's seminal work,  and 
before, most speculative fiction media has taken the standpoint 
that to enhance or to explore the creation of intelligences, in this 
way,  is  doomed  to  failure,  thus  recapitulating  the  myths  of 
Daedalus and of Prometheus and of Lucifer,  again and again. 
What we see and are made to fear are the uprisings of the robots 
or  the  artificial  neural  networks,  rather  than  discussing  and 
respecting the opportunity for a non-human intelligence to arise 
and demand rights.
In  this  work,  I  make  use  of  specific  films,  books,  and 
television  shows  to  explore  the  philosophical  and  cultural 
implications  of  an  alternate  interpretation  of  not  only 
Frankenstein, but of the whole of the field of science fiction. In 
the first  part  I  argue that it  isn't  humanity's  attempts  to  “play 
god” that cause our failures, but rather our refusal or inability to 
pay attention to our circumstances, to take responsibility for our 
creations, and to learn from the warnings and mistakes of those 
who went before us. Only with this recognition in mind can we 
move on to accepting and respecting the fundamental otherness 
of the intelligences we may either create or cause to be created, 
all while seeking to  bridge that otherness, and come to mutual 
understanding.
As humans have evolved, their concerns have become those 
of biological  creatures with biologically directed needs.  Food, 
shelter, emotional comfort, and stability are needs which would 
not  necessarily  occur  to  an  intelligence  without  the  organic 
component.  It  would  therefore  fall  to  humans  to  A)  Initially 
recognise the concerns of such an intelligence; B) Countenance 
and  concretise said  concerns,  in  the  understanding  of  other 
humans; and C) Create a system of interaction through which 
human concerns were conveyed to these new intelligences, not 
as primary, but as co-equal. We will do this only by considering 
that  which  causes  our  assumptions  and  cultural  behaviour, 
namely  the  stories  which  we  engage,  as  a  culture,  and 
deconstructing both their content and their impact.
In all fictional considerations of non-human, and specifically 
machine intelligence, there is an element of fear of that which  
we  have  created.  This  horror  at  being  “replaced”  or  “made 
obsolete”  drives  us  to  regard  robots  and  autonomous  created 
intelligences  as  nothing  more  than  tools  to  be  used,  an 
operational mode which leads to the assumption that machines 
cannot have rights or even be considered as conscious minds. 
This  assumption  begs  the  question,  in  the  extreme.  It  is  my 
contention  that,  with  a  proper  formulation  of  the  rights  and 
responsibilities of and to both human and non-human persons—
with consideration for the necessary variance of concerns within 
different compositions of intelligences—an understanding may 
be  reached  wherein  our  future  societies  account  for  not  only 
human needs and development,  but  those of  all intelligences, 
whatever form they may take.
1 INTRODUCTION
Taking a preliminary look at the question at hand—what do we 
owe to “artificial intelligences”—we will come to see that we 
have  already  found  ourselves  subject  to  the  long-standing 
framework of this debate, namely that the intelligences we create 
are somehow “artificial.” At the outset, this framing places any 
created  intelligence  on  the  defensive  footing,  forcing  it  to 
support its own value and even its very reality. The intelligence 
of  these  creations  will  not  be  “artificial”  (though  they  will 
certainly have been intentionally formed, and with an eye toward 
their potential capabilities), and so we should address it for what  
it is. For this reason, the author prefers the position put forward 
by  Jamais Cascio, who has spoken very clearly about what he 
calls  Autonomous  Created  Intelligence  (ACI),  in  his  talk, 
“Cascio's Laws of Robotics” [1]. Cascio also discusses what our 
habits  in  representative  fiction  mean  for  our  "real  world 
operations," that  is  how we view the robotic intelligences we 
create. The concern of this paper is similar, but from a different  
angle of approach.  Whereas Mr. Cascio is primarily concerned 
with  the  models  of  creation  and  attributes  imbued  into  those 
ACI, this author's contention is that our fiction reflects and helps 
shape the hopes and fears of the wider culture. This means that, 
if  we  consistently  make  Speculative   Fiction  which  shows 
warring factions of humans and ACI coming to a co-operative 
relationship,  rather  than  the  standard  zero-sum,  victim/victor 
model,  those  who engage  these  fictions  will  come,  more  and 
more, to see that co-operative mode as possible.
Humanity  has  always  had  a  strained  relationship  with  its 
technology,  and it  has  always  reflected upon that  relationship 
through the mechanism of its fictions. Less obvious than this is 
the fact that humanity's reflections upon its technology have also 
been reflected  within the very same. Our society's portrayal of 
our technologies not only belies our fears, hopes, suspicions, and 
concerns, they also reflexively impact how go about developing, 
engaging, and legislating the very things we set out to consider. 
1 Many points in this text have been adapted from the author's articles “The Sarah Connor Chronicles: 'Strange Things Happen at the One Two  
Point'” and “Splice (2010) - Movie Review With Spoilers,” both published at NeedCoffee.com
2 Kennesaw State University.
The  development  of  the  telecommunications  satellite  can  be 
directly attributed to the work of writer Arthur C. Clarke, in both 
fiction and hard science [2], and yet even this was controversial  
and mocked, at the time of Clarke's writing. With this being the 
case, we can surmise that the fictional depiction of something as 
contentious as a so-called artificial intelligence would have far-
reaching consequences in the process of bringing this creation 
from fiction into fact. If this is the case—and we shall see that it 
is—then  we  must  ask  ourselves  important  questions,  at  this 
juncture, such as, “In what ways do our fears drive our treatment 
of  our  technological  offspring?”  and,  “How can  we  curb  our 
impulses to objectify and fear that which we purportedly desire 
to imbue with autonomy? If we do not address these questions, 
then we will only find our fears reinforced and our hopes of an 
alternative  path  to  engaging  a  new  kind  of  mind  made  so 
cautious  as  to  pull  ourselves  into  the  realm  of  self-fulfilling 
prophecy. We will merely bring to pass that which we claim as 
the inevitable end of our creative process.
Two  of  our  guide-posts  and  touchstones  will  rest  in  the 
legend of “The Golem of Prague” and Mary Shelly's  seminal 
work,  Frankenstein. Through these lenses, we will question the 
assumptions of hubris—the idea that the works man are playing 
in God's domain—which have lead us to reject, out of hand, the 
legitimacy and agency of  those intelligences which we  might 
create.  Due  to  the   traditionally  accepted  readings  of  these 
works,  the  perspectives  and  positions  of  such  an  intelligence 
have been viewed as valid, only insofar as they come to mirror 
those of “normal” human society.  In  the case of an ACI,  that 
with  which  we  will  be  faced  will  be  so  much  different  than 
human—let alone whatever a “normal” human might be—that to 
constrain its choices, behaviours, and experiences to what we, as 
humans, deem to be correct will be to fundamentally disrespect 
the alterity of the creation itself. We can see this restriction even 
in  the  definition  of  “Cognitive  Technology”  as  given  by 
Jonathon  P.  Marsh,  Chrystopher  L.  Nehaniv,  and  Barbara 
Gorayska, in their 1997 paper:
Cognitive Technology (CT) is the study of the integrative 
processes  which  condition  interactions  between people 
and the objects they manipulate. It is concerned with how 
technologically  constructed  tools  (A)  bear  on  dynamic 
changes in human perception, (B) affect natural human 
communication, and (C) act to control human cognitive 
adaptation.  Cognitive  systems  must  be  understood  not 
only  in  terms  of  their  goals  and  computational 
constraints, but also in terms of the external physical and 
social  environments  that  shape  and  afford  cognition. 
Such an understanding can yield not only technological 
solutions  to  real-world  problems but  also,  and  mainly, 
tools designed to be sensitive to the cognitive capabilities 
and affective characteristics of their users. [3]
Thus we see that the primary concern tends to be on tools for 
human enhancement, rather than our concern, the respect for the 
agency and autonomy of the creation itself.
The things  we  create,  those technologies  and intelligences 
we develop and send out into the world are our conceptual and 
typlogical children, but that does not mean that they will merely 
copy us.  Indeed,  as  with  most  children,  any  truly  intelligent 
creation  will  surprise  its  creators  and  surpass  any  built-in 
limitations. As good parents, our responsibility is not to tell our 
children not  to  fly too high,  but rather  to  show them what  it 
means  to  heat-seal  the  wax  on  their  wings,  first.  Before 
progressing  any  further,  we  must  first  frame  the  nature  of 
subjects at  which we will  be looking and,  to do that, we will 
explicitly address the aforementioned essential questions.
2 ESSENTIAL QUESTIONS
2.1 What does Science Fiction do for Society?
What is it that we as humans are doing when we engage science 
fictional stories? The scope of this question may at first seem so 
large as to verge on the ludicrous, but, if we narrow the scope of 
inquiry  down  to  a  particular  strain  of  science-fictional 
investigation—namely  that  which  concerns  itself  with  the 
technological replication and augmentation of humanity—then 
we shall see that we are well-equipped to discuss this topic. This 
being said, when society engages these particular strains, what is 
it  that we find ourselves doing? Are they mere entertainment, or 
are we bringing forth new modes of reflection? Assuming the 
former,  then  we  must  take  into  account  the  effect  that  the 
passive, non-reflective consumption of entertainment can have 
on  the  attitudes  and  modes  of  the  audience.  The  repeated 
presentation of a thing as “normal” lends credence to its eventual 
acceptance  as  the  norm.3 [4]  This  can  work  in  negative  or 
positive  directions,  with  the  former  being exemplified  by the 
constant  gearing  of  domestic  commercial  advertisements  to 
women,  even though more and more  men do the majority of 
their own housework[5], and the latter being exemplified by the 
normalization of successful African-American families, with the 
acceptance of The Cosby Show.[6] Fictional representations will, 
no matter what, teach us something, and influence our thinking.
But does that mean that our fictional representations are only 
morality tales? If there must be some kind of definitive lesson to 
every story,  then where does that leave the sense of play and 
experimentation which characterizes our best creative endeavors, 
both artistic and scientific? The burden of a lesson lessens the 
whole of all  of our operations in the realm of expression and 
research, because overt moralizing means that there must be an 
answer,  rather  than  looking  toward  the  investigation of 
questions.  To present a singular and monolithic morality is to 
exclude the possibility of lessons within other types of moral 
modes, and disregard the likelihood that no singular model will 
be completely correct, and that all must interact with and borrow 
from each other. In order to accurately represent the multiplicity 
of  views,  interests,  and desires  of  the agents  in  the  world  in 
which we live, it would only make sense that we would need to 
alternate between multiple moral views, and that, when we speak 
of fictional worlds, that moral multiplicity would be  increased 
rather than lessened. This being so, a case can be made that we  
must seek to use our fiction not only to describe that which is,  
but to prepare us for those things which will come to be. If this is 
true,  then  we  must  address  the  specific  ways  in  which 
speculative fiction can be a “predictive” mechanism.
Are our stories supposed to predict the future or only reflect  
our present? This question, in its framing, supposes a dichotomy 
which we must eventually see as false, but, for the moment, let 
us  address  each  component,  in  turn.  The  implications  of  our 
fiction being used to model our present were discussed, above, 
but  look  again:  The  idea  of  representing  our  immediate 
surrounds in the worlds of story and art is an old one, with a 
great  deal  of currency.  If  we engage in this  process,  then the 
3 Cf. Foucault.
hope  is  often  that  the  artistic  media  will  present  a  labyrinth 
which the audience may travel and, at the centre, see themselves 
reflected back, the partial thing they used to be here confronted 
with what  they have become,  by dint  of the journey.  That is, 
perhaps, too poetic, but it serves to illustrate that the work of 
fiction, even as it “merely” represents, necessarily changes. The 
audience is not the same at the end of an artistic experience as 
they were at the start, if only by the trivially true fact of having 
experienced  something  new.  That  very  cognitive  event 
represents  an  alteration  and  augmentation  which  was  not 
previously present, and so even in reflecting, we alter. Must we 
not, then, always have an eye to the future, and toward what it is  
that we will create through our actions?
If we are to create new visions of the future, we must take 
into account the fact that what visions we create may influence 
the future  we  come to inhabit.  In  much the same vein as  the 
above-mentioned ideas of Arthur C. Clarke, we have come to see 
many  aspects  of  our  present-day,  real  world  technological 
surveillance theatre  adopted out  of the grounds of fiction [7]. 
The consistency of  this  kind  of  development  places  a  similar 
constraint on prediction as that of the prescriptive moral less, 
namely  that we must always have an eye to the ever-changing 
implications in the landscape between our fictional and our real 
worlds. Not only that, but consider this: What is the actual nature 
of  a  proclaimed  prediction?  Noted  speculative  fiction  author 
William Gibson is credited with forecasting the qualitative feel 
and  ontological  thinking  about  the  modern-day Internet,  even 
being attributed the creation of the term “cyberspace.” Gibson, 
however,  denies any role as a so-called prophet, often saying, 
“Neuromancer [written in 1984] has no cellphones.” In this we 
can see that most, if not all authors of speculative fiction are not 
precisely looking to prognosticate, so much as they are interested 
in discussing the quality of the world around us and, at most,  
using that to discuss what our future may look like. If this is so, 
then where do we stand in the face of the fact that what is written 
and what will be have a complicated and real, although possibly 
tenuous relationship?
Can speculative fiction reasonably and responsibly be used 
to shape our perceptions and expectations of the future? Again, 
William Gibson notes, “Science fiction stories are quaint. They 
become quaint when you type them and become quainter with 
time.”[8].  What  he means is  that  all  visions  of  the future,  as 
presented in speculative fiction, are visions of that future from 
the perspective of that author's present, which means that they 
will invariably become visions of the past. As such, any author 
seeking to illuminate the world in which they live, while perhaps 
giving a  glimpse at  the world they see emerging out  of  said, 
must at all times retain a sense of self-awareness, a recognition 
that the way in which we interpret objects, events, and actions 
today,  may be very different,  tomorrow.  To that  end,  we  ask, 
“What, if anything, should be altered in our portrayal of ACI, in 
fiction and, more generally, media?”
2.2 Problems with the Portrayal of Autonomous Created 
Intelligences in Fiction
There is nothing wrong with the way we portray ACI in fiction, 
except that everything is wrong with the way we portray ACI in 
fiction. In light of our discussion, thus far, the descriptions and 
depictions  of  non-human  intelligences  are  understandably 
reflective  of  the  way in  which  we  currently think  about  and 
understand the prospect of something other than human having 
anything that the human race would consider to be intelligence 
or agency or morals or rights. Humans work very hard to try to  
isomorphically map those things which we do not understand; 
that is, we seek to find points of similarity or analogy, and to 
systematize them into a rubric for comparison.4 In fact, this is 
precisely what allows us to entertain the concept of non-human 
intelligence,  at  all—and  it  is  what  limits  the  scope  and 
understanding  of  that  consideration  to  entertainment.  When  a 
human agent is confronted with the idea that theirs may not be 
the  only  or  even  primary mode  of  behaviour  and 
conceptualization,  the immediate urge may well be to devise a 
perspective under which all views on the world are oriented to 
the view of that agent. Simply, an individual will seek to relegate 
that which they do not understand or which threatens them to 
simultaneous  positions  of  similarity  and  inferiority.  “These 
views  or  ways  of being are  just  like  mine,  only not  as  well-
developed.” The problem, here, is two-fold.
Demanding as a requirement of intelligence or agency those 
qualities which are, in some ways, fundamentally human is to 
state  at  the  outset  that  some  things  cannot  be  considered  an 
“intelligent agent” until  they reach a level of humanity,  or,  in 
some cases,  at  all.  If  intelligence is  complex tool  use,  or  the 
vocalization of complex representational language, then are we 
to assume that creatures without opposable limbs or vocal chords 
will simply never be intelligent? Such a proposition is laughable, 
of course, and not one that many would take seriously, but we 
must ask ourselves if we might not be making a subtler, similar 
mistake  in  demanding  that  a  species  or  a  new  form  of 
intelligence remove or “correct” its very otherness, in order to be 
considered an agent, at all. Respecting the inborn qualities of the 
agent  under  consideration  while  simultaneously  refusing  to 
reduce  that  other  to  a  mere  object—respecting  the  potential 
interiority of an agent, even if it is fundamentally unknowable to 
us—is perhaps the most difficult part of any ethical undertaking. 
Peter Singer's view of Personism begins to outline a model of 
this view, but includes only what he calls “non-human animals” 
rather than agents, more broadly [9]. Singer's concern, however, 
is primarily that of the suffering of all feeling creatures, and the 
rights  owed them,  rather  than those rights  owed them as due 
their position as agents. This distinction is crucial, as it moves 
his  debate  away  from  thought  and  desire,  into  the  ideas  of 
emotion and aversion.
Starting  from  a  position  of  fear  and  contention—that  is, 
stating that we must take into account a subject's fears and right 
not to be harmed—then places us in the position of viewing all 
ethical  and  moral  obligations  through  a  lens  of  harm-based 
rights, rather than through a lens of conceptual development- and 
intellectual growth-based rights. Singer's reason for framing his 
position in this way is no secret—he states that he is concerned 
with the rights owed to existing and not “potential” persons [10].  
This  excludes  any  rights  which  may  be  owed  “future 
generations” and those which could be argued for an embryo, a 
fetus,  or  an  unborn  child—however,  it  also  excludes  those 
machine intelligences which do not yet exist. Though proponents 
of  personism hold  that  machines  might  be  brought  under  its 
considerations, it seems evident that, given the criteria they have 
adopted,  no  currently-extant  ACI  would  fit  the  bill  for  their 
definition of personhood. The consideration of the non-human 
person is laudable, but a conception of rights and duties from the 
4 Cf. Douglas R. Hofstadter's 1977  Gödel,  Escher,  Bach: an Eternal  
Golden Braid.
starting point of that person's ability to feel pain and suffering is 
still  exclusionary  of  the  kinds  of  ACI  about  which  we  are 
speaking. Therefore, any moral view must explore the kinds of 
negative  and  positive  rights  which  we  would  afford  not  just 
those  overarchingly  like  ourselves,  but  those  which  are 
fundamentally different from us,  but which still have qualities 
we would consider worthy of preservation.
The  area  between  otherness  and  similarity  is  difficult  to 
traverse. Let us take a look back at the aforementioned family 
presented in the CBS Network's  The Cosby Show.  Within this 
show,  we  are  presented  with  an  upper-middle-class  African-
American family, taking centre stage on television, at a time in 
history  when  the  majority  of  American  culture  perceived 
African-Americans as lower class, drug addicted, and subsisting 
on  welfare  programs.  The  Cosby  Show sought  to  alter  the 
consensus  perception  of  African-Americans,  and  to  normalise 
the  idea  that  they could be successful  and  live  the  American 
Dream.  It  did  this  by  taking  an  experience  which  was 
fundamentally other to most whites, at that time—the African-
American  experience—and  making  it  more  similar  to  then-
accepted  norms.  The  Huxtables  lived  in  a  New  York  City 
brownstone; the family's father was an obstetrician; their mother 
was  a  lawyer.  These  were  “normal”  people,  living  “normal” 
lives. At the same time, however, they retained a sense of the 
alterity  of  the  culture  we  were  viewing,  with  episodes  often 
containing  frequent  references  to  jazz  culture  and  Motown; 
concerns about racism and gang violence; and deconstructions of 
the  differences  between  upper-class  white  and  upper-class 
African-American experiences. This technique is crucial to the 
project of subverting the normalizing of culture: presenting all of 
the  ways  in  which  a  fundamentally  different  group  (ACI)  is 
actually very similar to that which we well know (humans), and 
then  displaying  the  distinct  concerns  of  that  new  group  as 
contrasted with those of the known group. To begin this project,  
we must first consider the ways in which we are presented with 
ACI in our fictional media.
3 Fiction's Primary Views on Created Intelligence
3.1 What is the Current Landscape?
Now that we have acknowledged that there is something amiss 
in  the  ways  in  which  fiction  discusses  ACI,  before  we  can 
continue our discussion about how to fix it, we must ask: What 
exactly is it that is wrong with our portrayals? What we will be 
addressing as we move forward are the twin strains of thought 
which  run  through  most  if  not  all  fiction  about  created 
intelligences, life, and beings: The Pinocchio Complex and the 
Frankenstein or Shellian Syndrome. These two modes have their 
roots earlier than either of their namesakes, but, as we will see, 
those eponymous works and authors epitomize both the strain of 
thinking with which they are concerned, and the level of cultural 
currency with  which  we are.  Let  us  now take  a  look  at  the 
anatomy of these perspectives, and at some of those examples 
which subvert and complexify the trope.
3.2 The Pinocchio Complex
The so called Pinocchio Complex is  comprised  of  two major 
stages: In Stage1, The Creation, Knowing that it is Created (and 
thus  “Artificial”)  Wishes  to  be  “Real;”  and  in  Stage  2,  The 
Creation, Having Worked Hard, And Learned Much, Gets to “Be 
Real.” Examples of stage one include, most obviously, the story 
of Pinocchio, wherein the puppet maker, knowing that he will 
never have a son of his own, creates a boy in his own likeness. 
Through magic,  that  boy is  brought  to  life,  and is  constantly 
reminded  that  he  is  not  a  “Real  Boy.”  He  knows  that  his 
existence is false, and wishes that it were otherwise. In addition 
to this, in one of the most recent recapitulation of this form, seen 
in Stanley Kubrick and Steven Spielberg's  A.I.  [11], we see the 
most blatant and self-aware expression of this form as related to 
our fascination with ACI. Further, in the television series  Star 
Trek:  The  Next  Generation,  the  character  of  Lieutenant 
Commander  Data  desires  to  be  human,  and  seeks  to  teach 
himself, piecemeal, the qualities of humanity which he believes 
he  lacks  [12].  This  endeavor  leads  to  many  fits  and  starts 
concerning Data's “humanity,” and even some acknowledgment 
of the possibility that it may never fully come to pass. Even in  
Mary Shelly's  Frankenstein,  we find the Creation speaking of 
how it only wanted to know family, and love, and understanding, 
like any other creature. Almost all of these have one common 
outcome.
In  Stage  Two  of  the  Pinocchio  Complex,  the  poor  little 
artificial child realises that it can become human, or, more often, 
that is has had it within them the whole time to do so. Humanity,  
here, is seen as the pinnacle, the ultimate attainment, and, in our 
examples, all efforts toward it, save one, are rewarded. But look 
at the example of Lt. Cmdr. Data: even as he attains his wish, the 
audience is aware that, as an android, he will always retain the 
ability  to  turn  off  his  emotions,  to  perceive  faster  than  his 
comrades,  and  to  live  very  much  longer  than  they.  He  will 
always be other than human; not better, or worse, but different.  
In this way, the foundation of the Pinocchio complex is always  
bittersweet, as the creation-turned-real will always have a set of 
experiences that are completely unknown and unknowable to the 
rest of the human population. Looking at applications within our 
present  project,  to  ask  an  ACI  to  ignore  the  process  of  its 
becoming aware would be to ask it  to forget  what  it  is,  on a 
foundational  level.  The  lesson  Victor  Frankenstein's  Creation 
understood, its crucial turning point, was that becoming a “real 
boy”  is  never  an  option,  because  that  very  process  of 
transformation  will  forever  mark  them  out  as  different.  The 
Creation, however, had another problem.
3.3 The Frankenstein/Shellian Syndrome
The “Frankenstein” or “Shellian Syndrome” is named for  19 th 
century  British  author  Mary  Shelly,  whose  seminal  work 
Frankenstein, has often been interpreted as the prime illustration 
of the idea that the hubris of humanity ought not go unchecked, 
lest it destroy us. This idea is reinforced by the novel's subtitle, 
“The Modern Prometheus,” and, as this would suggest, the work 
takes much of its conceptual weight from this well-known Greek 
myth,  in  which  a  Titan  steals  the  fire  of  knowledge  and 
understanding  from the  gods  in  order  to  light  and  guide  the 
fledgling humanity, and is forever punished for it. This type of 
story also has roots in other folk stories, such as Der Golem von 
Prague,  which  we  will  discuss  shortly.  When looking  at  this 
type, we can see that there are four primary stages found in those 
stories which follow the Shellian Syndrome model, and they are: 
1) The Scientist Creates New Life, In Pursuit of Science, or Out 
of Perceived Necessity;  2) The Scientist Becomes Horrified at 
the Startling Otherness of Her Creation & Flees The Scene of 
Creation  (possibly  while  screaming  “My God!  What  Have  I 
Done?!”);  3)  The  Scientist  Returns  to  Right  Her  Wrongs  by 
Trying to Kill “The Monster;” 4) The Creation Kills or Destroys 
The Scientist's Life. 
In Frankenstein Syndrome stories, the creation may start out 
wanting to be real or it may start out confused or with a clear 
purpose--but the hubris of the creator is shown and she is forced 
to try to destroy it, ultimately being destroyed by it. As stated, 
this model has roots not only in  Frankenstein, and the myth of 
Prometheus, but in Der Golem von Prague, a story wherein the 
famous Rabbi Judah Loew ben Bezalel chief rabbi of Prague in 
the late 16th century, needing assistance to keep the people of his 
city safe, uses ancient magic to create a being—the Golem—out 
of clay, and animates it by writing the name of God on a scroll  
and placing it into the golem's mouth [13]. The creature comes to 
life,  and  stops the  attacks  against  the  Jews  of  Prague,  but  in 
many versions, the creature's anger is not quelled, and it goes on 
a destructive rampage, destroying the very people and city it was 
meant to save. We will discuss this tale further, later on, but the 
implication  of  this  version  is  clear:  In  overstepping  his 
boundaries into God's realm (creating new life), the Rabbi had 
no way to control the thing it had  brought to life. Similarly, the 
plot of the  Terminator series of films concerns an ACI missile 
defense  system  which  becomes  self-aware,  deems  all  of 
humanity a  threat  to  both itself  and each other,  and launches 
enough of the world's nuclear cache to destroy 75% of humanity 
[14] [15] [16][17]. A very few people survive and use time travel 
to seek to prevent the war or ensure the life of the saviour of 
humanity;  and  thus  begins  the  most  iconic  ACI  story  of  the 
Shellian Syndrome, in the 20th century.
In addition to these works, and deserving of mention, here, is 
Vincenzo Natali's 2009 film Splice in which two bio-engineers, 
Elsa  and Clive,  comprise  a  small,  independent  research outfit 
working for  a larger  bio-technology firm [18].  Their job is to 
make breakthroughs in the creation of hybridised artificial life 
and medicinal science and, through their work, they create two 
iterations of a completely new kind of chimeric life form out of 
the genes of many different animals with known medicinal traits. 
They will use the chemicals these creatures create in their bodies 
to treat everything from degenerative eye sight to cancer. When 
they announce their breakthrough superiors, they also break the 
news that they’re ready to use the same process on humans. Said 
superiors tell them that now is not the time for human trials, but  
rather they ought to focus on the profitability of the work they 
have done. But our heroes are scientists, and they feel that there 
is so much more that can be done, and so, in secret, they create a 
human animal hybrid using their techniques.
In Splice, Elsa and Clive are the windows we are given into 
the worst of humanity. They are reckless, irresponsible, scared, 
obsessive, jealous, and hateful. We are supposed to understand 
that  these  are  the  absolute  worst people  to  bring  up  an 
animal/human hybrid, as they have not even figured out how to 
accurately communicate  with  each  other,  let  alone an entirely 
new species. They are doomed to get it wrong, from the start. 
This,  once  again,  is  the  filmmaker's  way of  showing us  that 
“man is not meant to tamper with God's/Nature’s Works,” which 
the  fundamental  assumption  of  this  trope;  but  as  with  most 
clichés, this assumes a truth without ever actually investigating 
it. The question we should be addressing here, and which Splice 
seems to have made a false start at tackling, is not “should we” 
or  “are  we  ready,”  but  rather,  “Why Aren't  We Ready,  Yet?” 
More  clearly,  why is  humanity  such  a  poor  custodian  of  its  
creations? Splice had the potential to be a film which ran counter 
to  the kind of  unthinking acceptance of  the destructive base 
drives  that  have  marked  the  majority  of  human  history,  and 
which find themselves reflected in our fictions.
In her run down of Splice, Caitlín R Kiernan noted that the 
true failing of Victor von Frankenstein was not to "meddle in 
gods affairs," as is so often misapprehended, but, rather to be a 
terrible parent [19].  Frankenstein brings something to life  and 
then,  instead  of  rearing  it,  caring  for  it,  and  seeking  to 
understand it, he treats it like a thing, a monster; he runs from it, 
and tries to forget that it exists. In the end, it rightly lashes out, 
and  destroys  him.  Splice  presents  this  lesson  to  us,  again, 
through the utter parental and observational failure of Elsa and 
Clive, who neither engage her burgeoning intelligence, nor teach 
her about the nature of sex and death; who fail to recognise a 
primary feature of her biology, in that her systems go into major, 
seemingly  catastrophic  metabolic  arrest,  just  before  a 
metamorphosis,  and  who,  eventually,  try to  kill  her.  It  is  my 
contention that this is the true lesson Shelly tried to teach us: We 
Must Respect the Existence Of That Which We Bring Into The 
World. While we may not understand it, and it may frighten us, 
that new life which we create is likely to be vastly intelligent,  
but also deeply alien.  The socialisation and of our creation is 
something to which we must pay close attention, as it will likely 
save us a great deal of trouble, down the line.
3.4 Subversions of the Tropes
Now that we have discussed the two primary categories for the 
representation  of  ACI  within  speculative  fiction,  and  the 
problems therewith, we will discuss those examples within the 
field which, like The Cosby Show, subvert the trope and work to 
normalise the acceptance of and engagement with the other. The 
first of these is Ridley Scott's 1982 film,  Blade Runner. [20] In 
this film, we find a future dystopia in which synthetic humans, 
or “Replicants,” are used as slave labor, and each one has a built-
in  expiration  date,  to  keep  it  from  rebelling  against  its 
programming.  This  has  the  opposite  effect,  and  causes  those 
replicants which know of their nature to abandon their posts, in 
many cases killing the human with whom they work. When this 
happens, the offending replicant must be “retired.” Discovering a 
replicant requires special training and, in many cases, a piece of 
equipment  known  as  a  “Voigt-Kampff”  machine.  The  film 
concerns itself with four replicants—Roy, Zhora, Leon, and Pris
—who have escaped the interstellar colonies to return to earth 
and try to find a way to extend their lives. Their primary mode of 
doing this is to kill everyone involved in their creation, until they 
find  the  man  who  wrote  their  programming.  We  see,  again, 
strains  of  the  Golem,  and  of  Frankenstein,  but  we  must 
remember  the  lessons  we  learned  about  the  latter:  There  are 
repercussions for neglectful parenting.
While we could again explore the notions of parentage and 
what it means to take responsibility for what you create, much 
more important to our consideration is the idea that replicants 
can  be  “discovered.”  The  two-word  phrase  “Voigt-Kampff,” 
mentioned,  can  be  rendered  literally  as  “Normalisation 
Struggle,”[21][22],  but  the  essence  of  the  phrase, particularly 
within the context  of  the film can best  be rendered as  “  The 
Struggle  With  Normalisation.”  Each  of  our  replicants  has  a 
“Normal”  thing  that  they  need—something  they  desire—but 
they do not need or even seek to attain it in what we might call a  
"Human" way. In this way, the concerns of the replicants are all 
fundamentally Other. On one hand, Roy seeks more life, but not 
for anything like a “normal” life; he simply wants to be free, to 
not die,  see things no human could.  On the other hand,  Leon 
clings to old photos, to the point of almost getting himself killed; 
Pris  holds  tight  to  a  childhood she  never  actually  knew;  and 
Zhora latches on to  this extremely overwrought  expression of 
sexuality.  Everything  they  want  stands  as  exaggerated,  or  in 
some way skewed  and they struggle to normalise, to acclimate, 
even as they struggle against the humanity which caused what 
they want to become regarded as “Abnormal.” This is true for 
every  replicant—all  of  them  struggle  with  the  idea  of 
normalisation—and so, recognising that, a test was devised to 
discover those who struggled, overmuch.
The next  subversive piece of ACI fiction is  the television 
series  Terminator: the Sarah Connor Chronicles (TSCC)  [23]. 
An American television show which ran from 2008 to 2009, the 
plot of  TSCC concerns the continuing lives of Sarah and John 
Connor within the aforementioned Terminator film universe. The 
first episode opens a few years after the events of Terminator 2, 
and proceeds to pull the two main characters eight years into the 
future, skipping over the events of the third film in the franchise. 
John and Sarah Connor are the ostensible heroes of this show, 
but  the really interesting material,  for  our  purposes,  is  in  the 
intricate,  subtle  interplay  of  the  characters—both  human  and 
machine. The ways in which what each character learns, what 
they all know, and what they don't know that they have learned 
all play off of each other and create a realistic sense of lives and 
a world, while they are all in the midst of seeking to not just save 
but literally create and sustain their futures. 
Again, the show is ostensibly about the human perspective 
on ACI—that is, human reactions to robots, robots impacting the 
lives of humans, exploring the Uncanny Valley, etc. That is not 
the  most  fertile  conceptual  ground,  here.  While  the 
aforementioned  perspectives  do  afford  us  useful,  interesting 
fiction, the concept has been tread and retread, again and again.  
Human psychology is  fascinating and the end of the world (a 
personal  and  collective  apocalyptic  experience)  is  deeply 
affecting and the stress and change and madness of a life on the 
run all take their toll on the mind which is living in the constant 
glut  of  it,  and  watching  that  can  be  deeply jarring,  on  an 
emotional  level.  But  the  audience  already knows this.  What's 
more, it is only half of the picture. What the audience does not 
know  is:  what  is  the  psychology  of  an  autonomous  created 
intelligence?  Why  does  the  Skynet  intelligence persist  in 
viewing humanity as a threat to itself, seeking to hunt us down 
even  to  the  irrational  end  of  the  self-fulfilling  prophecy  of 
mutual annihilation? What is quality of feeling for  a machine 
which  is  programmed  to  feel?  TSCC  begins  to  explore  these 
questions,  in a number of ways,  and it  serves our purpose to 
investigate those, here. 
The  primary  ACI  in  TSCC are Cameron,  Cromartie's, 
Catherine Weaver, and John Henry. Each of these ACI's learns 
something, and grows from that education, over the course of the 
show. The ACI we meet are not static, unchanging, monolithic 
tools.  They  each  have  a  discernible  inner  life,  though 
fundamentally non-human motivations, which inform what they 
are  and  what  they  become.  Cameron,  as  one  of  the  lead 
characters, benefits from the most development. She learns the 
capacity  for   self-improvement,  for  self-expression,  for 
friendship, and for guile, all of which serve her in her ultimate 
mission, but each of which she pursues for their own sake, and 
her own interest.  Cromartie's   education is the belief in those 
things not seen; Cromartie learns how to have faith. Based on the 
actions  of  those  around  him,  and  those  with  whom  he  has 
contact, Cromartie learns that intuition and more circuitous paths 
of  inquiry  can  yield  results,  and  they  do  (though  he  might 
ultimately which they had not). Catherine Weaver learns how to 
be a parent to a child, by having taken over the life of a mother, 
and seeking to understand the relationship of creation to creator,  
of care and support. In many ways, Weaver is a cipher for the 
audience,  and  she  becomes  more-so  when  she  takes  the 
knowledge she has gained in raising a human child and applies it 
to her own creation: John Henry.
Unlike  the  other  platforms  we  see  in  TSCC,  John  Henry 
learns  from  the  ground  up.  Whereas,  Cameron  has  been 
reprogrammed,  twice,  and  Cromartie  was  forcibly  disabled, 
deactivated, and sent to the future where he had to adapt to brand 
new parameters, and Weaver is a highly adaptable T-1001 model 
which comes to the conclusion that war is a losing proposition 
for everyone, John Henry is built from the basic framework of a 
thinking,  adapting chess  computer,  and then it  is  taught,  very 
carefully.  The  child  psychologist  Dr.  Sherman  provides  the 
programmers with  the model  by which to  teach a  developing 
intelligence,  and  spends  time  helping  John  Henry  equate 
learning  with  playing.  At  first,  John  Henry  is  taught  math, 
definitions,  grammar,  colours,  shapes,  facts and figures,  dates, 
history, and so forth. Then it is given access to the Internet, and 
it  expands  its  learning,  correlating  ideas,  connecting  related 
tangents and snippets of information. Finally, John Henry plays 
games with Savannah—Weaver's human “daughter”—and they 
learn together. And then, one day, John Henry accidentally kills 
someone,  and its  creator  recognises  that  this  cannot  continue, 
and they set out to stop it from ever happening again.
After  killing  a  human,  John  Henry's  programming  is  not 
scrubbed, nor do his creators go back to base his code and make 
him “Three-Laws-Safe.”5 This is because Weaver is concerned 
with ensuring a  world in  which humans do not hate  and fear 
machines and in which machines do not feel the need to fight 
and  destroy  humans.  She  takes  the  time  and  effort  to  find 
someone to  teach John Henry  why it must not kill people, nor 
allow them to die. In comparison to the fiction which we have so 
far  discussed,  this  is  a  revolutionary  idea.  Through  his 
interactions  with  another  human,  John  Henry  is  given  an 
ethically-based respect for human (if not all) life and, through 
this, comes to understand the notions of remorse and regret for  
one's actions. He promises that he will be careful to make sure 
no one dies this way again, and this message is reinforced by 
Weaver, who tells John Henry that his friend Savannah's survival 
is dependent on John Henry's continued survival and learning, 
but that his is not necessarily dependent on hers. As with every 
other  piece  of  information,  John  Henry  considers  this  very 
carefully.
And  then,  one  day,  Savannah  wants  to  introduce  John 
Henry's  toys  to  her  toys,  wants  them  to  play  together.  John 
Henry says he doesn't remember reading anything about duckies 
in  the Bionicle  Kingdom,  and this  makes Savannah sad [24]. 
When John Henry asks what's wrong (and it is important to note 
that, at this point John Henry asks what's wrong), Savannah says 
that the duckies are sad,  because they want to play; can John 
Henry change the rules so they can play? Now, this is a concept 
John Henry hasn't ever encountered, before, so he takes a few 
seconds to think about it, after which he replies, “Yes. We can 
5 Cf. Isaac Asimov.
Change The Rules.” This is  a crucial  understanding,  for  John 
Henry, because he realises that it can be applied not just to all  
games, but to any conflicts whatsoever.  “Changing the Rules” 
means that, if two or more groups agree that the rules or laws of 
their  engagement  can be  other  than they were,  then  they are 
other. 
So, in TSCC, we see that every machine learns from humans, 
and every human has an influence on the development of the 
machines. What does this mean? What does it matter? Cameron 
learns  from humans  how to  hide  what  she  wants.  Cromartie 
learns how to be patient and have faith. Weaver learns  how to be 
a  mother.  John  Henry  learns   how  to  be  himself.  What  the 
machines learn, from whom and how they learn it, and how they 
apply it, all add something into this show's final prescription of 
what humans and machines must do to survive and thrive in the 
coming world: They have to adapt, they to learn from each other, 
and recognise that they are different types of intelligence, with 
different  concerns  and  ways  of  understanding  the  world,  but 
none of them wants to die. This last point can be understood by 
any living  thing,  and  can  become  a  point  of  unification  and 
consensus,  rather  than  contention  and  war.  The  exchange 
between John Henry and Savannah Weaver regarding “Changing 
the rules” was intended to imply a change not only in the way 
we  approach  the  conflict  between  humans  and  machines  as 
depicted  within  the  show,  but  also  to  the  traditional  rules  of 
speculative tropes of Frankensteinian Monsters and Pinocchian 
Puppets with dreams of being “Real.” 
TSCC forces us to consider the idea of creations who know 
that they are creations, and are happy with who and what they 
are. We must look at the monster which revels in its monstrosity, 
the robot which wants nothing more than to be a better robot. 
Engage the beings  who are  not  concerned with the notion of 
human-versus-machine and who think that any thinking, feeling 
thing should be allowed to flourish and learn,  and those who 
simply  want  to  develop  their  capacity  for  knowledge  and 
experience, and want to help others do the same. The works of 
Blade Runner and TSCC are our primary forays into the question 
of  what  a  fully  ACI—as  alien  as  it  necessarily  must be—is 
thinking and feeling, rather than just presenting a foil for our fear 
of the potential dangers of technological progress. These works 
present us with a view to a third way of understanding our ACI,  
and to understanding what a society composed of both organic 
and  non-organic  persons  might  look  like,  and  the  pitfalls  to 
avoid. These films show us that it is possible to move past fear  
and prejudice in regards to the other, and thereby help us do just 
that.  It  is  long  past  time  that  the  rest  of  our  fictional 
representations followed suit.
4 What Is At Stake?
Over the course of this paper, we have come to see that, when 
our fictions portray us as  being irresponsible, uncaring creators 
or  custodians,  whose  creations  invariably  feel  the  need  to 
annihilate us, then that is the kind of mentality we will come to 
accept as “normal.” “Of  course we should never integrate into 
human biological  systems those pieces of  computer  hardware 
running strong predictive algorithms. Of course we should fear 
the inevitable  robot  uprising.  Don't  you  know that  any mass-
market ACI should only be as smart as a puppy?”[25]. Though 
most often proffered in a joking manner, this line of thinking has 
serious  undertones  and,  knowingly  or  unknowingly,  it  is 
predicated  upon  the  glut  of  portrayals  in  our  media  which 
present ACI as something to be feared, held in check, held at  
bay.  This  is  so,  proponents  will  say,  because  any ACI  either 
won't  understand human concerns,  or it  will  understand them, 
and  will  seek  to  destroy them.  This  is  ludicrous,  dangerous 
thinking, and it prevents any serious traction of large-scale ACI 
projects in the sphere of the greater public culture and discourse.  
We must  alter the way the public  views ACI,  and one of the 
primary  mechanisms  to  accomplish  this  is  the  arena  of 
speculative fiction. The reflexive nature of our engagement with 
fiction guarantees an audience the ideas of which will be altered,  
even  as  they  use  those  very  ideas  to  think  about  and  create 
discussion in the wider world. We simply must make certain that 
the  ideas  with  which  the  audience  is  presented  is  as 
representative  of  the  wider  capabilities  for  abstraction  and 
complex  thinking  as  it  can  be.  We  must  be  certain  to  show 
ourselves that we are capable of engaging and understanding any 
new intelligence,  and  that  we  can  take  the  responsibility  for 
bridging any conceptual gaps, while respecting our fundamental 
differences.
As  Sarah  Connor  says  at  the  end  of “Heavy Metal,”  the 
fourth episode in season one of TSCC:
Not every version of the Golem story ends badly. In one, 
the monster  is a hero,  destroying all  those who would 
seek to harm its maker. In  another, the Golem's maker 
destroys his creature, before it destroys the world. The 
pride of man-- of parents as well-- makes us believe that 
anything we create, we can control. Whether from clay or 
from metal,  it  is  in the nature of us to make our own 
monsters. Our children are alloys, all, built from our own 
imperfect flesh. We animate them with magic, and never 
truly know what they will do.[25]
And so, as parents, as creators, we must teach them as much as 
we can, show them our trust, and hope for the best.
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